THEATRICALITY AND SURVEILLANCE:
THE ART OF GOVERNMENT
IN EARLY MODERN ENGLISH LITERATURE

By

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Dedicated to Pu-Nahm,
with love

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PREFACE

This dissertation is composed of seven chapters. In the Introduction, I lay out

the theoretical grounds for a project that deals with five early modern English

writers: Sir Thomas More, John Skelton, John Bale, Christopher Marlowe, and

William Shakespeare. Mainly benefiting from the theoretical works of two

twentieth-century philosophers, Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, I put forth the

central themes of the dissertation: "subjectification," "governmentality,"

"performativity," "surveillance," and "theatricality." Early modern writers such as

Machiavelli, Erasmus, Castiglione, and Puttenham are invoked to show the

legitimacy and immediacy of the above terms in understanding the period.

In Chapter 2, I examine two books, *Utopia* (1515) and *The History of*

Richard III (1515), by Sir Thomas More (1478-1535), along with William Roper's

biography, *The Life of Sir Thomas More* (1555-57). I start with a brief discussion of

episodes that show More's lifelong fascination with theatricality, which often

subverted his strong religious conviction. I then explain More's ambivalent attitude

towards Richard's dissimulation and political maneuvering as part of the fissure

inherent in his humanist ideal of education and government. I focus on how *Utopia*

at once idealizes and questions the practices of government in connection with the

relation of the public and the private.

The third chapter deals with John Skelton (ca. 1460-1529), the Poet Laureate of Henry VIII, by discussing *Magnifycence* (1520). While drawing on the medieval morality tradition, Skelton's only extant play reveals a new understanding of "governmentality" and subjectivity insofar as moderation and prudence, for example, are not religious virtues but qualities of "government."

Chapter 4 takes up John Bale (1495-1563), the staunch and militant Protestant who loved to use theatrical forms to promote his religious conviction. Bale's best-known play, *King Johan* (ca. 1538), is the focus as I examine his role in the Henrician Reformation and its propaganda machine. Bale's hybrid play--combining the genres of morality and chronicle--sheds light on the transitional aspects of the Henrician period and its ambivalent responses to the variety of changes brought about by the Reformation.

In Chapter 5, I will discuss Christopher Marlowe's *Edward II* (1592-3) in terms of homoeroticism and governmentality. Edward's sodomitic relation with his minions will be seen in relation to royal favoritism and friendship in court politics. I also examine the notorious torture and regicide of Edward in the context of the idea of government. Marlowe's play is predicated the art of government that at once constructs and deconstructs the contrary relationships of patronage and homoeroticism, the sexual and the political, and the private and the public.

The sixth chapter will be dedicated to Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* (1604), one of the so-called problem plays. In continuity with the previous chapters, I will attempt to comprehend the ways that surveillance and theatricality are deployed and rehearsed in the name of government. They are used to intervene in people's

lives, rearticulate societal relationships, and distribute power relations through punishment and pardon. The disguise of the Duke Vincentio will be discussed in the context of pastoral power and gender politics in the early modern period.

In the Epilogue, I look at Sir Francis Bacon and his utopian fiction, *New Atlantis*, as a way of reviewing the transformations in the idea of government during the hundred years since Thomas More's *Utopia*.

Note on citation: In citing early modern texts, I have tried to use modernized spellings. But when quoting from recent editions that retain the original printed orthography, I have followed their spellings, except that long *s* has been revised to *s*.

Style: This dissertation follows the style of *MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers*, fourth edition (1995).

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CHAPTER 1
SUBJECTIVITY, SURVEILLANCE, THEATRICALITY, AND THE ART OF
GOVERNMENT IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

This dissertation purports to account for the process of subjectification in

early modern England in which the art of government was rehearsed, reproduced,

and circulated in the form of the literary and theatrical representation of surveillance

and theatricality.[1] Viewed as a process of initiating and re-articulating the subject

into an individual, early modern subjectification involves an idea of government that,

in turn, feeds on the culture of surveillance and theatricality.[2] In invoking the

Renaissance art of government, I think less of "*government* as an institution or as an

event, than of *governance* as a process, a series of multilateral initiatives to be

negotiated across space and through the social order" (Hindle 23). Therefore, I

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[1] The term "subjectification" here is used in the same way as it is in Montrose: "Thus my
invocation of the term *subject* is meant to suggest an equivocal process of *subjectification*: on
the one hand, it shapes individuals as loci of consciousness and initiators of action,
endowing them with subjectivity and with the capacity for agency; and, on the other hand, it
positions, motivates, and constrains them within—it subjects them to—social networks and
cultural codes, forces of necessity and contingency, that ultimately exceed their
comprehension or control" ("New Historicism" 414-415). In an interview about Foucault,
Gilles Deleuze defines "a process of subjectification" as "the production of a way of existing"
(*Negotiations* 98). Judith Butler's definition of "subjection" is also close to my usage:
"'Subjection' signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process
of becoming a subject" (*The Psychic Life of Power* 2).

[2] For a discussion on the relation between the individual and the subject in early modern
period, see Peter Stallybrass "Shakespeare, the Individual, and the Text."

present the art of government as ranging from the question of the art of self-government to the art of properly governing a family to the art of governing the state.

In an attempt to come to grips with the process of subjectification in early modern England, I want to introduce Michel Foucault's idea of "governmentality" or "governmental rationality" with which I will locate the collision and collusion of theatricality and surveillance. Under the rubric of governmentality, Foucault tries to investigate "the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other" ("Ethic of Care" 19). Foucault's governmentality implies not only the government of the state but also the government of oneself:

> How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor—all these problems, in their multiplicity and intensity, seem to me to be characteristic of the sixteenth century, which lies, to put it schematically, at the crossroads of two processes: the one which, shattering the structures of feudalism, leads to the establishment of the great territorial, administrative and colonial states; and that totally different movement which, with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, raises the issue of how one must be spiritually ruled and led on this earth in order to achieve eternal salvation. ("Governmentality" 87-88)

Defining "government" as a form of activity aiming to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of some person or persons, Foucault develops the term, governmentality, as "a kind of rationality which was intrinsic to the art of government" (89).[3] Foucault's governmentality, I would argue, allows us to locate in early modern political culture

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[3] In one of his final interviews, Foucault suggests that "governmentality implies the relationship of self to self" ("The Ethic of Care" 19). In another place, Foucault mentions "governing oneself, managing one's estate, and participating in the administration of the city were three practices of the same type" (*Sexuality* Vol. 2 76). Colin Gordon argues that "the governmental theme has a focal place in Foucault's later philosophy" ("Governmental Rationality" 2).

"the sense of a profound connectedness between the principles of political action and those of personal conduct" (Gordon 12). From the vantage point of Foucauldian governmentality, therefore, I propose that in early modern England, surveillance and theatricality together formed a "modality" for the exercise of "government" and thus essential parts of its discursive and non-discursive techniques. In the ensuing chapters, I will investigate the ways in which surveillance and theatricality were deployed and rehearsed to the degree of intervening in people's lives, re-articulating societal relationships, and negotiating power relations in the form of punishment and pardon.

As the most infamous Renaissance treatise on the government of the state, Machiavelli's *The Prince* is considered by Foucault as a defining moment in the sixteenth century literature of governmental rationality.[4] Machiavelli's treatise, according to Foucault, is through and through about the art of (political) government—the art of manipulating relations of force to retain and strengthen the principality. Machiavelli elaborates the need to sever princely power from its medieval and theological grounds--that is, the feudal theory of the "king's two bodies"--by rejecting the medieval idea of princehood based on moral injunctions. In doing so, Machiavelli puts forward a rationale for "the administrative state, born in the territoriality of national boundaries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to a society of regulation and discipline" ("Governmentality" 104). Aspiring to "the science of ruling the state," the Machiavellian art of government

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[4] As A. B. Ferguson points out, "To Machiavelli, the government is not personal any more; instead, it becomes institutional" (33).

intends to provide a permanent institutional form for the new political configuration by laying out the ways of controlling the forces and groups that were considered to menace the prince's claim to absolute power. In addition to the stripping of the divine aura from the political actuality of the prince, the Machiavellian theory of "reason-of-state" is anchored on the technique of dissimulation as an integral part of the art of government: the prince "must know how to colour one's actions and to be a great liar and deceiver" (*The Prince* 100). Machiavelli unequivocally endorses as quintessential to governmental rationality "deception" and "dissimulation," which are closely knitted with surveillance. When Machiavelli advises the ruler to "make a nice use of the beast and the man," for example, he deliberately replaces the traditional conceptualization of the good king and the evil king with the efficiency and effectiveness of the government.

The emphasis Machiavelli puts on "deception" in terms of techniques of government is not far from "*sprezzatura*" (nonchalance or indifference) that Castiglione proposes in *The Courtier* which, unlike Machiavelli's book, enjoyed favorable receptions by sixteenth century European elites. Castiglione's book, which was translated into English in 1561 by Sir Thomas Hoby, expounds upon the art of government—how to "govern[th] him selfe with that good judgment that will not suffer him to enter into any folly" (42). In order to acquire "*grazia*" (grace) that would appear on the body as a sign of inner virtue, Castiglione's courtier is asked to employ "*sprezzatura*" in order to seem to do things effortlessly: In other words, the courtier must learn "the art of artifice" or "a verie arte, that appeareth not to be arte" (*The Courtier* 46). As the main goal of courtliness, Daniel Javitch explicates,

Castiglione's grace "requires the artful achievement of being without art" (55). Castiglione's Renaissance courtier, thus, is able to demonstrate his own value in the guise of well-contrived false modesty and self-deprecation (the concealment of art), which in turn involves the art of concealment—for example, with "graceful and nonchalant spontaneity." The art of concealment, as will be discussed in what follows, is instantiated in the scenes of surveillance that often become a contestatory ground and an evidentiary requirement of government.

Frank Whigham's explication of Renaissance courtesy literature sheds further light on my conceptualization of the art of government that is on a continuum with surveillance and theatricality in everyday life.[5] Whigham proposes that Elizabethan courtesy literature must be interpreted as "a repertoire of actions invoked by, and meant to order, the surge of social mobility that occurred at the boundaries between ruling and subject classes in late sixteenth-century England" (xi). According to Whigham, the Renaissance conduct literature, contrary to its ostensible purpose of promoting "an exclusive sense of aristocratic identity," played a crucial role in formulating and circulating the idea that anybody can become a courtier by internalizing those codes (5). The rhetorical operation of the ruling elites in conduct literature to delineate exclusive domains for aristocrats actually reveals their vulnerability and the social fissure among different classes.[6] Because of its

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[5] It is unfortunate that, despite its insight and perspicacity, Whigham's book expresses little interest in the matter of the similar phenomenon (such as deception/deceit) in ordinary people's life.

[6] For example, Whigham says: "First promulgated by the elite in a gesture of exclusion, the [courtesy] theory was then read, rewritten, and reemployed by mobile base readers to serve their own social aggressions" (5-6). In a different context, Jonathan Goldberg claims that Elyot's *The Governor* is "a book which attempts to write the formation of a newly educated

investment in the transformative power of performance, the mobilization of dissimulation and simulation as pedagogical rules in the courtesy literature could produce a displacement within and of the normative roles that, at the same time, are the conditions of early modern subjectivity. Administered through educational systems and (con-)tested in communal transactions, the Renaissance literature of courtesy elaborates subjectivity through codifying normalized behaviors and emotions that are part of what Norbert Elias has called "the civilizing process." The novelty that Norbert Elias discovers in the early modern courtesy books, as Harry Berger describes, is the shift of emphasis "from the context of grazia to that of sprezzatura, which…is a shift from pedagogy to surveillance, the admonitory project of forestalling bad manners to the voyeuristic project of seeking them out" (*Grace* 59).

In this context, Whigham underscores the importance of "disguise" or theatricality—under the rubric of "*sprezzatura*"—as one of the main modes by which Elizabethan gentlemen communicated "symbolic messages about status" (xi). As Lloyd Davis argues, "disguise is a central topos in this emergent rhetoric of self-reflection, evaluation, and intentionality" (9). Stephen Greenblatt also observes that "dissimulation and feigning are an important part of the instruction by almost every court manual" (*Self-Fashioning* 163). Insofar as dissimulation is crucial to the art of government, simulation is an indispensable means of getting access to that art in which simulation/imitation is stipulated for the pedagogical purpose of promoting the possibility of changing. Dissimulation and simulation are employed in the

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ruling class and which, at the same time, also serves as a mirror for the monarch written by one of his disaffected servants" (*Writing Matter* 43); and Ascham's *The Schoolmaster* is an attempt to "negotiate the position of a pedagogic class within the reformed courtly/gentle society which the pedagogue claimed to form" (44).

literature of government to the end of rendering and naturalizing performative

identity as both the norm and the origin of the subject. The sixteenth century

literature of manners seems to have appropriated the idea of dissimulation and

simulation as a central means by which to come to terms with the art of

government.[7] Renaissance courtesy literature reveals the tension and friction

between the performative sense of identity and the pedagogical process of fossilizing

and essentializing the performativity.[8] The cultural anxiety over social mobility in

the Renaissance courtesy literature helps us understand the early modern power

relationship that engaged itself in the process of subjectification within the

framework of the art of government.

Therefore, it does not come as a surprise to hear George Puttenham advise in

his exposition of "*allegoria*" that the "courtly Poet," like "every common Courtier"

and "the gravest Counselour," should learn how to "dissemble not only his

countenances & conceits, but also all his ordinary actions of behaviour, or the most

part of them, whereby the better to winne his purposed & good advantages" (186;

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[7] For examples of the literature of government among many others, see Desiderius Erasmus's *The Civilitie of Childehode*, trans. by Thomas Paynell (London, 1560); and Sir Thomas Elyot's *The Book Named The Governor*, (1531), ed. by S. E. Lehmberg (London & NY: Dent & Sons LTD, 1962); Roger Ascham's *The Schoolmaster* (1570), ed. by Lawrence V. Ryan, (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1967); Thomas Blundeville's *Of Councils and Counselors* (1570), ed. by Karl-Ludwig Selig (Gainesville: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1963); Henry Peacham's *Compleate Gentleman* (1622). For Peacham's book, I consulted a reprint of 1634 edition, *Peacham's Compleat Gentleman* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1906).

[8] I here draw on Homi Bhabha's juxtaposition of "the pedagogical" and "the performative" (145). See also Judith Butler: in reference to gender formation in modern society, she argues "performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms" (*Bodies That Matter* 95).

300).[9] The courtier and the courtier-poet are advised to learn the ways to construct their own public image and thereby to manipulate viewers' perceptions. Greenblatt presents succinctly:

> Theatricality, in the sense of both disguise and histrionic self-presentation, arose from conditions common to almost all Renaissance courts: a group of men and women alienated from the customary roles and revolving easily around a center of power, a constant struggle for recognition and attention, and a virtually fetishistic emphasis upon manner. (*Self-Fashioning* 162)

In essence, such dissembling is supposed to protect one from the gaze of surveillance of others. Thus, the art of concealment necessitates that the courtier be able to pierce beneath the appearance of others into their interiority. In the courtly theater where every movement is being watched by each other, every courtier must "learn, in addition to a symbolic vocabulary of word and gesture, how to read his own gestures as others read them" (Lanham 152). In the context of the art of government, dissimulation and surveillance become the opposite sides of the same coin. Dissimulation seeks to control the image perceived by others, whereas surveillance seeks to gain access to the hidden truths of others.[10] Inasmuch as surveillance serves as the means of access to the truth of others, the scene of surveillance becomes the condition for the subject to articulate as well as to internalize moral and cultural codes. Taken together, dissimulation and surveillance are deployed as an apparatus

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[9] Daniel Javitch argues: "As the courtier's grace derives from his various modes of deception so the grace of poetry depends on the poet's ability to conceal aspects of his subjects and delay, by indirection, the recognition of his meanings" ("Puttenham" 873-74).

[10] Dissimulation is not just for the rulers and politicians but for the subversive dissidents who needed to employ it for self-protection from the oppressive power of state—for instance, early modern recusants who were forced to attend Anglican churches. For those religious and intellectual dissidents victimized by the intolerance of the majority, dissimulation becomes a way to maintain the integrity of their beliefs and truths.

to ensure the process of subjectification—to borrow an Althusserian term, the cumulative, continuous *interpellation* of the subject.

Throughout this project, I employ the term "surveillance" to represent not only the form of espionage practiced by the ruling elites such as the spy network of Sir Francis Walsingham, but also the more comprehensive forms of supervision and observation embedded in daily life that can be discovered, for example, in the communal and parental supervision over women and children.[11] Conceptualizing surveillance as a technique of power exercised on the scale of a whole society, I differentiate and then conflate the two configurations of surveillance by classifying the former as a "manifest" form, the latter as a "latent" form.[12] I intend to show the ways in which the two forms of surveillance impinge upon, and thus complement, each other within the relations of power. With this differentiation and conflation, I want to establish surveillance as a cultural apparatus taking the form less of a political ruse by monarchs and working from the top downwards than of the supervisory relationships inscribed massively and latently in everyday life of ordinary people as well as in courtly life. By positing the culture of surveillance as "the concrete changing soil in which the sovereign's power is grounded, the conditions

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[11] For example, Curtis Breight focuses on surveillance as espionage and intelligence in the context of *realpolitik* in his *Surveillance, Militarism and Drama in the Elizabethan Era* (NY: St. Martin P, 1996); by contrast, John Michael Archer conceives it in a broader sense of culture, but still puts it only in the context of court: see, for example, Archer's statement that "sovereignty and intelligence were united in a culture of surveillance that was chiefly defined by life at court" (3).

[12] My invocation of the Freudian trope—"latent" and "manifest"—is at once strategic and metaphoric. With the differentiation, I want to show the dialectic relationship between the two forms of surveillance. For Freud's succinct discussion of "latent" and "manifest" content in dreams, see his *On Dreams*, trans. James Strachey (NY & London: Norton, 1952), especially Chapter 2.

which make it possible for it to function" (Foucault *Power/Knowledge* 187), this project attempts to comprehend the dynamics of surveillance and its bearings upon early modern English culture and politics. This study of surveillance in the Renaissance, I hope, directs us to realize "how things work at the level of on-going subjection, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted process which subjects our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours" (Foucault *Power/Knowledge* 97).

In early modern England, espionage and surveillance were part of invisible disciplinary strategies, no less than were public torture and punishment which, as Foucault expounds in *Discipline and Punish*, served as visible emblems of the sovereign's absolute power over the criminal's body.[13] Elizabethan England witnessed a rapid development of spy networks that were far more sophisticated and institutional than the traditional form of reconnaissance as a diplomatic-military technique in previous centuries. As many scholars have noted, espionage and intelligence in Elizabethan England had a special political importance because of the instability of the queen's government which lacked a standing army and police force. For example, Katherine Maus suggests, "To oppose this perceived threat [by papists and sectarians], the Elizabethan regime in the later decades of the sixteenth century devised an unprecedented domestic espionage system under the auspices of Sir Francis Walsingham, which infiltrated heterodox and possibly subversive religious groups" (23). Patricia Parker also reports that the Elizabethan age witnessed "the

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[13] For example, Foucault says, "the body of the condemned man became the king's property, on which the sovereign left his mark and brought down the effects of his power" (*Discipline and Punish* 109). But we need to remember that, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault is

'floating population' of informers and spies in the years before more full-scale development of the police and policing apparatus of the state" (*Margins* 109).[14] It would be safe to say, therefore, that such an intelligence network as Walsingham's was integral to the political security of a sovereign amid social unrest and political turmoil. Walsingham's spy network was still far from institutional surveillance as modern spy agencies may do.[15] Both the governments of Elizabeth I and James I relied on "police and policing" through surveillance, which became a critical condition of keeping their power in the presence of a hostile, sometimes vicious and rebellious, nobility or populace. As Derek Hirst points out in his study of the Stuart period, "since policing was so scanty, informal controls were the key to the maintenance of order" (49).[16]

Within the culture of surveillance, as John Michael Archer elaborates, the early modern English monarchs tried to mobilize and conjoin the domains of

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concerned more or less with the political form of surveillance in producing docility among the criminals, and thus modern subjects.

[14] Among the recent publications regarding early modern spies, for instance, see Alan Haynes's *Invisible Power: The Elizabethan Secret Services, 1570-1603* (NY: St. Martin, 1992); Alison Plowden's *The Elizabethan Secret Service* (NY: St. Martin, 1991); and John Bossy's *Giordano Bruno and the Embassy Affair* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1991). Charles Nocholl's *The Reckoning* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1992) is very interesting in its attempt to explain the murder of Chirsotpher Marlowe in relation to his alleged spying activities.

[15] John Michael Archer recognizes, "Elizabethan espionage, however, was far from the centralized ideal of the modern-nation state. There was no professional secret service, no systematic apparatus of surveillance at home or abroad. The field of intelligence was instead a particularly obscure sector of the greater field of patronage" (4-5).

[16] Norbert Elias makes a similar statement regarding Louis XIV's reign: "the observation and supervision of people is indispensable in defending his rule" (*Court Society* 129). See also *Treason in Tudor England: Politics and Paranoia* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986) by Lacey B. Smith, which is a very provocative study on political struggles in early modern England in the light of socio-pathology.

knowledge and power through the mutually productive relationship between sovereignty and intelligence (2-3). Archer draws our attention to the fact that, during the English Renaissance, intelligence assumes a critical position in the exercise of monarchical power:

> Intelligence in the sense of the sovereign's ideal knowledge became in practice intelligence as spying, a relation governed as much by opacity as by understanding. That is why . . . "intelligence" denotes primarily spying and statecraft, although it also carries the deceptive promise of ideal political understanding. (3)

Intelligence and espionage, therefore, can be said to be employed as a concerted action of sovereignty through practices and discourses directed towards the control of other social agents and institutions.

Exercised from above through the spy networks, Elizabethan espionage can be said to work with and within the structure of the *de facto* exercise of sovereign power through the juridico-political might—i.e., laws, decrees, and regulations. As a manifest form of surveillance, espionage was mobilized as a tactic of "government" by the monarchical administration whose duty was to impose order on a territory and its subjects. In contrast to the symbolic strategies of display that have often been the focus of New Historicists, espionage works as a concrete, yet surreptitious, mechanism of power to keep the monarch informed and, therefore, in control of otherwise uncertain situations. In this context, the power of surveillance in early modern England was derived from, and prefigured within, the power of recognition and punishment. On these grounds, I disagree with some leading scholars—e.g., Stephen Orgel, Leonard Tennenhouse, and Christopher Pye—who put nearly exclusive emphasis on the iconographic and emblematic strategies of display

employed by sovereign power during the Renaissance.[17] While emphasizing the

power of display by the monarchs in early modern England, for example,

Tennenhouse argues that "the Renaissance state had little in the way of domestic

police or even a standing army, let alone something as sophisticated as a secret police.

Its totalitarian [sic] government depended largely on the subject's willingness to

submit to the monarch" (*Display* 51-2). But I suggest that if sovereign power was

crystallized around its theatrical display, surveillance was the crucial condition for

articulating and effectuating the power of display that served to produce compliance

and obedience to the sovereignty. Thus I would argue that Regiocentric critics fall

prey to what Frances Yates has called the "imaginative re-feudalization of culture"

(108) and, as a consequence, lose sight of the broader culture of surveillance lurking

behind the feudalistic deployment of sovereign power.[18] I do not question the fact

that the power of display and the display of power were widely adopted and

exploited by English Renaissance monarchs. But my point is that the sovereign

exploitation of theatricality by display was supplemented, complemented, and thus

completed by the invisible machines of surveillance and espionage. As a political

mechanism for keeping subjects under control, the institution of espionage itself

functioned in an ideological sense to mystify the sovereign power as the surrogate of

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[17] For a persuasive critique on this position, see Curtis Breight "Introduction: Regnum Cecilianum" 1-42. Breight, for example, suggests, the Tudor "state mastered a system of foreign and domestic espionage, creating a culture of informers that induced widespread paranoia" (4).

[18] Yates uses this phrase to explain the widespread penchant for the ceremonial and mystical chivalry in court spectacle and pageantry among Renaissance European monarchs. See her book, especially chapter 2, "Elizabethan Chivalry: The Romance of the Accession Day Tilts," 88-111.

an omniscient god. The refeudalized power of theatricality--display and ceremony--
in early modern England, therefore, could have been realized, or at least imagined,
only within a culture of surveillance.

In contrast to espionage that operates on the assumption of domination and
servitude, the supervisory form of surveillance appears rather as a disciplinary and
productive relationship of power. The latter form of surveillance is embodied, for
example, through the incessant gaze and judgment that form the condition for the
internalization of morality and rules. As Albert Tricomi envisions:

> To think seriously about surveillance as a cultural phenomenon rather
> than a legally sanctioned policing system is to realize that it was
> virtually ubiquitous. It underlay ceremonial occasions, as when
> marriage banns were proclaimed with the request to know if anyone
> possessed knowledge that might impede the joining of the engaged
> people in holy matrimony. It appeared in communal supervision of
> heterodox spousal behavior, as in the practice of skimmington and in
> the observations (and sometimes voyeurism) of husbandmen,
> householders, farmers, shepherds, constables, and other community
> members who discovered illicit sexual behavior. More mundanely,
> such oversight operated in the parental supervision of children,
> husbands' supervision of wives, and householders' supervision of
> servants, not to mention guild masters' superintendency of apprentices
> and pastors' stewardship of parishioners. (49-50)

As is implied in the above quotation from Tricomi, the cultural phenomenon of
surveillance culminates in both the voluntary communal observation and the
internalized conscience of individuals. In coordinating and regulating the individual
behaviors and conducts, early modern surveillance was deeply engaged in the
cultural efforts and desires to impose behavioral, gestural, and sartorial regulations
with which to produce the habitually law-abiding subject.[19] And Renaissance

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[19] When I differentiate the two forms of surveillance, I do not question that there is a general
asymmetry of power between master and servant, husband and wife, and parents and

conduct literature, as discussed above, played an important, pedagogical role in producing and circulating "norms of what the body is supposed to be, to look, and to feel like for the early modern subject" (Scholz 25). The cultural injunction for the subject to perform his subjectivity operates through what Bryan Reynolds calls "an assembly of sociopolitical 'conductors'" that includes "the educational, juridical, and religious structures, as well as the institutions of marriage and family" (145). In this context, I would suggest that the exploration of surveillance as an apparatus of power entails more than investigating the political scenes of the age.

If the most complete mode of surveillance is found on the level of conscience, as its consummate internalization whereby the individual polices his or her own behavior, we can argue that surveillance becomes the central momentum in the process of early modern *subjectification*. Understanding this process involves investigating the culturally and psychologically inscribed web of courtly and domestic supervisory relationships that, as much as the courtly practices of competitive observation, comprises "the play of surveillance as an internally produced pattern of culture" (Tricomi 52).[20] I think Tricomi is accurate in saying:

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children. My point is that these relationships are not a plain replica of the courtly form of surveillance, as Archer seems to suggest in his book.

[20] In this sense, my treatment of surveillance is similar to Tricomi's: "I treat surveillance both in the restrictive sense of the observation of or spying upon suspected persons and, more broadly, as the social oversight of individual behavior, especially sexual behavior" (18). As I will show later, however, Tricomi loses sight of the fact that the process of subjectification is also involved with the formation of a nation-state. The subject is not only gendered but nationalistic. On the other hand, John Archer points out that "more than just an instrument of discipline within the judicial model of power, intelligence was an integral component in a broader configuration of knowledge and power in early modern Europe" (5-6). But Archer also seems to see surveillance too narrowly as that "which in the forms of reconnaissance in the field and diplomacy at court mediated between these two systems of physical force [sovereignty and war]" (7).

> surveillance intrudes into the field of perception and channels
> seemingly unrelated life events into the supervisory field of vision.
> More than just another social practice, surveillance shows itself to be a
> medium of exchange that converts an array of otherwise dissimilar
> units of thought into a common currency. (54)

This organizing function of surveillance explains why it is crucial to examine the

roles that espionage and surveillance played in the pedagogical and disciplinary

mechanisms of envisioning and constructing the Renaissance subject. The culture of

surveillance in early modern period, therefore, requires us to scrutinize the ways in

which power relationships partake of the process of subjectification through

individualization.

The literary and theatrical representation of surveillance and theatricality

becomes a locus in which the readers and the audience will experience "the

difference between knowing oneself 'from the inside' and knowing other people 'from

the outside'" (Maus 12). The art of government made an individual visualize and

inscribe the "mind" on the surface of the body as a denominator of its depth. The

disjunctive binary of inner/outer makes it possible to imagine the human body that

figures on its surface the very visibility of its secret interiority. For example, Erasmus

recommends in an epistle,

> Arrange your facial expression beforehand at home, so that it may be
> ready for every part of the play and so that not even a glimmer of your
> true feelings may be revealed in your looks. You must plan your
> delivery at home, so that your speech suits your looks and the bearing
> of your whole body suits your feigned speech. These are the rudiments
> of courtly philosophy, for which no one will be fitted unless he has first
> wiped away all sense of shame, and leaving his natural expression
> behind at home, has put on a mask, as it were.[21]

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[21] Erasmus, *The Collected Works of Erasmus*. Vol. 24. ed. J.K.Sowards. trans. Charles
Fantazzi. 195-6.

Under the rubric of dichotomies of body/soul and inward/outward, early modern literature at once prefigures and materializes the cultural desire to subsume the interiority of subject through the body and bodily signs. As Foucault proposes, "the soul is the prison of the body" to the extent that the body is utilized to inscribe on its surface and thus produce the imagined interiority of the soul (*Discipline and Punish* 30). With the literature of art of government, we can see how Renaissance English society entrusted to the human body "in abbreviated and practical, i.e. mnemonic, form the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of the culture" (Bourdieu 94). By granting a privilege to inner self or interiority over outward and public self, the art of government not only prefigures a divided selfhood as ground of modern subjectivity but also underscores that recognition of the division is indispensable to the process of subject formation or subjectification.[22] It is manifest, however, that the rhetoric of inwardness and privacy that the art of government frequently mobilizes attests to the anxiety and nervousness resulting from the dichotomous spatialization of inward disposition and outward signs.

The above discussion on the relation between surveillance and theatricality (in the form of dissimulation and display) directs us to the early modern relations of power that are embodied in the conflicts and negotiations between performativity

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[22] The development of ideas about "interiority" and "privacy" can also be located in the tremendous architectural changes in households of the upper and middle classes in early modern England. According to Lawrence Stone, the rapid growth of public demand and desire to increase private space—for example, private bedrooms and closet—was "partly to obtain privacy for individual members of the family, but more especially to provide the family itself with some escape from the prying eyes and ears of ubiquitous domestic servants" (169). Stone also claims that "the most striking change in the life-style of the upper classes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the increasing stress laid upon personal privacy" (169). See also Mark Girouard's *Life in the English Country House* (NY: Penguin, 1980), especially chapter 4 & 5.

and normalization. I propose that surveillance and theatricality played the crucial role of supervising the reiteration and sedimentation of normalized identity in the process of subjectification. In order to comprehend surveillance and theatricality as apparatuses of governmentality, I here refer to Foucault's idea of power with two seemingly conflicting features—those of "centralized and centralizing power" and "individualizing power" ("Politics and Reason" 60). According to Foucault, power is not only repressive, totalizing, and disciplinary but also productive, individualizing and pleasurable: "the state power (and that's one of the reasons for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power" ("Power and the Subject" 782). Against the common understanding of power merely as the force of repression, Foucault defines it as "procedures which allowed the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted and 'individualized' throughout the entire social body" (*Power/Knowledge* 119).[23] In agreement with Foucault, I propose that we need to look at the power relations as "a constant correlation between an increasing individuation and the reinforcement of . . . totality" ("Technologies" 162). The Foucauldian conceptualization of modern power, both as totalizing and individualizing, helps us understand the political and cultural importance that surveillance and theatricality assumed in early modern England, either in the prevalence of espionage and supervision or in the proliferation of courtly histrionics and professional theater.

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[23] While commenting on his book, *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault suggests in an interview that, "from the seventeenth and eighteenth century onwards, there was a veritable technological take-off in the productivity of power" (*Power/Knowledge* 119). He designates this as "a new 'economy' of power."

The activities of policing and peeping into the other's interiority contribute reciprocally to the construction of the identity of the spy himself.[24] The interdependecy of superiors and subordinates, monarchs and subjects, and the observers and the observed attests to the relevance of Foucault's idea of power to the early modern period. If the power of the sovereign requires subjectivity as its object on which it can exert itself, the monarch must depend upon his subjects for the exercise of his sovereignty.[25] Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that monarchs--the major players in courtly theater of politics--complained of the lack of privacy, which evidences not only the presence of such a culture but also its reciprocal aspect: For example, Elizabeth I who felt "set on stages in the sight and view of all the world" (qtd. in Neale 2: 119); James's description of himself as "one set on a scaffold, whose smallest actions and gestures all the people gazingly do behold" (qtd. in Maus 29); in Shakespeare's *Henry V*, Henry V's complaint of being "subject to the breath / Of every fool" (4.1.222-23); or in *Measure for Measure*, Vincentio's ambivalence toward the people ("I love the people, / But do not like to stage me to their eyes" 1.1.68-9). The incessant gaze and judgment of monarchs, as I will show, participate in forming conditions for the subjects to internalize dominant

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[24] For a related discussion, see Judith Butler: "to be addressed is not merely to be recognized for what one already is, but to have the very term conferred by which the recognition of existence becomes possible. One comes to 'exist' by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the Other" (*Excitable Speech* 5). In a similar way, Althusser conceives of the hailing policeman as the postulation of the subject who is "interpellated."

[25] The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in surveillance, of course, gives the sovereign a leverage to realize its power by rendering the subjects powerless. Shakespeare provides an ironic version of this relation through those scenes where the eavesdroppers are manipulated because of the naïve belief in their invisibility (For example, Benedick and Beatrice in *Much Ado About Nothing*).

rules and cultural codes, as much as for the monarchs themselves to realize his/her

power and thus recognize the fundamental interdependence with their subjects.

In a most famous formulation of early modern subjectification, Shakespeare

offers us Hamlet whose unspeakable and inscrutable interiority paves the way for, or,

rather, is reinstated by a notion of truth that resides only in private space or inner

experience.[26] The conflicting position embodied by Hamlet himself—the

unspeakability of truth and the possibility of revealing truth through external

performance—can be explained, I believe, in terms of the mediation of the art of

government in tandem with power relationships.[27] When Gertrude reproves his

excessive mourning of his father's death ("Why seems it so particular with thee?"

1.2.75), Hamlet throws out this blatant response: "Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know

not 'seems'" (76). He goes on to say that his funeral outfits or tears could not reveal

his inner sorrow, because those are just "actions that a man might play" (84). His

sadness and sense of loss are "that within which passes show" and beyond "the

trappings and the suits of woe" (86). With the emphasis on his own inner truth and

its unspeakablity, Hamlet acknowledges "the mere, inevitable existence of a hiatus

between signs ... and what they signify" (Maus 1).

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[26] See, for another example of this conceptualization, Shakespeare's sonnet 62: "it [sin of self-love] is so grounded inward in my heart."

[27] On the issue of Hamlet's interiority, see Katherine Maus, Stephen Greenblatt, Francis Barker, and Catherine Belsey. The latter two argue that there was no such thing as interiority and subjectivity in early modern England. I rather agree with Maus and Greenblatt, but not without some modification.

Hamlet's insistence on his own private thoughts and feelings that cannot be reduced to their outward expression and appearance, however, cannot be properly understood unless it is juxtaposed with his staging of the dumb show and spying upon Claudius's confessional prayer. Hamlet's "contrast between an authentic personal interior and derivative or secondary superficies," I suggest, is inseparable from his interpretation of Claudius's private confession as the manifestation of inward conflict and experience (Maus 2). The scene of Claudius's prayer, as Ramie Targoff points out, interrogates foremost "the belief that external practices might not only reflect but also potentially transform the internal self" (3). When he overhears Claudius during his confession (3.3.36ff), Hamlet assumes that the private moment and space make intelligible something that is usually invisible and indiscernible because of his public mask. To Hamlet, Claudius's private prayer becomes an occasion in which some inner truth is exteriorized, and thus as the confirmation of the spectral testimony by Old Hamlet. While watching Claudius kneeling down and praying to himself ("Bow, stubborn knees; and heart with strings of steel,/ Be soft as sinews of the new-born babe" 3.3.7-1), Hamlet takes the scene of private prayer not only as sincere but also as a sign of inner contrition so that he passes up the opportunity for revenge. Claudius's posture of devotion, as well as his kneeling, is considered by Hamlet as the external evidence of his interiority, contrary to his initial position on the inward and the outward. But just a few lines later just after Hamlet leaves the scene, unlike Hamlet's judgment of Claudius's repentance, Claudius admits his words of prayer has failed to achieve an internal contrition ("My words fly up, my thoughts remain below./ Words without thoughts never to heaven go"

(3.3.97-98). Hamlet believes that the *private* prayer scene and his *secret* observation of outward gestures should allow himself to comprehend the sincerity and authenticity of Claudius's penitence, though he knows all too well that Claudius is able, in *public*, to "smile, and smile, and be a villain" (1.5.108).

I argue, therefore, that Hamlet's attempt to visualize the invisible crime of adultery and murder, to borrow Katherine Maus's words, signifies "an impossible aspiration to the absolute knowledge of another person" ("Proof" 42). What Hamlet does not seem to realize, or at least does not articulate, is that one's secret self or interiority can reveal itself only through performance, whether the public performance of the play-within-the play or Claudius's private performance of prayer. If, as I have discussed, the scenes of surveillance become the condition for the articulation as much as for the internalization of morality and cultural codes, Hamlet's unspeakable truth about the interiority only comes into existence through his numerous encounters with Claudius's and others' political maneuvering. As Walter Benjamin suggests, "truth is not a process of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation which does justice to it" (31). Even more important is the fact that Hamlet's effort to put on disguise (or "antic disposition") and thus control his image against all kinds of spies goes hand in hand with his scheme to uncover Claudius's secret with his shows. Sissela Bok's discussion of secrets here comes in handy:

> I ... take concealment, or hiding, to be the defining trait of secrecy. It presupposed separation, a setting apart of the secret from the non-secret, and of keepers of a secret from those excluded....The separation between insider and outsider is inherent in secrecy; and to think something secret is already to envisage potential conflict between what insiders conceal and outsiders want to inspect or lay bare. (6)

Hamlet desires to discover the secret--the concealed depths--under the surface or "the face as both mask and window to the soul" (Taussig 256). In his dumb show, therefore, Hamlet is able to configure theater as part of the game of secrecy, the dynamic of which positions the spied upon as the owner of hidden secrets (or truths) that the spy must uncover. Not far from this notion is Claudius's desire to pluck out the heart of Hamlet's mystery by hiring spies. In other words, the masks that both Claudius and Hamlet wear can exist and thus be realized in/as a performance. Hamlet's initial position on the incommensurability between "seeming" and 'being" in Act 1 is in contention with his acceptance of "the possibility that external practice might serve as both a criterion of outward judgment and a vehicle of inward change" (Targoff 4). Thus I suggest that *Hamlet* the play renders problematic the uneven dichotomy of inward and outward in that, as Hamlet himself recognizes fleetingly, the interiority could only come into being through performance.[28]

In this context, I can only partially agree with Catherine Belsey who argues that Hamlet cannot speak out his "mystery" to himself or, for that matter, to the audience in his own speeches because he has none of such a thing, which is "the heart of his mystery, his interiority, his essence" (50).[29] Belsey's denial of Hamlet's

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[28] Richard Finkelstein, for example, has recently urged us to see Ophelia as a challenge to Hamlet's assumptions about subjectivity, in "Differentiating Hamlet: Ophelia and the Problems of Subjectivity" *Renaissance and Reformation* 21 (1997), 5-22: "Shakespeare uses Ophelia to expose an interplay between culture, epistemology, and psychology which constructs Hamlet's heroic subjectivity, itself understood through his logic, development, and actions informed by agency" (6). See also David Leverenz, "The Woman in *Hamlet*" An Interpersonal View," in *Hamlet: New Casebooks* (London: Macmillan, 1992), edited by Martin Coyle 132-153.

[29] For another example of such an opinion, see Francis Barker: "At the centre of Hamlet, in the interior of his mystery, there is, in short, nothing. The promised essence remains beyond

interiority is based on the assumption that such an idea of interiority did not exist before the eighteenth century, the so-called age of the bourgeoisie. But I propose that, at the very moment of his calling for interiority, the absence *in* the interior, in fact, vouches for the presence of its authenticity with the infinite reiteration through which the subject paradoxically comes into existence. In this sense, Hamlet's self-contradictory stance reveals that early modern English literature at once gestures towards and resists the modern idea of divided selfhood that relies on the rhetoric of inwardness and its exclusive privilege over outward appearance. The growing notion of the subject as an individual entity in early modern period, as its corollary, gives an exclusive priority to inward experience as distinct from public appearance, while putting under strain the medieval epistemology of self. As Patricia Fumerton's study shows, "the history of the Elizabethan self, in short, was a history of fragmentation in which the subject lived in public view but always withheld for itself a secret room, cabinet, case, or other recess locked away (in full view) in one corner of the house" (69). The efforts of Hamlet and other early modern literary characters to differentiate the inward and the outward are, of course, not incompatible with the emergence of modern individualism.[30]

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the scope of the text's signification: or rather, signals the limit of the signification of this world by marking out the site of an absence it cannot fill. It gestures towards a place for subjectivity, but both are anachronistic and belong to a historical order whose outline has so far only been sketched out" (37 emphasis added).

[30] As Caroline Bynum shows in "Did The Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?" the term individual is not appropriate to describe the idea of subject in the pre-modern England. "Individual" is a highly charged word with the modern sense of individualism: "when we speak of 'the individual,' we mean not only an inner core, a self; we also mean a particular self, a self unique and unlike other selves" (87).

The process of subjectification in early modern England is also involved with the new idea of the nation-state and with the patriarchal hierarchy. The representation of surveillance and theatricality on stage frequently intersects with the process of subjectification and nation-state formation in the early modern English culture. In sixteenth century England, as Greenblatt points out, "the concept of the nation presupposed a sense of respect toward the individual, an emphasis on the dignity of the human being" (*Self-Fashioning* 31). Since the Henrician Reformation of the early sixteenth century, the idea of the nation-state was frequently mobilized to organize individual and communal experiences.[31] Transformed from what was essentially a household rule into a national administration, the Tudor regime was eager to reproduce and circulate "the will to nationhood...that unifies historical memory and secures present-consent...[and that] is, indeed, the articulation of the nation-people" (Bhabha 160).[32] The Reformation gesture toward an English nation enabled the Tudor monarchs to establish the idea of government mediating the conflictual relation between the Church and the state as well as that of the state and individuals.

The same holds true for the chorographical and cartographical enthusiasm that led early modern English people to delineate the cultural and political boundaries of a nation coinciding with language and geography. As Helgerson sums

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[31] Elyot's governor, for instance, is advised to learn and internalize the moral codes with which he should serve "a public weal[state]" that is "a body living, compact or made of sundry estates and degrees of men, which is disposed by the order of equity and governed by the rule and moderation of reason" (1).

[32] For an application of Homi Bhabha's insight to early modern literature, see David Baker's book.

up succinctly, "The emergence of the country as a single, if variously significant, term for the focal point of allegiance parallels the emergence of the description, survey, or chorography as an autonomous and widely practiced genre" (133).[33] In this context, I want to look at the ways the art of government was deployed as a vehicle for a subject to conceive of the nation as an "imagined community"—to borrow Benedict Anderson's term.[34] My argument is that the early modern art of government facilitated the intelligibility of the nationalized, gendered relation—i.e., the national subject. If, as Claire McEachern puts it, the early modern idea of the nation-state is "a performative ideal of social unity founded in the ideological affiliation of crown, church, and land, imagined not in opposition to state power, but rather as a projection of the state's own ideality" (5), I believe that the idea of government came into play in seeking to construct a nation-state as a cohesive social body built into the notion of homogeneity and universality.[35] While government as a bureaucratic apparatus was installed within the structure of a dynastic regime, the technologies of government were gradually initiated towards the yet-to-come

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[33] For example, see Victor Morgan's "The Cartographic Image of 'the Country' in Early Modern England," and Swen Voekel's ""Upon the Suddaine View": State, Civil Society and Surveillance in Early Modern England."

[34] See Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. The nation-state as a community is imagined, according to Anderson, "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion … because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (6-7).

[35] In a comparison of traditional and modern states, Anthony Giddens claims that "Traditional states have frontiers, not borders" (4). The efforts to draw the boundaries, geographically and culturally, therefore, can be seen as part of phenomena in the modern nation-state.

Hobbesian model of nationhood as the union of self and state in the form of "Leviathan." [36]

In early modern England, the emergent conception of the human subject with privileged interiority is pre- and con-figured in "the domestic space as the space of the normalizing, pastoralizing, and individualizing techniques of modern power and police: the personal-*is*-the-political; the world-*in*-the home" (Bhabha 11). It is well known that Renaissance literature and theater are eager to represent, for example, the punitive silencing of women in juxtaposition with the paradoxical encomium of women. As will be discussed later, Renaissance literature abounds in its efforts and desire to impose behavioral regulations on females with which to produce and reproduce them as gendered subjects. The patriarchal, gendered nature of early modern subjectivity creates, and depends upon, the ideal of female chastity and passivity because, as Judith Butler puts it, "the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there could be no gender at all" (*Gender Trouble* 140). In the context of a socially instituted gender asymmetry, early modern culture desired to prescribe and establish the normativity of identity over its performative sense as a way of stipulating and thus essentializing the gender roles and codes.[37]

With the Foucauldian conception of surveillance, power and governmentality, I intend to examine the ways the Elizabethan public theater

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[36] Richard Helgerson asks rhetorically regarding Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*: "Peace and security are much to be desired; terror and coercion are not. How can the state achieve one without the other?" (292).

[37] For the cultural efforts in early modern Europe to control the alleged insatiable female sexuality, see Wiesner 46-56. James Turner also remarks that "Renaissance discourses on sexuality and gender cultivated a dissociation between ostensible meaning and performative occasion" (7-8)

materializes the place and significance of surveillance and theatricality, which imbricated the idea of government with the dynamics of power relations.[38] The early modern English public theater was a cultural topos in which national collectivity and cohesiveness could be articulated. In the representation of surveillance and theatricality, the public theater becomes "an internal distantiation that creates a theater of and within the subject, in which one views oneself as if on stage, through the eyes of a judgmental and imaginary Other" (Mullaney 102). As a paradoxical space of cultural discourse, the Renaissance English public theater partook of "the symbolic process through which the social imagery—nation, culture or community— became the subject of discourse, and the subject of psychic identification" (Bhabha 153).[39] As Greenblatt hints while making a connection between conduct books and Renaissance theater, "the manuals of court behavior which became popular in the sixteenth century are essentially handbooks for actors, practical guides for a society whose members were nearly always on stage" (*Self-Fashioning* 162).

This dissertation also re-examines a variety of theatrical conventions in early modern English drama, including the morality play tradition, mirror-for-magistrates, eavesdropping, disguise, and bed-trick. In an attempt to stipulate the political and cultural significance of the literary and theatrical representation of surveillance, I take up the theatrical conventions as an entry into the understanding of subjectivity

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[38] Listen to the self-conscious defense of theatrical representation by Heywood in his *Apology for Actors:* Plays are "to teach subjects obedience to their king, to show the people the untimely ends of such as have moved tumults, commotions, and insurrections, to present them with the flourishing estate of such as live in obedience" (qtd. in Helgerson 212).

[39] Following Peter Womack, I believe that the Elizabethan public theater "opens up the dramatic space in which the nation can appear, not as a personal patrimony, but as an autonomous presence" (121).

represented in early modern English literature. The dramatic and literary
conventions, I suggest, reveal the ways the early modern authors come to terms with
the governmental rationality in the context of the new perception of the human being
as a fashioned and fashionable subject. By placing the conventions in the context of
early modern English culture, this project is also designed to complement and thus
extend Raymond Williams's "sociology of forms" that is eloquently exemplified in
his study of "soliloquy" (*Culture* 143). Williams proposes, for example, that the
soliloquy of Renaissance drama is "at once a new compositional mode and a new
kind of content, ... [and] these [uses of soliloquies]...are indispensable evidence of
that most central of cultural processes: the formation of specific forms within a
general form" (*Culture* 141). He argues that the particular convention of "soliloquy"
is "fundamentally connected with the discovery, *in dramatic form*, of new and
altered social relationships, perceptions of self and others, complex alternatives of
private and public thought" (142). Against formalistic studies of the convention,
Williams suggests that soliloquy as a literary convention is "directly related to new
valuations of individuality, and to new possibilities of self-development and practical
change and mobility" (146).[40] This dissertation draws upon Williams' study of
soliloquy and his definition of "convention" as "an extension of the sense of
agreement to something implicitly customary or agreed, and to a different kind of
extension, especially in literature and art, to an implicit agreed method" (*Key Words*

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[40] For Williams's exhaustive explication of Shakespearean soliloquy under the aegis of
"sociology of form," see "On Dramatic Dialogue and Monologue" 31-64, as well as pp. 139-
143 of his *Culture*. For more traditional and formalistic studies of soliloquy, see Wolfgang
Clemen, *Shakespeare's Soliloquies* (London: Methuen, 1987) trans. by Charity Scott Stokes;
Nevill Coghill, "Soliloquy" in *Shakespeare's Professional Skills* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1964) 128-163.

80). As Keir Elam points out, "it is only through convention that the spectator [of drama] takes stage events as standing for something other than themselves" (27). Given the ubiquity of surveillance practices in courtly and ordinary life, for example, it comes as no surprise that Renaissance playwrights and audiences were so fascinated with eavesdropping and spying. A study of eavesdropping convention would demonstrate the culture of surveillance and theatricality encoded, on the one hand, in its literary representation and, on the other, in the interplay between the social practice of spying and its representation. The particular theatrical convention of eavesdropping, I argue, registers the social/cultural permutation, and thus allows us to understand the discursive ways in which the early modern English theater intersects with the process of modern subject and nation-state formation.

I also address how the court politics mobilize the economy of epistle that becomes a mediator of social interactions and relations, while investigating early modern courtly politics in the context of interpersonal communication. The literary works I discuss are strewn with many different kinds of letter exchanges: in More's *Utopia*, his use of letters as a literary apparatus that can support the authenticity of his reality; in Skelton's play, Fansy's forged letter in a way of winning trust and getting access to Magnificence; in Bale's *King Johan*, the letters as part of Catholic reconnaissance; in Marlowe's *Edward II*, the personal and official letters that reveal the chasm between the private and the public; in Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, Vincentio's deployment of letters along with his signet in advancing his scheme. In the early modern economy of epistle, I locate a socially marked space in

which an individual is able to make a claim for self-ownership, and thus suggest that the exchange of the letters confirms the intersubjective moment of subjectification.

CHAPTER 2
"ANSWER A FOOL ACCORDING TO HIS FOLLY": THEATRICALITY
IN SIR THOMAS MORE'S *RICHARD III* AND *UTOPIA*

> How does one distinguish the false
> (the simulators, the "so-called") from the
> authentic (the unadulterated and pure)?
> – Michel Foucault[1]

1

In *The Life of Sir Thomas More*, William Roper, More's son-in-law, provides

an encomiastic picture of More as a spontaneous actor during his adolescence at

Cardinal Morton's house:

> Where, though he was young of years, yet would he at Christmas-tide
> suddenly sometimes step in among the players, and never studying for
> the matter, make a part of his own there presently among them, which
> made the lookers-on more sport than all the players beside. (198)

In this compelling anecdote, Roper draws our attention to More's youthful

improvisation that attests to his lifelong fascination with the theatrical aspects of life.

As Roper reminds us, More's interest in and propensity towards histrionics went far

beyond his youthful eccentricities such as teaming up with actors on stage. In his

dedicatory letter to More for *The Praise of Folly*, Erasmus confirms that More would

"ordinarily take great pleasure in jokes…and habitually play the role of Democritus

by making fun of the ordinary lives of mortals" (2). In addition to More's impromptu

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[1] The quotation is from Michel Foucault's "Theatrum Philosophicum" 344.

performances at Morton's, Roper recounts in a dramatic way several memorable episodes that have led later biographers to portray More as a person who loved to improvise and play different roles in diverse situations.[2] More's "habit of uttering his deepest convictions in a humorous way, and his wildest jokes with a solemn countenance" deeply ingrained his entire life (R. W. Chambers 18). Among the episodes of More's role-playing (or disguising his mind), the most telling might be perhaps his making a joke on the scaffold at the moment of his execution. In the face of his own death, Roper reports, More spoke "merrily" to his executioner: "I pray you, Master Lieutenant, see me safe up and, for my coming down, let me shift for myself" (254). Turning toward the people surrounding the scaffold, More now added "with a cheerful countenance": "Pluck up thy spirits, man.... My neck is very short. Take heed therefore thou strike not awry, for saving of thine honesty" (254). With these playful remarks expressing an unexpected concern for the executioner in an otherwise grim moment, More not only turned the king's spectacle of punishment into his own performance but also demonstrated the extraordinary histrionics he loved to practice throughout his life.

Published during the Marian restoration of Catholics in England, Roper's *Life* draws upon the hagiographic tradition to present More's life with extensive dramatic elaboration. However, More's fondness for making straightfaced jokes and putting on theatrical masks often runs counter to Roper's eagerness to portray him as "a man of singular virtue and of a clear, unspotted conscience" (197). The picture of More as a saintly figure competes in Roper's biography with the image of More as a protean,

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[2] See Richard Marius 22-23; R. W. Chambers 18-19; Greenblatt 29-31.

playful person. [3] The pervasive drama of More's actual life, as well as Roper's

hagiographic dramatization of it, allows this famous biography to raise the possibility

of seeing More's life and his works from the perspective of the dynamic relationship

between performance and governmentality. In Roper's portrayal of More valorizing

conscience in the tradition of casuistic resistance against Henry's tyranny, we witness

More's love of theatrics standing as a way to come to terms with the sense of

performativity within the bounds of the dominant discourse of identity in his time.

Such a theatrical practice, I would argue, is at once a medium and mediation for

More to maintain in his worldly engagement "a calculated distance between his

public persona and his inner self" (Greenblatt 45). His theatrical propensity enabled

him to produce and negotiate the polemical divisions between good and bad

government, between truth and falsehood, and between private and public realms.

In the following pages, therefore, I discuss the ways that the issue of theatrics is

mobilized, under the rubric of the art of government, throughout More's life and in

his literary works.

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In order to account for the significance of theatrics in More's life and its

relationship to his subjectivity as well as his conception of it, I start with his

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[3] Roper's conflicting portrait may be seen as mirroring the doubleness of More's own life. Some critics such as Louis L. Martz see Thomas More as a precursor of modern man in his privileging the interiority (for example, see *Thomas More: The Search for the Inner Man*): others have tried to trace medievalism in More's works (See for example, P. Albert Duhamel's "Medievalism of More's *Utopia*" and Elizabeth Donno's "Thomas More and *Richard III*"). Both of the groups might have paid too little attention to the doubleness of More, and thus the perplexing coexistence of medieval and modern aspects in his life.

unfinished and posthumously published prose work, *The History of King Richard III.* As "the first work in Western literature with a dissembling hypocrite as the major protagonist," *Richard III* has been read as "an attack on the non-moral statecraft of the early sixteenth century" (R. W. Chambers 117; 119-120) or as "a depiction of a designing and relentless villain by a skillful manipulation of rhetorical stratagems and narrative devices" (Donno 420).[4] Richard Marius, one of the most recent biographers of More, also sees *Richard III* as a historical illustration of "the contradictions between Richard's professions and his deeds" (103). With such general characterizations of *Richard III* in mind, I focus on the ways in which More's text indicts the wicked king of both using and abusing theatrics for his political gain.

When the pseudo-historical narrative opens, the readers are met with an idealized representation of the dead king, Edward, in stark juxtaposition to the debased image of Richard.[5]

> He [Edward] was a goodly personage, and very princely to behold: of heart courageous, politic in counsel, in adversity nothing abashed, in prosperity rather joyful than proud, in peace just and merciful, in war sharp and fierce, in the field bold and hardy, and nevertheless—no farther than wisdom would—adventurous. (4-5)

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[4] Many have discussed the dramatic aspects of *Richard III.* See, for example, Arthur Noel Kincaid, "The Dramatic Structure of Sir Thomas More's *History of King Richard III*" *SEL* 12.2 (Spring 1972): 223-242. Retha M. Warnicke, in "More's *Richard III* and the Mystery Plays," refers *Richard III* as a dramatic set-piece derived from the mystery plays.

[5] In a sense, Richard is a negative exemplum of Erasmus's Christian king: "The tyrant's rule is marked by fear, deceit, and machinations of evil. The king governs through wisdom, integrity, and beneficence. The tyrant uses his imperial power for himself; the king, for the state" (*Education* 163). See also Rebecca Bushnell, *Tragedies of Tyrants: Political Thought and Theater in the English Renaissance* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990). At his death bed, Edward says with a touch of clairvoyance that "Such a pestilent serpent is ambition and desire of vainglory and sovereignty, which among states where he once entereth creepeth forth so far, till with devision and variance he turneth all to mischief—first longing to be next the best, afterward equal with the best, and at last chief and above the best" (13). This uncanny speech validates the notion that Edward is an emblematic character, rather than a realistic one.

More paints Edward as an impeccable king, "so benign, courteous, and so familiar that no part of his virtues was more esteemed" (5-6). Edward was said to be "a king of such governance and behavior in time of peace… that there was never any prince of this land attaining the crown by battle so heartily beloved with the substance of the people" (4). By contrast, Richard is portrayed as "close and secret, a deep dissembler," as a man who does not hesitate to "kiss whom he thought to kill" (9). Full of "the execrable desire of sovereignty" (6), this dissembling Richard is ready to break "all the bands … that binden man and man together, without any respect of God or the world, unnaturally [contriving] to bereave them, not only their dignity, but also their lives" (6-7). The "dispiteous and cruel" prince of "deep dissimulating nature" is, in fact, "outwardly coumpinable [=friendly] where he inwardly hated" (9); in his speech, "one thing [is] pretended and another meant" (8). Capitalizing on "the rhetorical mode that held good kings to be handsome and bad kings to be hideous" (Marius 102), More draws the contrasting images of Edward and Richard as the good king and the tyrant, respectively. This portrayal is intended to imagine a good king who, through the proper governing of the self, fosters a well-governed kingdom. Such an antithetical opposition between Richard and Edward (a "malicious, wrathful, envious, … forward" tyrant vs. "a benign and liberal king" 8) enables More, the Renaissance humanist, to speculate on the issue of government and its theatrical aspects. Richard becomes a textual palimpsest that produces a discursive past-in-the-present within the social memory of the chaotic period when the political in-fighting over the crown was extremely destructive to England.

This sharp contrast between the benign Edward and the evil Richard, as many critics have noted, is very tenuous when compared to historical facts. And as the narrative itself admits fleetingly, it becomes clear that Edward's "fleshly wantonness" (5) along with his youthful carelessness was the source of many serious problems for the monarchy and the country. More's free alteration of historical records, as Judith Anderson argues, "signals that he treats historical facts but that he treats it [sic] very much as subject rather than inviolable object" (84). Regardless of the historical inaccuracies, More is willing to deploy the ideal images of Edward against the demonic Richard, in service of his own moralistic and artistic purpose.[6] However, More seems to be very conscious of his tailoring of facts, for instance, when he alters Edward's age in the first lines of the text. Even though he must have known that Edward died at forty, More tells us Edward died at fifty-three. He does not hesitate to reverse the actual order of some events to emphasize his moral purpose, as in the episodes of the widow Grey and of Shore's Wife (101-103). With the memory of Richard still vivid in people's mind just thirty years after his death, More creates a new historiography of Richard that later Tudor chroniclers such as Holinshed and Edward Hall emulated in making Richard a cautionary and deliberate exemplum of a tyrant.[7]

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[6] Leonard Dean suggests, "there was not historical evidence for Richard's consistent dissimulation" (317). For the historical inaccuracy of More's portrait of Edward, see Judith Anderson 75-109. Anderson is right that "Richard is not to be defined entirely or even primarily by his historical actions; he is primarily More's subject rather than primarily an objective sequence of acts" (86). In this context, Anderson calls More's *Richard III* "a generally mixed work and a virtual touchstone for the extension of biographical truth beyond a single form or genre" (75).

[7] The general consensus is that *Richard III* was written about 1513-17.

Throughout this semi-history, semi-biography, More demonstrates how adept Richard is at exploiting the theatrical dimension of kingship. He goes to great lengths in revealing Richard's relentless exploitation of theatricality that creates an uncertainty between truth and falsehood that in turn leads to the corruption of government—both political and personal. With an explicit link between the stock image of Richard as a tyrant and his use of theatrical presentation, More suggests that Richard is extremely dangerous not only because he is a tyrant, but also because his tyranny is empowered by the adroit use of theatrics. For example, Richard acts out a feigned reluctance to receive the crown while his accomplice, Buckingham, drums up popular acclamation. The focus here is on Richard's sly use of theatrical skills to conceal his ambition before the public by performing the role of the modest hero. More focuses on Richard's theatrical performance of "meekness" in this "mockish election" surrounded by the spectators making "the sound of a swarm of bees." Richard is such a formidable player in "king's games, as it were, stage plays...upon scaffolds, in which poor men be but the lookers-on" (83) that he can create a public image of himself by orchestrating the spectacles. Through his simulation of simulation (or representation of representation), Richard produces "the immense gulf between rhetorical structure and moral intent, between words and action" (Grant 31).[8]

More thus calls into question the legitimacy of Richard's authority, which can only be maintained by his unrelenting appropriation of theatrical power. Such an

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[8] There is an interesting parallel between this and the episode of parasite in *Utopia*. See Perlette's "Of Sites and Parasites: The Centrality of the Marginal Anecdote in Book 1 of More's *Utopia*."

abuse of theatrics by the princely dissembler becomes problematic to More because it betrays the Platonic gap between truth and its representation. To More, Richard's theatrics opens up the uncertainty of meaning, "as many well-counterfeited jewels make the true mistrusted" (85), and thereby confuses the relationship between what seems and what is. When ill-intended theatrics dictate the political scene, as More observes, "the state of things and the dispositions of men were then such that a man could not well tell whom he might trust or whom he might fear" (43). The (mis)appropriation of theatrical tropes by Richard is, therefore, symptomatic of the corruption of society as well as the degeneration of his self.

In addition to the intertwined relation between abusive theatricality and tyranny, More also associates Richard's despotism with his physical deformity and psychological perversity. His persistent abuse of theatrics to fulfill his political volition is put in a chiasmic relation with his perversity and physical deformity, which in turn attest to his moral and ethical degeneracy. Richard's unusual birth, for example, becomes the omen of future crimes that he "in the course of his life ... *unnaturally* committed" (8; emphasis added).

> It is for truth reported that the duchess his mother had so much ado in her travail, that she could not be delivered of him uncut, and that he came into the world with the feet forward, as men be borne outward, and (as the fame runneth) also not untoothed. (8)

In this way, More conflates the physical and psychological features of Richard with his deceitful performance of statecraft.[9] Richard is portrayed as a person "little of stature, ill-featured of limbs, crook-backed, his left shoulder much higher than his

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[9] This monstrosity of Richard echoes in the opening scene of Shakepeare's *Richard III.*

right, hard favoured visage" (8). His evilness is engraved on his deformed body and the physical ugliness is taken as the sign of his tyrannous government. For example, in order to establish his own moral and sexual superiority, Richard paints his brother as an effeminate womanizer and thus a threat to the kingdom's well-being. More's intention is more apparent in another episode in which Richard brands his own mother with the charge of promiscuity. By accusing her of adultery and thereby discrediting Edward's legitimacy, he tries to substantiate the legitimacy of his own claim to the crown with the purity of his blood.[10] Inasmuch as Richard's beguiling performance becomes a distinctive feature of his tyranny and ill-governance, so the illegitimacy of his authority is also confirmed by his monstrous and immoral conduct of tainting his own mother.

In contrast with Richard's performance that is couched in the gap between inward and outward, More imagines a correspondence between the mind and the body through an ingenious reconstruction of Richard's harrowing moments. More portrays Richard as agonizing over having killed the young princes: "So was his restless heart continually tossed and tumbled with the tedious impression and stormy remembrance of his abominable deed" (90). Because of the feelings of guilt, More illustrates, Richard "never had quiet in his mind" (89). Just after recounting Richard's "treacherous tyranny" of killing "these innocent, tender children," More graphically draws the image of a Richard who "yet all the meantime spent in much pain and trouble *outward*, much fear, anguish, and sorrow *within*" (89; emphases

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[10] For the superfluity of Richard's accusation of his mother, see Rudnytsky's "More's *History of King Richard III* as an Uncanny Text" 157-8. Rudnytsky suggests, "the fantasy of his mother as promiscuous...conveniently allows Richard to think of himself as his parents' only true offspring" (158).

added). Here we are invited to visualize Richard agonizing for his cruel activities and the tormenting moments that are revealed through his bodily signals: his "trouble and pain outward" become signifiers of his agonizing interior.

Thus we run into a seemingly contradictory story, when More turns this chronicle narrative of Richard into a suitable vehicle for description as well as prescription of his idea of proper government. On the one hand, More suggests that Richard's physical deformity and psychological perversity are the signifiers of his tyranny. But on the other hand, More identifies Richard's theatrics as the source of his tyranny, in terms of the discrepancy between his inward intention and his outward performance. But isn't it true that a tyrant can exist only by acting out his own tyranny, unlike the case with his physical deformity? As More himself phrases it in a poem, a king is just "a man in an embroidered garment" ("On the King and the Peasant" 154), and realizes himself as a king by performing his role.[11] In a sense, More suggests that Richard is tyrannical because he simultaneously "shows" and "hides" his true identity. More's endeavor to make the inside correspond to the outside in Richard's case, I think, obfuscates the fact that tyranny can come into

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[11] In the following well-known passage in *Richard III*, More presents a similar idea: "in a stage play all the people know right well that he that playeth the sowdaine [=sultan] is percase a sowter [=shoemaker]. Yet if one should can so little good to show out of season what acquaintance he hath with him and call him by his own name while he standeth in his majesty, one of his tormentors might hap to break his head, and worthy, for marring of the play" (83). This echoes Erasmus' passage in *Praise of Folly*: "If someone should strip away the costumes and makeup from the actors performing a play on the stage and to display them to the spectators in their own natural appearance, wouldn't he ruin the whole play? Wouldn't all the spectators be right to throw rocks at such a madman and drive him out of the theater? ... to destroy the illusions in this fashion would spoil the whole play. This deception, this disguise, is the very thing that holds the attention of the spectators" (43).

existence only through its performance.[12] Thus, *Richard III* rather betrays the ways in which More tries to normalize the disturbance of meanings in the king's use of theatrics that generates an anxiety over the performative sense of identity. More wants to draw a clear line between good and bad theatrics, between good and bad governance, through the rigorous combination of drama and politics, though his text also testifies to how precarious the boundary is between them. My point is that, while recognizing the protean character of human subjectivity (in other words, the performativity of identity), More wants to recuperate the available discourse that promotes the ideal correspondence between the mind and the body. As a devoted Catholic who once wanted to become a monk, More tries to stifle the performative sense of subjectivity under the blanket of an essentialist vocabulary.

When we locate one of the major themes of *Richard III* in this effort to distinguish between good and bad theatrics, it becomes critical to understand Cardinal Morton. A mentor to the young More, Cardinal Morton is introduced as an example of how to stay honest while sustaining the theatrical aspects of life. In both *Richard III* and *Utopia,* Morton is portrayed as an epitome of wisdom with "a deep insight in politic, worldly drifts" (*Richard III* 93), and "much respected for his wisdom and virtue as for his authority" (*Utopia* 15). Morton is said to be "a man of great natural wit, very well learned, and honorable in behavior, lacking no wise ways to win favor" (92). This honorable Cardinal, More's narrative tells us, is no less a superb actor in disguising his true feelings and being ready to manipulate others to achieve a certain goal. For example, in a very subtle manner Morton encourages

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[12] More demonstrates here "how language is not transparent to intent, and how the inner life

Buckingham, Richard's former accomplice, to rebel against Richard.[13] Morton first "wooed him [Buckingham] to come and had him from henceforth both in secret trust and very special favor, which he nothing deceived" (93). Morton not only tries to feed Buckingham "with fair words and pleasant praises" but "he craftily sought the ways to prick him forward" (93-4). Nor is Morton shy of flattering Buckingham ("excellent virtues meet for the rule of a realm, as our Lord hath planted in the person of your grace" 96). With "his faithful secret advice and council" (94), Morton talks Buckingham into an unsuccessful bid to overthrow Richard's throne, and, as a consequence, gets him killed. Morton himself proves a good courtly politician, "whose wisdom abused [deceived] his [Buckingham's] pride to his own deliverance and the duke's destruction" (92).

It is quite understandable why Alistair Fox finds "the same kind of Machiavellism" in both Richard and Morton (*Politics* 121). Such a characterization confirms my suggestion in the Introduction that a Machiavellian prince may share many traits with Castiglione's courtier in that both of them are supposed to have the ability to disguise and dissemble. Still, Fox's statement stops short of explaining the significance of More's attempt to differentiate the two, however unstable the distinction may be. I would argue that the polarity of bad and good theatrics is deployed by More at once to hide and reveal his anxious recognition of the intellectual uncertainty lurking behind a performative identity. When we juxtapose

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of the spirit remains secret and mysterious" (Grant 43).

[13] Compare this to persona "More's" advice to Hythloday in *Utopia*: "Don't give up in a storm....You must strive to influence policy indirectly, urge your case vigorously but tactfully, and thus what you cannot turn to good, you may at least make as little bad as possible" (36).

Morton's political adeptness with Richard's vicious abuse of power, we come to

realize the degree of More's investment in demarcating the Machiavellian Richard

from the Castiglionean Morton. Morton's performance is pitted against Richard's

maneuvering. For example, Morton's seduction of Buckingham to such headlong

rebellion is perfectly justified according to the logic of More's text in which Richard's

tyranny is branded as monstrosity. To usurp the government from the tyrant

becomes a moral duty of any righteous subject and thus a role that Morton rightly

performs.[14] Morton's employment of theatrics, therefore, is validated with reference

to the sudden fall and beheading of Hastings, "whose truth toward the king no man

doubted nor needed to doubt" (23).[15] More highlights the fact that Hastings fails to

heed four ominous portents and thus is trapped both by Richard's treacherous

intrigue and by his own naiveté.[16] Hastings cannot avoid his fatal downfall and

death because he does not recognize the theatrical aspects of Richard's courtly

politics. The gullible Hastings who falls into the hypocritical Richard's trap is here

the opposite of Morton, the prudent political actor. More envisages Morton as an

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[14] See, for example, the following statement from *Utopia*: "The prince holds office for life, unless he is suspected of aiming at a tyranny" (49). More proposes here that the prince could be deposed when he becomes a tyrant. If we put this passage against the description of Morton in *Richard III*, it is not difficult to see the justificatory description of Morton's conspiratorial exchange with Buckingham.

[15] On Hastings' honesty, More tells us: "this honorable man, a good knight and a gentle, of great authority with his prince, of living somewhat desolate, plain and open to his enemy and secret to his friend, eth[=easy] to beguile, as he that of good heart and courage fore studied no perils; a loving man and passing well beloved; very faithful and trusty enough, trusting too much" (*Richard III* 53).

[16] Four portents are as follows: 1) a warning from his ally Lord Stanley about a dream; 2) the stumbling of his horse on his way to the council; 3) a sinister allusion of his companion; 4) Hastings' encounter with a pursuivant of his own name. For More's careful construction of circumstances surrounding Hastings' death, see Rudnytsky 151-7. Rudnytsky emphasizes the importance Hastings' episode in *Richard III*.

exemplary model of how to sustain honesty without denying the inevitable theatricality of life, while problematizing Richard's exercise of power through theatrical dissembling ("his dissimulation only kept all that mischief up" 46).

Still, this pseudo-hagiographic text reveals More's anxiousness in fixating the performative sense of subjectivity on the existing discourse of an ideal correspondence between the soul and the body. Performance, as is manifest in More's own life, can both establish and hide the player's identity. More's poignant criticism of Richard, despite his intention, inadvertently betrays the possible incongruity between the inward intent and the outward appearance. *Richard III* exposes More's self-contradicting effort to resolve the conundrum of humanists over the new understanding of human subjectivity. His narrative at once condemns and reclaims the rupture between signifier and signified or between what is and what seems, which is inherent in theatricality. *Richard III* shows More's vigorous attempt to couch his understanding of human subjectivity as performance within the available, normative discourse of religious tradition, even as it exposes his anxiety about the clear demarcation between true performance and its travesty.[17] Richard's mimicry of "true" performance, through an excess of theatricality, threatens to overthrow the Renaissance humanist's eagerness to subsume the performative sense of self within the frame of the old epistemology.

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[17] Though in a slightly different context, Greenblatt finds out "the complex interplay in More's life and writings of self-fashioning and self-cancellation, the crafting of a public role and the profound desire to escape from the identity so crafted" (12-13).

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       Written almost at the same time as *Richard III*, *Utopia* (1515-16) takes as one of its topics the relationship between self-government and political government. With what has been called "a pervasive tenor of humanistic self-evaluation and self-criticism" (Leslie 28), More introduces the idea of government in terms of major social and political issues such as the courtly life, royal counseling, and social discipline. In this sense, More's book serves not only as a critique of the practices of government among English and European elites, but also as an invitation for them to develop a sense of propriety, moderation, and mastery in their governments. More's utopian narrative certainly allows us to ruminate on the transition of forms of government, from a medieval household government to the institutionalized administration associated with the Henrician bureaucratization.[18] But unlike *Richard III*, *Utopia* is less concerned with kingship as the epitome of government than with the government of the individual and society as a whole.

       In the first meeting with Hythloday, the persona "More" is eager to spend time talking more about "the manners and governments" (14) than about monsters and exotic aspects of foreign countries, as was the case of most travelogues in the early sixteenth century.[19] Distancing itself from typical travelogues, More's narrative puts emphasis on its intense interest in "governments wisely established and sensibly established and sensibly ruled," in place of "the routine of travelers' tale" about "Scyllas, ravenous Celaenos, man-eating Lestrygonians and that sort of monstrosity"

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[18] See G. R. Elton and David Starkey.

[19] I use the quotation marks to indicate the persona "More" in contrast to More, the writer.

(12). All "More" wants to hear from Hythloday is about "the manners and institutions and the Utopians" (13), that is, the ways those unknown people manage to govern themselves. The episodes in Book I certainly function as a framework for introducing the themes of government in relation to the Utopian fable in Book II. For example, Hythloday tells an episode of the imaginary Achorians (30) who got in trouble because, instead of concentrating on the proper governing of themselves, they went out to conquer others. In this portrayal of how such an invasion of the neighboring countries eventually led them to a disastrous result of constant wars, More attacks, with Hythloday's story within his story, the expansionist idea of government in contemporary Europe. The same is true when Hythloday describes an imagined situation at the French court where a philosopher-courtier advises the king, but to no avail, to "look after his ancestral kingdom, improve it as much as possible, [and] cultivate it in every conceivable way" (31).

In this context, one of the most interesting moments in *Utopia* is when "More" criticizes Hythloday's cynicism about the life of courtiers, and then proposes a special philosophy for the political arena. Recognizing Hythloday's profound understanding of human beings and government, "More" offers him an opinion: "If you would devote your time and energy to public affairs, you would be doing something worthy of a generous and truly philosophical nature, even if you did not much like it" (13-14). In response, Hythloday advocates his personal freedom over public interests ("As it is now I live as I please" 13) and opposes "More's" suggestion: "Would a way of life so absolutely repellent to my spirit make my life happier?" (13). But "More's" pointed objection reveals Hythloday's failure to recognize the theatrical

aspects of the political world as well as his lack of concern for the public good.

"More" argues very strongly that "there is another philosophy, better suited for the

political arena, that takes its cue, adapts itself to the drama in hand, and acts its part

neatly and appropriately" (36). Different from Hythloday's "academic philosophy"

which is only suitable for "the private conversation of close friends" (35), "More's"

proper philosophy for courtiers is anchored in the metaphor of the theater:

> When a comedy of Plautus is being played, and the household slaves are cracking trivial jokes together, you propose to come on stage in the garb of a philosopher, and repeat Seneca's speech to Nero from the *Octavia*. Wouldn't it better to take a silent role than to say something wholly inappropriate? You pervert a play and ruin it when you add irrelevant speeches, even if they are better than the play itself. So go through with the drama in hand as best you can, and don't spoil it all just because you happen to think of another one that would be better. (36)

A good counsellor, according to "More," should know which role he is playing and

be alert to his cues; otherwise, he will wind up disrupting that political performance

of which he is an integral part. In his refutation of Hythloday's privileging of

personal freedom and peace over the public good, "More" also strongly suggests that

he "strive to influence policy indirectly, to urge [his] case vigorously but tactfully,

and thus what [he] cannot turn to good, [he] may at least make as little bad as

possible" (36), even though he may not be able to root out "bad ideas… [or] long-

standing evils to [his] heart's content" (36).

   "More's" use of the theatrical metaphor in proposing a philosophy for the

courtier can be read as an unabashed celebration of the humanist participation in

realpolitik: "I think if you could overcome your aversion to court life, your advice to

a prince would be of the greatest advantage to mankind. No part of a good man's

duty--and that means yours--is more important than this" (28). It is important to remember that, at the time of writing this book, the real More was mulling over the possibility of plunging into real politics through public service in the council of Henry VIII. Likewise, Giles advises Hythloday to join "the council of some great prince, whom you incite to just and noble actions" (14). Hence, it is not difficult to see why More begins *Utopia* "by mocking the ideal of counsel but ends by obliquely endorsing it" (Skinner 1:218).[20]

When this anecdote is read in tandem with Hythloday's fable about Utopia, however, it is clear that what Utopians are doing is not following either one's position ("More's" or Hythloday's) but producing an imaginary negotiation of the conflicting ideas. As regards the relation between government as a political system and the government of self, the writer More seems to propose a synthesized, but still ambiguous, vision of "More's" and Hythloday's positions on political participation. By placing Hythloday and "More" in a dialogic juxtaposition, the writer More fleshes out a way of accommodating both the public good and the private interest so as to deal with his own dilemma in entering the royal service.[21] After all, more often than not, the writer More seems to pit two conflicting ideas against each other, both of which are, after all, his own creation. More turns himself into a character and thus develops a unique relationship with himself within the literary artifice. More brings

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[20] A historical irony is that if *Utopia* shows More's speculation on his entering royal service, as Marius suggests, it was certainly successful in that the reputation the book generated helped him land his new job as Henry's counselor.

[21] The episode of parasite in Book I, as Perlette implies, could be illuminating and indicative of More's dialectic positioning of himself between "More" and Hythloday: see "Of Sites and Parasites: The Centrality of the Marginal Anecdote in Book I of More's *Utopia*."

into play a dynamic series of dissociations and associations which, in doubly splitting both himself (the writer and the character) and the hero (two Hythlodays in Book I and Book II), allow him to embrace both the Utopian vision of Hythloday and "More's" engagement in humanist ideals. Or to put it another way, More is able to authenticate the creator himself in his refusal to endorse his own creation (Hythloday). In the spectral doubling of himself, More thus creates an illusion in which the author loses some of his claims for priority, or a prior substantiality, to the mimetic double. What is inscribed in the construction of *Utopia* is thus More's vigorous yet playful attempt to alternate between production and erasure of the distance he creates between the work and the creator. So it is by no accident that More seems to enjoy playing on words such as Hythloday's name (meaning nonsense) and the book's title (utopia and eutopia), both of which serve to affirm the Morean antinomies of sense and nonsense, and place and no-place. The same thing can be said of the scandalous *parerga* of letters from More's Humanist friends in blurring the boundary of fiction and reality, and joining inside and outside of the text.[22] This account should offer an answer to the question of why "More" in the end passes up a chance to challenge Hythloday's narrative of Utopian ways of life when Hythloday finishes his narrative.

In order to develop a fuller understanding of More's dialogic and dialectic form of courtiership and thus of "government," I now turn to the Utopian ways of life and government. The Utopian way of government entails a process of

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[22] Well known is the voyage of John Rastell, More's nephew, who was allegedly moved by Utopia and set off to find the land six months after its publication. See R. W. Chambers 140-2. Also for the issue of *parergon* (framework) in art, see Derrida's *Truth in Painting*.

subjectification, challenging the assumption that individual desire precedes social milieu and its prohibition.[23] More's utopian meditation on the correspondence between a virtuous commonwealth and virtuous citizens requires the latter to have a firm grip on themselves and to be ready to perform their role in any given context. With such active, earnest participants in the civic life, the Utopian society promotes the sense of public responsibility with which "More" exhorts Hythloday. As "More" admits, "it is impossible to make everything good unless all men are good" (36); as Hythloday protests, "How can one individual do any good when he is surrounded by colleagues who would more readily corrupt the best of men than be reformed themselves?" (37-8). The achievement of good life, individually and collectively, calls for a conflation of the existing ideas of communality and individuality under the banner of government.

Utopians locate the principles of proper government in controlling material and spiritual matters. With "their chief concern" being "human happiness" (67), Utopians understand by pleasure "every state or movement of body or mind in which man finds delight according to nature" (71). Hythloday tells us that Utopians want to pursue "a joyous life, in other words, pleasure, as the goal of [their] actions" (70). But they will never try to seek their own "advantage in ways that cause misfortune to others" because they know very well that "to pursue your own pleasure by depriving others of theirs is injustice" (70). Their indifference to gold and clothing has much to

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[23] Hence Richard Halpern asserts that "Utopia frequently tries to reform social desire by manipulating the *things* that serve as the apparent objects of desire" (148). For an orthodox reading of this book as "a practical reformist document" promoting the notion that "a properly structured social and political order will encourage the development of godly citizens," see Margo Todd 37.

do with how they believe they can achieve pleasure and happiness. The ritual debasement of gold "signals the ascendancy of use value over exchange value and demonstrates that the production of goods in Utopia aims at satisfying needs rather than extracting profits" (Halpern 145). They find happiness "not in every kind of pleasure, but only in good and honest pleasure" (69). Because "there is plenty of everything, and no reason to fear that anyone will claim more than he needs" (56), Utopians are completely happy with "a single cloak" (54) and clothing "which is the same everywhere throughout the island" (50). That is why "nowhere do grain and cattle flourish more plentifully, nowhere are men more vigorous or liable to fewer diseases" (77) than on this island, even though they have neither fertile soil nor the best climate. Hythloday's repeated criticism of private property and the desire for private hoarding brings to the surface the issue of proper management in producing and distributing material goods. When there is no private property, Utopians ask themselves, what is the use of stealing? When every place looks exactly the same, what is the fun of traveling? As is clear in Hythloday's argument about enclosure and punishment, the Utopian social condition produces a certain kind of human behavior, a new notion of government.

Free from the "false idea of pleasure" and "the perverse enticements of evil lusts" (71), Utopians enjoy a peaceful society where individual self-government and government as a political system exist in harmony and reinforce each other in a reciprocal way: "Among them virtue has its reward, yet everything is shared equally and all men live in plenty" (38). Therefore, it is essential for Utopians to learn how to enjoy their pleasure within the bounds of the common good and thus to avoid "the

phantoms of false pleasures." Self-controlled and industrious citizens are the foundation of this disciplined and ordered society. The social structure of the utopian society is organized to ensure that individuals can achieve self-government, which in turn is the ground of a righteous government. Utopians make sure that "there is no chance to loaf or kill time, no pretext for evading work" (60). They believe that "men should abide not only by private agreements but by those public laws which control the distribution of vital goods, such as are the very substance of pleasure" (70). How Utopians spend their leisure time after the six-hour daily labor is solely "left to each man's discretion, provided he does not waste his free time in roistering or sloth but uses it properly in some occupation that pleases him" (51). They are said to "know nothing about gambling with dice or other such foolish and ruinous games" (52); and "there are no wine-bars, or ale-houses, or brothels; no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for secret meeting" (60). But Utopians, More writes, are "much inclined to think that no kind of pleasure is forbidden, provided harm does not come of it" (60). An individual must learn how to manage his leisure appropriately because it is the basis for the well-being of both the person and the community. Utopians, and indeed the writer More, know well that the duties of citizenship are the conditions of individual happiness and freedom.

In this context, I do not subscribe to Greenblatt's statement that "the destruction of the individual as a private and self-regarding entity is a positive goal in Utopia" (41). Greenblatt draws attention to the fact that a Utopian cannot even leave his residence "without permission," and that if he is caught without a letter from prince, he will be punished as "a runaway." But I think it is anachronistic for

Greenblatt to assume that there was already a perception of the individual as "a private and self-regarding entity," which signifies certainly a bourgeois subjectivity. The idea of the autonomous individual was not yet clearly established, but still in the process of being conceptualized and practiced (or, was, at best, one of many competing notions) during the early sixteenth century. The same criticism can be made of Greenblatt's statement that *Utopia* is deeply related to the idea of "private ownership of self... [and that] to abolish private property is to render such self-conscious individuality obsolete" (38-39). More's narrative of Utopia, I would argue, does not destroy the already-existing individual but represents the newly emerging idea of subjectivity within the boundary of the existing discourse of communality and morality. And I believe that it is compatible with the humanist idea that any corruption of the society can be resolved through the reformation of the society, but not just by the moral regeneration of the sinner through repentance, as is in medieval religious doctrines.

The total openness of Utopia is predicated on the implicit idea that prohibition is the very operation of desire. In Utopia, any social regulation and restriction are voluntary and consensual, because the force and threat of punishment are exclusively derived from the internalized regulation that exists fully as ir-regulation and de-regulation at the same time. The regulative power in Utopia works through punishment and surveillance, two modes of governing the state, which are translated into shaming and honoring. The criminal "accepts his punishment in a spirit of patient obedience and gives promise of future good conduct" with the "hope of gaining his freedom" in the future; and thereafter he will

be pardoned "*as a reward* for submissive behaviour" (25 emphasis added). The stress falls on the voluntarism and thus the formative and productive power working through the Utopian conscience. As Judith Butler says, "Conscience is fundamental to the production of the citizen-subject, for conscience turns the individual around, makes him/her available to the subjectivating reprimand" (*Psychic Power* 115). The process of internalizing the social regulation requires voluntary cooperation to create and then destroy the boundary between the inside and outside. Utopians see the existence of interiority that does not correspond to outward experience as the evidence of corruption in human beings. That is why Utopians "do not compel [an individual] by threats to dissemble his views, nor do they tolerate in the matter any deceit or lying, which they detest as next door to deliberate malice" (98-99).

The nearly obsessive openness of the Utopian society is fully compatible with multiple prohibitions and restrictions such as the restricted fashion code, the severe restraints on travel, and the ban on any discussion of political issues outside the senate. Without an all-seeing God or any institutional police force, Utopians need this openness to guarantee that nobody will have a moment to conspire against the public good. For the benefit of their commonwealth, Utopians are willing not only to accept the complete integration of private and public spaces, but also to live "in the full view of all, they are bound to be either working at their usual trades or enjoying their leisure in a respectable way" (*Utopia* 60-61). So the fact that in Utopia "there is nothing private or exclusive" (47) proves the ontological basis of the society. If Utopians "take pains to reduce sharply the number of points of reference by which men mark themselves off from each other" (Greenblatt 41), I suggest it is because the

corruptibility of human being, the underlying assumption of Utopia, becomes a reality only when one is isolated from community.[24] That is why, as Greenblatt himself notes, "Utopia is constructed so that one is always under observation" (49) and Utopians willingly put themselves under communal observation.[25] The restrictive freedom cultivates the subject as a reflective being with his own will.

The amalgamation of openness and self-surveillance in Utopia may certainly anticipate an antithetical concept of private and public, the anchor of modern individualism. The importance of surveillance is already underscored in Book I when Hythloday narrates the example of the imaginary Polylerites rewarding the informant (23-4). For the Polylerites, as well as the Utopians, it is essential to reward the informers in their punishment and discipline of criminals. The slaves are not allowed to "meet or talk together, or even to greet together" as a preventive measure of their possible "conspiracy against the government" (25). But I think that in *Utopia* More is not replacing private conscience with communal consciousness: instead, he dreams of a space in which both parts are in harmony and thus reinforce each other, on the condition of the abolition of money and private property.[26] The way that

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[24] Early modern utopian literature, J. C. Davis suggests, is commonly based on the two assumptions of native human imperfection and its potential perfectibility through institutional means: see Davis's "Introduction" and chapter 1.

[25] J. C. Davis argues: "*Utopia* therefore illustrated how and under what conditions conscience could be so effective. It showed a society in which law, social pressure and conscience converged in the direction of goodness, but it was a standard of goodness which was pre-ordained, not chosen by the inhabitants of that society, and to which their willfulness was made to conform" (50).

[26] Frederic Jameson characterizes *Utopia* as "the coexistence of the critique of feudalism with a critique of nascent capitalism" (98). See also his evaluation: "The explicit link More establishes between the social disorder of the countryside and the inner collapse of feudalism as a system has long been appreciated as one of the most original insights of his book" (93).

desire is produced and regulated in Utopia involves a certain spatialization of inter-subjective relations in its arrangement of houses, city planning, and the balanced development of city and country.

We know well that this ideal space of Utopia as "nowhere" is severed not only geographically but also culturally and politically from the mainland. To achieve the self-sufficiency and fullness of Utopia, More underscores the foundational moment of splitting itself from the mainland. The temporal and spatial limitations in the geography of Utopia are separate from exteriority (and the external force of corruption and contamination) and become the essential condition of Utopia and thus of More's utopian imagination. "Raphael's story is less concerned with narrating a travel than it is with displaying a map, but a map whose essential characteristic consists in not being another map; or, being in maps, it cannot exactly be found in them" (Marin "Frontiers" 416). Richard Halpern argues that Hythloday "represents a mode of discourse which finds no place--not even the place of the false--within philosophical dialectic, just as Utopians find no place within a society that produces such a dialectic" (142). The disconnection of Utopia from the mainland becomes constitutive of the dynamics of "disjunction" and "exclusion" in Utopian life and diplomacy (Jameson 100). Within this exclusive terrain opened up by the separation, the Utopian narrative turns on an imagination of "a constitutive outside to the subject, an object outside, which is, after all, 'inside' the subject as its own founding repudiation" (Butler, *Bodies* 3). As Richard Halpern points out, "the apparently map-like precision of Hythlodaeus' description outlines a social space that could not possibly exist, whose various elements are mutually exclusive and

dislocating" (139). But more importantly More's narrative *re-inscribes* the non-existence right away onto the geography of Utopia by *describing,* for instance, the features of Aumoraut that make it look much like London.

By the same token, we see Utopians savoring an unwavering desire to keep intact the boundary between the inside of the island and its outside, which is the obverse of that openness among themselves. The threat of disruption by the outside force serves as a political and rhetorical resource in re-articulating its own superiority. In a sense, the game of secrecy and openness in Utopia operates in tandem with ways of differentiating the insider from outsiders, and that is why it is so important for Utopians to keep their society pure. The need for security against outside threats leads them to develop many deceptive foreign policies and warfare tactics. Despite their alleged love for peace, Utopians are always ready to launch a war against outside enemies if it does not require sacrificing their own people. When they are involved in a war, it is "only for good reasons: to protect their own land, to drive invading armies from the territories of their friends, or to liberate an oppressed people, in the name of humanity" (87). Along with its geographical isolation, vigilance against external enemies is essential to the existence of Utopia, not only because Utopians need to protect their way of life from the invasion of outside forces but because the outsiders and their imagined threats would help them understand the intertwined relation of communal well-being and individual happiness. Utopians are ready to use spies and infiltrators to destroy neighboring enemies whenever they are in a dispute. They are willing to depend on insidious tactics such as assassins to murder enemy leaders and on mercenaries to carry on the wars. Through such

apparently nationalistic and even imperialistic justification of warfare, Utopians promote homogeneity and solidarity among themselves.[27] The internal homogeneity and openness among Utopians are juxtaposed with extreme suspicion and secrecy toward outside forces. So it is not surprising to hear that when Utopians make trades with neighboring countries, they "never trust individuals but insist that the foreign city become officially responsible" (61). If the Utopians' relationship with the outside world shows the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, the internal social order is predicated on the dynamics of openness and surveillance.

4

In addition to his avid theatricality, William Roper tells us, More used to wear a hair shirt under his clothes throughout his life: "albeit outwardly he appeared honorable like one of his calling, yet inwardly he, no such vanities esteeming, secretly next his body wore a shirt of hair" (224).[28] We also hear of More's habitual self-flagellation which, along with the hair shirt, was meant to conquer "all his carnal affections utterly" (238). Inasmuch as More's hair shirt is indicative of his inner will

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[27] Amy Boesky interprets *Utopia* in relation to the idea of the nation-state in the early modern period: "Early modern utopias are partly colonialist fables, and the discovery of the ideal commonwealth bolsters imperialist self-confidence and self-importance. . . . In the same way utopias unsettle as they promote the idea of nationhood, revealing both the nation's power to organize and to aggrandize itself as well as the limits and consequences of such endeavors. In most early modern utopias the nation functions as a machine for the production of "perfected" citizens, but it is not always clear whether the author is praising or bemoaning the nation's burgeoning power" (8).

[28] Jonathan Crewe suggests that More's life-long wearing of the hair shirt signals his "desire to prolong the monastic vocation even under the circumstances of public life" (94). Following Crewe's suggestion, then, we may argue that, to a degree, More's own life imitates the dialectic resolution of difference, *as a utopian narrative*, between Hythloday and "More" in *Utopia*.

to control the body and bodily desire, Roper wants to juxtapose it with the public role of the conscientious More. Now remembering that More was very much fascinated by the theatrical and performative aspect of life, we may ask if the hair shirt is not just a costume that More identifies with the inside or at least as an emblem of the inside. If the hair shirt signifies his interior as Roper seems to suggest, then More's claim of his interiority can only come into existence by wearing the external materials or the injuries caused by self-flagellation.[29]

More's habit of wearing a hair shirt and practicing self-flagellation exists in a close relation with his ambiguous attitude as regards the performative sense of identity. The religious and scrupulous More, I suggest, should be juxtaposed with the theatrical, worldly More. The More with the hair shirt exists inseparable from the More who "changed himself into his best apparel" for his execution (253). The hero of conscience loved to keep in his last moment, together with his hair shirt, "a chain of gold" that signified his social status (238-39). If the pre-Reformation More accommodated, within existing religious doctrines, a new understanding of the theatrical aspects of life, More in his final days shows dramatically the fundamental ambivalence he had always cherished towards the sense of performative identity.

When More decided to give over his chancellorship because of Henry's divorce from the queen, he "pretended himself unable any longer to serve" (Roper

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[29] See, for example, the following: "Which [the hair shirt] my sister More, a young gentlewoman, in the summer as he sat at supper singly in his doublet and hose, wearing thereupon a plain shirt without ruff or collar, chancing to spy began to laugh at it. ...He [More] used also sometimes to punish his body with whips, the cords knotted, which was known only to my wife, his eldest daughter, whom for her secrecy above all other he specifically trusted, causing her as needed required to wash the same shirt of hair" (224). Jonathan Crewe points up this examplifies More's *sprezzatura*, "an artless disclosure that makes known More's private self-mortification" (94).

225). This decision to withdraw was certainly a form of personal resistance that had the effect of undermining the moral legitimacy of Henry's position. By his resignation, Elton suggests, More "announced his recognition that the battle was lost: there was nothing left for him to fight for, and the time had come to look to the salvation of souls--his own as well as of those of others" (*Reform* 155). After the resignation of the chancellorship in the face of Henry's tyrannical pressure, More sought refuge under the pretext of being ill among his family at Chelsea, preferring to stay on Fridays in the New Building to spend "his time only in devout prayers and spiritual exercises" (211). In addition to this retreat to his country house, More's refusal to avow Henry's supremacy publicly has been considered as evidence of his privileging the private self over the public self. As J. C. Davis points out, however, we need to recognize that "his conscientious refusal of the oath of supremacy was not the product of an agony of spirit like Luther's, but a reasoned willingness to defy one set of institutions in order to serve a greater and more universal; a denial of the part in order to serve the whole" (47).

But it is more important to note that in this incident More at once paradoxically privatizes his public stance on the issue of king's divorce by resorting to silence, and publicizes his private thoughts on the king's divorce and later his supremacy. In his effort to keep his integrity in the face of Henry's tyrannical threat, More held desperately to the legality of silence. Here we see that his interiority came into existence through his refusal to make a public statement, his masterful performance of silent resistance, as regards the king's supremacy. In order to guard "the secrets of [his] conscience," as his wife reproaches, More "play[ed] the fool to lie

here in [the] close, filthy prison and be shut up among mice and rats" (246; 243).

Disturbed by the performative power of More's silence that challenged the legitimacy

of Henry's tyrannical authority, the anxious king hired Sir Richard Riche as a bait to

pull More from his hideout of silence. With Riche's perjurous testimony that he

overheard More expressing his discontent with Henry's break with Rome, Henry

finally could nail him down. Once trapped by Henry's legal maneuvering, More now

determined to use the king's court as a platform to publicize his private thought.

When his reticent resistance was crushed by the king and he was sentenced to death,

he launched his final performance, his joke on his own life on the scaffold, so as to

make his pain look trivial and thus to ridicule the king's power of punishment.

When, as Marius puts it, More "turned the scaffold into a stage and played his part

to the multitude that came to see him die" (23), I would argue that the brilliance of

his performance lies in its serendipitous realization of the performative sense of

identity. His performance shows eloquently how persistently More wanted to make

his public role correspond to his inner mind, which was his way "to govern his self."

But at the same time, that last performance reveals how contradictory it is to contain

the performativity within the normative knowledge of identity based upon the

existing discourse of the soul and the body. By taking advantage of the scaffold (in

its double senses), More makes execution a triumphant stage of his own dignity,

displaying the power of "the rhetorical ingredient in 'conscience' itself" (Burke 223).[30]

The totality of his life is achieved, at the very moment of death, only through the

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[30] As Kenneth Burke elucidates, martyrdom is "a species of the rhetorical motive"; because "martyrdom (being witness) is so essentially rhetorical, it even gets its name from the law courts … bearing witness to God, bearing witness to the sovereign, bearing witness to one's peers under the guise of bearing witness to God" (222-3).

imaginary sublimation in which the creator circles back to the created by transforming himself into an artifact, as with the subjective implication of himself in *Utopia*.

CHAPTER 3
"MEASURE IS TREASURE": FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PRUDENCE IN
JOHN SKELTON'S *MAGNIFICENCE*

> I think it very convenient, before I begin to meddle
> with the rule of other, surely to learn to rule myself;
> for he that cannot govern one, undoubtedly lacketh
> craft to govern many. I never heard of any mariner
> able to govern a great ship which never could
> govern well a little boat. (Thomas Starkey)[1]

1

John Skelton's *Magnificence* (ca. 1515-21), the only extant play of the English

poet laureate and "orator regius," stages the ways in which the lack of self-control

and temperance renders Magnificence unable not only to manage his personal

wealth but also to fulfill his obligations as a governor. With its primary focus on

Magnificence's financial mismanagement and the political and economical

consequences of his willful conduct, Skelton's play calls for a royal balance between

extravagance and parsimony and thereby links the arts of political and personal

government. Drawing upon the traditional literature of advice to the prince, he takes

pains in this morality play to speculate on "the proper management of the royal

household, especially in relation to finance" (Scattergood 22). "In the physical

interaction of monarch, courtiers and anti-courtiers," Greg Walker suggests,

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[1] The quotation is from Thomas Starkey's *A Dialogue Between Reginald Pole & Thomas
Lupset*, edited by Kathleen M. Burton (London: Chatto & Windus, 1948) p. 23.

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Skelton's *Magnificence* "provides a symbolic representation of the theory of conduct in the early modern court" (*Plays* 90). With the shrewd fusion of economic and ethical principles, this morality play supplies the early Tudor audience--mainly, the monarch and courtiers--with practical advice on how best to conduct themselves and how to govern their households and subordinates.

While keeping in mind the possible referential points in contemporary political and social events, I am more concerned with how the play goes beyond its immediate political context.[2] My interest is in showing how Skelton could take advantage of the morality play tradition in envisioning humanist ideals for governors and princes to cultivate. The play cannot be categorized simply as a conventional panegyric or a glorification of medieval Christian doctrines like typical morality plays. It is well known that Skelton himself had dedicated a verse celebrating Henry's accession, ten years earlier in 1509.[3] After a decade of Henrician reign, however, English humanists including Skelton now began to realize Henry had fallen short of the ideal philosopher-king. Written when the euphoria for the accession of Henry VIII (1509) among humanists had begun to subside, the play reveals the ambivalent desire of English humanists to "mold" a sovereign by subjecting his desire

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[2] If we accept Walker's dating of *Magnificence* as 1521, it may also be of great significance for us to consider together his other poems written between 1519-1522 (such as *Speke, Parrot* and *Why Come Ye Nat to Courte?*) and Skelton's sharp turn-around to begin to praise Wolsey, his one-time target of satire. For example Walker suggests, the political intention behind *Speke, Parrot* is to scandalize "an excess of futile activity which, Parrot suggests, characterizes Wolsey's regime" (*Politics* 69).

[3] For Henry's accession in 1509, Skelton dedicated *A lawde and prayse made for our sovereyne lord the kyng.*" For a subtle and nuanced reading of panegyric verses written for Henry's accession, see David Rundle's "A New Golden Age? More, Skelton and the Accession verses of 1509" *Renaissance Studies* 9.1 (1995) 58-76.

to his subjects. In *Magnificence*, I will show, Skelton offers a revisionary idea of sovereignty when he implies that Magnificence becomes a truthful sovereign by shifting his allegiance from the feudal relationship with aristocrats to his intersubjective one with his counselors.

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In this chapter, therefore, I expound how *Magnificence* dramatizes personified qualities of human relations in order to moralize politics and thus politicize those moral and economic issues, a process through which Skelton can formulate the moral and political codes for the king and his courtiers. While tackling the true and false ways of governing oneself and others, as I shall show, the play collapses the division between religion and political economy, public and private, administrative discretion and personal prudence. In an attempt to locate Skelton's desire to fashion economical and ethical codes appropriate for the monarch, I investigate the ways Skelton represents Magnificence's failure to govern himself and his household, as well as its disastrous consequences for the commonwealth. By rendering Magnificence not only as a representative of mankind but also as a governor of the household and commonwealth--as the guardian of the well-being of *res publica*--Skelton anatomizes the governance of Magnificence and thereby underscores the fact that his failure to master himself touches, beyond his own personal interests, the entire political realm. In this sense, Skelton's *Magnificence* is similar to the works of English Renaissance humanists such as Thomas More, Thomas Starkey, and Thomas Elyot. For instance, Starkey declares:

> if it were so that a man had most prosperous state of body, with health, strength and beauty, yea, and if he had also all abundance of worldly goods and riches, yet if he had not also the straight and right use of the same, he shall not only take of them no profit nor fruit, but he shall also have nother pleasure nor comfort thereby, but rather hurt, damage and utter destruction. (49-50) [4]

Relying on the "widespread agreement amongst the northern humanists about the nature of the advice to be given to their rulers and magistrates" (Skinner 228), the play enables Skelton to scrutinize social and political behavior in early modern England as informed by theatricality of courtly life. As Scattergood observes, in *Magnificence* "the proper administration of a household was a moral as well as practical and political matter" (24).

The play registers a tension between Skelton's personal desire to gain royal favor by offering dramatic advice and the subversive potential of representing, in however contained a manner, the faults and weaknesses of the monarch through an enactment of his self-destructive misgoverning. Dynamically played out in this dramatic work are the competing claims of Skelton's political marginality in Henry's court, his ambition, and his engagement in the humanist reformulation of courtly behavior. As many scholars have pointed out, Skelton was "without support from any noble source in 1521, and isolated from the influential sections of the scholarly world" (Walker *Politics* 49). In this "interlude" of "a mirror encleared" (2520), Skelton fuses an aesthetic treatise on princely behavior with his humanistic (and desperate) desire to impress the king so that he would return to the court as Henry's

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[4] For instance, the entire Book III of Thomas Elyot's *The Governor* is dedicated to defining the virtues that the governor needs to be equipped with. For a discussion on More, see the previous chapter.

counselor. The dialectics of Skelton's commitment to and detachment from real-politics as a humanist intellectual are played out in terms of his role of humanistic pedagogue. As Rebecca W. Bushnell posits in a discussion of early modern humanism, Skelton's ambivalence toward his former pupil and now master is "a symptom of a world of uncertain hierarchies, shifting relations, conflicting authorities, and contradictory values" (*Teaching* 20). An understanding of Skelton's paradoxical position in early Tudor politics as a peripheral and conservative poet who was once the master of his master, Henry, this chapter suggests, allows us to comprehend the ways in which the play deploys "the art of government."[5] Hinged on the fundamental interdependence between the master and his subjects, and involving such issues as patronage and royal deputation, this didactic morality play thereby provides a portrait of Magnificence "as a general figure of authority, one vulnerable to the follies of willfulness, extravagance, and meanness" (Happé 443).

To some scholars, Skelton is a poet-priest or Christian poet addressing his religious concerns through the poems. Still, the portrait of Magnificence might be interpreted as in line with the tradition of *speculum principis*:

> In *Magnificence* Skelton aims at putting the young Henry VIII on his guard against the evils that associating with wicked counselors can bring in its train, and he exhorts the sovereign to practice the virtues of fortitude and liberality according to the particular tradition of *specula principum* that Lydgate and Hoccleve belong to. (Anna Torti 118)[6]

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[5] As for Skelton's marginal status at Henry's court, Greg Walker says: "Skelton was not, contrary to traditional assumptions, a close confidant of Henry VIII, fulfilling some hybrid role of poet, minstrel, teacher and counsellor. Neither was he a substantial figure at Court, capable of observing and criticizing Wolsey at close quarters" (*Politics* 50).

[6] See also Pollet 100.

Undoubtedly Skelton's play, as well as his major poems, taps into this long revered literary tradition. Magnificence is surely cast in the image of the fallen prince in the mirror-for-magistrates literature. Skelton demonstrates that Magnificence's willfulness is an open invitation for the vices to flock into his courtly household where the competition for royal favor is unchecked. Skelton's play relies heavily upon such traditional themes as mutability and duplicity in worldly affairs. As previous critics have pointed out, *Magnificence* shares many similarities with medieval morality plays such as *Mankind* and *Everyman* in its dramatization of a battle between virtues and vices over the soul of the protagonist, Magnificence.[7] The tradition of morality plays, in tandem with the mirror-for-princes genre, offers the playwright the ready-made material to dramatize the fallibility and vulnerability of the prince.[8] With the subtle use of conventional elements for his desired effects, Skelton adumbrates the double dealings and treacheries of the corrupted courtiers in a portrayal of the vice characters similar to that which he had already drawn twenty years earlier in *The Bowge of Court*.[9]

What makes Skelton's play unique is, however, the ways in which he utilizes the morality tradition so as to present a normalizing and prescriptive relationship

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[7] Maurice Pollet divides the play into five parts by using the patterns in morality plays: 1) prosperity 2) conspiracy 3) error 4) chastisement 5) restoration. These phases, Pollet argues, have equivalencies in morality plays: 1) innocence 2) temptation 3) fall 4) repentance 5) redemption. Ramsey uses very similar terms in his division: 1) prosperity, 2) conspiracy, 3) delusion, 4) overthrow, 5) restoration.

[8] Hence, for example, Adversity's dire warning that he will, "strike lords of realms and lands/ That rule not by measure that they have in their hands,/ That sadly rule not their household men (1939-41)."

[9] As early as in *the Bowge of Courte* of 1498, Skelton tried to employ the vice personas to portray and criticize the corrupt courtiers.

between a monarch and his subjects, thereby fashioning an ideal of governor and "government."[10] As Nan Carpenter points out, *Magnificence* differs from typical morality plays in that "the struggle is between prudence and folly [rather] than good and evil," and thus the play is not about "salvation of the soul but worldly prosperity" (76). The main concern of the play is less Magnificence's spiritual well-being as a Christian, as is the case in other typical morality plays, than a presentation of Christian humanist idea of the king's subjection, humility, and restraint.

Magnificence, as Irving Ribner suggests, is "the first clear application of the morality play form to problems of secular politics" (36). Despite the thematic conventionality of the play, Skelton brings to the early modern English stage more than a simple restatement of the medieval commonplaces in morality plays. "Skelton's great contribution to political drama," in David Bevington's words, was "not observation from the life but a closer application of old techniques to new realities than had heretofore been attempted" (56). When the morality tradition is fused with contemporary politics, the tell-tale story has a new resonance. In replacing the salvation of Everyman with instruction in royal governance, the play turns the twisted monarchical impulse toward ostentation into a site of its own renunciation and a disciplinary domain. Thus, I suggest that the play stands as a representation of the humanist idea of government -- both as statecraft and self-mastery.[11] In this dramatic representation of courtly life, Skelton underscores the need for the monarch to negotiate between prodigality and frugality, and medieval hospitality and

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[10] For a succinct discussion of its relation to morality tradition, see Paula Neuss 17-26.

[11] The metaphor of "barge" is, not surprisingly, employed a few times to signify the monarchial government in the play: "if reason be regent and ruler of your barge" 38.

coordinated monetary management. With such subtle alternations between mastery and submission, and between freedom and subordination, Skelton registers the shifts in societal definitions of government, both in terms of the royal household and one's self.

Another way to explain the relation between *Magnificence* and the morality tradition is to recognize the fact that, as Quentin Skinner points out, the northern humanists tended to put more emphasis on the virtue of "godliness" than their less devout predecessors in Italy (231).[12] The rejection of Measure by Magnificence, for example, leads to his committing the sin of pride which many Christian humanists saw as the destructive passion of social life. I would, however, argue that the play's concern with the king's religious sincerity is rather a backdrop or, at best, a complement to its concern with Magnificence's lack of judgment in preserving the welfare of commonwealth against the temptations of willfulness and deceit. In the early sixteenth century, David Starkey suggests, "the theme of the relationship between magnificence and providence was almost a literary commonplace" ("Household" 256). The advocacy of those virtues in the play is tantamount to the religiosity and morality that the northern humanists tried to promote.

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At the opening of the play, we witness a formal debate between Felicity and Liberty on the relation between wealth and reason. Felicity's aphoristic

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[12] Certainly the play seems to couch a tacit assumption that the good prince should, foremost and after all, be a good Christian. "If the prince attains complete virtue, this will make him fully a Christian; and if he becomes fully a Christian, this will enable him to lay the foundations of a perfect commonwealth" (Skinner 232-33).

pronouncement signals the central issue of the play: "wealth without measure suddenly will slide" (192). The ensuing actions are richly informed by this formulaic debate about the proper code of conduct both in households and at the royal court. Magnificence himself echoes in a catechistic manner the notion that liberty and wealth should be tamed and controlled with moderation:

> Wealth without measure would bear himself too bold;
> Liberty without measure prove a thing of nought. (116-7)

With the rich accolade, Measure is established as the chief agency of Magnificence's government ("Wherefore, Measure, take Liberty with you hence,/ And rule him after the rule of your school" 230-1). After the initial debate about the significance of measure in proper government, Magnificence puts Liberty under Measure's supervision. With Measure in charge of his bookkeeping and household expenditures, Magnificence declares that "Measure and I will never be divided/ For no discord that any man can sow" (186-7). Here is a brief moment of harmony and balance, in which Magnificence enjoys prosperity with the aid of Measure, Wealth, and Liberty, whom Maurice Pollet calls "the indispensable conditions of good government" (86-87).

The embrace of Measure as the mainstay of political economy, however, runs counter to Magnificence's desire to realize the kingship through and in his magnificent representations and spectacles. Despite Magnificence's hyperbolic broadcasting of the tie between himself and Measure ("Measure shall never depart from my sight" 190), a moment later Fancy's entrance disrupts the short-lived equilibrium Magnificence seems to relish. Magnificence falls for Fancy's enticing prediction that he would "exceed in nobleness/ If [he] had with [him] *largesse*" (376-

7; italics added). At first Magnificence responds very skeptically and thoughtfully ("But Largesse is not meet for every man" 369) to the suggestion that "surely largesse saved my life/ For largesse stinteth all manner of strife" (367).[13] Yet he readily succumbs to Fancy's sarcastic remark that, under the supervision of Measure, he does nothing but "pinch at a peck of groats" (385), or that "Measure is meet for a merchant's hall,/ But largesse becometh a state royal" (382-83).[14] By the same token, Magnificence willingly gives in to the bold challenge by Courtly Abusion ("Are not you a lord? Let your lust and liking stand for a law" 1607-8) and is inclined to embrace the alleged "princely pleasure, [a] lordly mind" (1628).

From the outset, the play foregrounds the troublesome relation between the exercise of royal magnificence and the frugal management of household economy. In this context, *Magnificence* challenges the traditional conception that princely largess, with its conspicuous consumption, is a spectacular manifestation of royal power. When Felicity urges "Magnificence, this noble prince of might" (273) to display largess and magnificence or when Fancy insists,

> That without largesse nobleness cannot reign. ...
> I say without largesse worship hath no place,
> For largesse is a purchaser of pardon and of grace. (265; 267-8)

The vices love to tap into the notion of royal display and its public splendor. The conflict centers on the conception of kingly power, which registers the dynamic shift of power relations in early Tudor England. The meanings of magnificence, according to OED, include "sovereign bounty" and "sumptuousness or splendor,"

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[13] Magnificence initially chides and has a suspicion of Fancy: "I have espied ye are a carl's page [=a churl's servant]" (288).

[14] An English groat is a coin equivalent to four pence.

not to mention Aristolean "moral virtues." In this perspective, the word "magnificence"--the royal use of extravagant pageantry and display as an exercise of power--is a medieval concept of royal spectacle that, for example, Henry VIII tried hard to embody, even though the exploitation of theatrical power has, for good reasons, been considered more a trademark of Elizabeth.[15] Henry's penchant for spectacular tournaments and grand pageants attests to the theatricality of early modern power and thus to the royal necessity to theatricalize his own body. It is quite probable that Henry's notorious pageant at the Field of Cloth of Gold that Wolsey organized in 1520 might have been in Skelton's mind.[16]

Drawing on this dialectical relation of "Magnificence" and "magnificence," Skelton's play argues for the king's keeping a tighter rein on his entourage and patronage. This morality play, to say nothing of Skelton's other poems, is surely designed to check such royal extravagance. Magnificence's inclination toward lavish self-presentation and public splendor is embodied through "largess" and translated into the household politics of the Henrician court in its broader sense. According to Anna Bryson,

> The sixteenth-century English court was a paradoxical institution. On the one hand, it was the greatest exemplar of conservative aristocratic household organization in the land, with an elaborate hierarchy of officers, geared towards the displays of aristocratic 'magnificence' in the provision of entertainment and the maintenance of rituals of service to the monarch. ... On the other hand, the increasing scale and ideological pretensions of the English court during the sixteenth century made it ever more a unique social and political world, which

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[15] Interestingly, the Lord Chamberlain's department under Edward IV was called the "Household of Magnificence" (David Starkey, "Household" 255).

[16] For the Field of Cloth of Gold, see Scarisbrick 74-80; Guy 106-7.

> encouraged new forms of sociability and social self-valuations among
> the increasing numbers of nobles and gentlemen drawn to it. (118-9)

Skelton's play engages the political economy of the Henrician court in discouraging

the extravaganza of royal spectacles and courtly life.[17] Magnificence discloses the

conflict between wealth and virtue, as well as between the moral and economic codes

of government. Measure is a managerial figure who controls the lavish expenditure

in the royal household. Magnificence himself recognizes the importance of measure

as "a merry mean" in his governance and wholeheartedly delegates his authority to

Measure as the essential force of controlling his administration: "That Measure be

master us seemth it is sitting [=befitting]" (176). Among the horde of allegorical

characters, Measure embodies Skelton's symbolic gesture toward the institutionalized

regulation of expenditure and consumption as an essential attribute of the early

modern art of government. As Greg Walker points out, Measure "exemplifies in his

person both an ideal of conduct, and a practical example of that ideal in action in its

courtly context" (*Plays* 92).[18]

Many critics have read Measure as a bourgeois and mercantile figure in

contrast to Largesse as the mark of nobility. Alistair Fox, for example, calls Measure

a mouthpiece of London's merchant class, arguing that the play "records the

unhappiness of the London merchants at the influence on Henry VIII of the king's

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[17] For a detailed discussion n the importance of the Privy Council in Henrician politics, see David Starkey's articles, "Intimacy" and "Representation."

[18] Walker also says, "Not only does he [Measure] represent a moderate mean between extremes of conduct, he also acts as a mean between individuals, a channel of access for fitting aspirants to place and office" (*Plays* 92). But this view is rather about what Measure is meant to do, not about what he does in the play.

'minions' and the excess into which they had been leading him" (*Politics* 6).[19]
Certainly *Magnificence* contains quite a few passages in support of such an
interpretation: for example, the circumstances of performance and the probable
audience, which explicitly implicates Merchant Hall (cf, 382).[20] But we need to
remember that the issue here is not so much how to accrue wealth as how to spend it.
Magnificence needs to learn how to make a proper distribution of both "largesse" and
liberty, as they are defined in Liberty's speech at the end of the play. Measure is
more a bureaucratic model of management (distinctively different from a medieval
financial system) with his judicious and strong control over the expenditure of crown
money. Skelton's message is that a liberal use of wealth, aligned with "wantonness"
(149) and the unlimited exercise of power, should be checked and ruled by Measure
or mean. Magnificence is advised to rely on a bureaucratic officer, Measure, who
can promote a well-ordered and systematic control of the government.

It is worth noting that Magnificence understands clearly from the outset the
importance of measure in a proper government: "doubtless I perceive my
magnificence/ Without measure lightly may fade/ Of too much liberty under the
offence" (227-29). His tragic fall occurs not because he fails to grasp the importance
of measure and moderation, but because, despite his clear understanding, he falls
easily to the temptations of an indulgence in sensual pleasure and willfulness--the
failings of body and mind. Simple-minded Magnificence is gullible to the flowery
language of the vices, mainly thanks to his easy acceptance of appearance and words

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[19] In 239, Fox also says that the play was "written to represent to the London citizens their
common concern with and understanding of, recent events" (*Politics*).

[20] For a more detailed discussion on this issue of performance, see Paula Neuss 42-3.

at their face value. With this inculpating scene, the "fall of Magnificence is explicitly shown to be the consequence of his failure to regulate the workings of his household" (Walker *Plays* 90). Not simply an innocent victim of those sycophantic courtiers, Magnificence is the chief source of the realm's disasters because of his failure to govern himself properly and in turn to recognize his own deceitful advisers for what they are.

In this sense, the play underscores the need for Magnificence to develop his own "measure" that will eventually help him discern the truthful subjects from the sycophants. His false sense of free will or liberty comes to the surface when he rejects the meddling of the meticulous Measure, after getting a piece of advice from the vicious courtiers. In fact, Skelton is eager to show in several places that Magnificence is under the sway of the vices even when he believes he follows his own likings. At the very moment of proclaiming his own independence, Magnificence actually becomes more dependent upon his subject-courtiers, in the double sense that his decision has been made under their sway and that the practice of his proclaimed liberty requires them (as the Other) for its recognition. Ironically, his declaration of absolute power reveals the fundamental dependence on his subjects and the limitations of his proclaimed autonomy. "The risk of flattery," as Lloyd Davis sums up, is that it "lures the prince to relapse into an imaginary conception of his personal, political desire" (68). Hence the negation of the con-artists or of being deceived comes down to the issue of Magnificence's own self-mastery, inasmuch as the success of the deceptive vices lies in their manipulating Magnificence's own vanity and flaws.

The play here takes issue with the idea of delegation that became inevitable with the growth of bureaucratic apparatus of the Tudor government (for example, the administrations of Wolsey and Crmowell), to the degree that the new royal counselors become the vicegerent of the king who is already the vicar of God. While portraying the frivolous shifts of institutional authority from Measure to the extravagant vice-courtiers, Skelton puts the royal delegation of power under scrutiny. According to Elizabeth Hanson, "in the early modern state, the power the monarch comes to 'hold' is founded, paradoxically, on the dispersal of authority among a portion of her/his male subjects" (19). In other words, the monarch needed to consolidate royal power by organizing his subjects around the interplay of ambition and competition. Magnificence's delegation of power, first to Measure and then to those sycophants, prohibits him from devoting himself to the matter of self-government, essential to his maturity as a governor. The imprudent delegation of power leads to his poverty, which in turn affects both the household and the commonwealth. With the gradual centralization of court administration, such indiscreet preferment now proves detrimental to sound royal governance.

Magnificence's guilt here parallels that of "Henry VIII, … with his fluctuations, enthusiasms, and irregular handling of business, [who] gave it [the faction] an open invitation to flourish" (Starkey *Henry VIII*, 29). This allegorical play, according to Greg Walker and Alistair Fox, reflects on political events such as Henry's expulsion of four minions from court in 1519, the date Walker proposes for the composition of *Magnificence*. According to David Starkey,

> In May 1519 most of the minions, with a few lesser favorites, were
> expelled from court. No formal criminal charges were preferred

against them. Instead they were simply denounced before the Council for unbecoming conduct: for encouraging the King to gamble; for treating him with undue familiarity; in short, for being 'youths of evil counsel, and intent on their own benefit to the detriment, hurt and discredit' of the King. (*Henry VIII* 78)[21]

Starkey reports that "the advent of 'minions' and the creation of the office of Gentleman of the Privy Chamber in 1518-19" (*Henry VIII*, 27) caused great commotion and led to resistance around the Henrician court.

But Greg Walker's (and Fox's) informative undertaking to identify the vices with the four court minions should be received with caution. The immediacy of topical references cannot exhaust the interpretative possibility of this early modern dramatic work. Though it might well be that Skelton was inspired by a political incident, the play seems to be more than a blunt warning to the young king against his indulgence of untruthful courtiers.[22] The same is true of the much-discussed topic of whether Magnificence represents either Henry VIII or Cardinal Wolsey. Skelton's provocative criticism of the court as a hub of scheming and intrigue is usually considered as an attack on either Henry's or Wolsey's court. I think the play does take issue with Henry's as much as Wolsey's governance, both of which fell short of taking good care of the commonwealth. Still, it is more likely that, as Walker himself recognizes, "Skelton has not designed a consistent line of argument with

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[21] For more details on the minions' dominance in Henry's court, see Walker's *Plays* 66-72. Also see Fox, 236-40. Both critics' dating of 1519-20 has effectively replaced the previously held date of the play as 1515-16. On Henry's minions, see David Starkey's *Henry VIII*, chapter 4 "The Court and the Cardinal." Starkey records the details of what Henry did with his closet servants and the intimate circle of his fellow jousters and revelers.

[22] Seth Lerer even argues that what is at stake in the play is really "a confrontation of the very idea of topical literature itself--a querying of the effectiveness of moral drama and political satire" (63). But as I suggest, Skelton seems to sidestep such a difficult problem, rather than deal with it.

which to attack Wolsey" or, for that matter, Henry VIII (*Politics* 85-6). Skelton's play is ultimately a generalized, symbolic configuration of the significance of proper government which involves understanding how to discern others' as well as one's own traits. If there is any ambiguity in the identities of the characters, its intention might be to defeat any attempt to pinpoint allegorical characters as historical figures in a very specific political incident. For example, Measure may not be the representative of traditional nobility, but rather may correspond more closely to Wolsey, whereas the vices are similar to Henry's intimate circle of fellow jousters and revelers.[23] Despite all the personal attacks of contemporary opponents on the administration of Wolsey and his extravagance, what Wolsey did, in fact, was to take care of day-to-day administrative business that was not attended to carefully by the king. As Wolsey's first biographer points out, "the king was young and lusty, disposed all to mirth and pleasure and to follow his desire and appetite, nothing minding to travail in the busy affairs of this realm" (Cavendish 12). Wolsey was the principal figure among those responsible for keeping an eye on the king's assets and giving him financial and political advice.

In Magnificence's wanton expenditures upon his favorites, the play certainly deals with the matter of prodigality ("largesse") that characterized the administration during the Henrician era. By dismantling the image of "ideal" court, Skelton parodies court fashions and turns the palace into a perverted assemblage without moderation and propriety. By their treacherous behaviors, the upstart courtiers

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[23] For a detailed discussion on this circle, see Starkey *Henry VIII* 43-45.

pursued their personal interests at the king's expense. The problem of political

favoritism is underscored when Courtly Collusion asks Magnificence:

> To chose out two, three of such as you love best,
> And let all your fancies upon them rest.
> …
> Better to make three rich than for to make many.
> Give them more than enough, and let them not lack." (1770-4)

On hearing the encomiums of Courtly Abusion (1519-22; 1526-29; 1533-36),

Magnificence announces "in my favor I have you feoffed and seised" (1537).[24] Such

preferential treatment of his chosen courtiers, Courtly Collusion suggests, will

guarantee that "Those three will be ready even at your beckoning" (1779). This

exchange between Courtly Collusion and Magnificence can thereby be read as a

thinly veiled criticism of the favoritism in Henry's court.

By the same token, Skelton shows concern about self-destructive willfulness

driving Magnificence to expel his reasonable advisor, Measure, and to indulge

himself in sensual pleasures ("fasten your fancy upon a fair mistress" 1551), as is

manifest in Courtly Abusion's flowery speech:

> Abusion. So as ye be a prince of great might,
> It is seeming your pleasure ye delight,
> And to acquaint you with carnal delectation,
> And to fall in acquaintance with every new fashion;
> And, quickly your appetites to sharp and address,
> To fasten your fancy upon a fair mistress
> That quickly is envied with ruddies of the rose,
> Impurtured with features after your purpose,
> The strains of her veins as azure indy blue,
> Embudded with beauty and colour fresh of hue,
> As lily white to look upon her lere [=countenance],
> Her eyen reluctant as carbuncle so clear,

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[24] Paula Neuss glosses enfeoff as "put in legal possession" and seise as "invest with."

> Her mouth embalmed, delectable and merry,
> Her lusty lips ruddy as the cherry--
> How like you? Ye lack, sir, such a lusty lass. (1546-60)

With his overly embellished compliment of Magnificence, Abusion lures him seductively into pursuing dangerously irresponsible pleasure. The fact that a prosperous ruler has been brought into adversity through his willfulness becomes a warning against the idea of omnipotent power, manifested in Magnificence's arrogant speeches: "I dread no dints of fatal destiny" (1799). Such arrogance recalls the typical harangue of villains such as Pilate in medieval cycle plays.

4

For a warning sign against the congenial appearance of those evil characters, Skelton resorts to traditional, negative assessments of flexible identities, symbolized by Fortune's mutability. In fact, this theme of satirizing the insolence of the upstart as Fortune's prey had been Skelton's favorite topic in poems such as *Colin Clout* and *Why Come Ye Nat to Court*. From early on, Magnificence frequently invokes Fortune in the process of bragging about his own power and magnificence: "I shall of Fortune rule the rein;/ I fear nothing Fortune's perplexity" (1461-2). With his verbal harangue, Magnificence defines himself in relation to Fortune's mutability. The idea of Fortune as the embodiment of contingency and change helps Skelton highlight the ever-deceiving attributes of the vice-courtiers. In turn, the conventional theme of Fortune's whim and the fate of human beings is deployed to affirm providential design: "Sir remember the turn of Fortune's wheel,/ That wantonly can wink/.../All her delight is set in doubleness" (2023-30). Skelton's concern with protean

changeability--the mutability of identity--might also reflect the social mobility that the conservatives considered a serious threat to destabilize the social order in early modern England.[25] As Richard Britnell puts it, "employment at court was the goal of ambitious young men from the universities or the inns of court who hoped for a lucrative career in politics or the professions" (75). The transformative power of those courtiers, as well as the upward mobility among the educated middle class, shakes the hierarchy by crossing class boundaries and breaking social decorum. Skelton's alleged antagonism toward Wolsey had much to do with the fact that Wolsey was considered an emblem of the ambitious upstart. Fortune's doubleness is coupled with the licentious multiplications of identities among the vice characters-- dissemblance, disguise, counterfeit--in parallel with their ability to change names: "In Fortune's friendship there is no steadfastness" (2157). A world of human limitation and mutability is identified in those histrionic changes of name, which is Skelton's rhetorical operation to promote the unity and constancy of identity. Fortune, which does not care about "man or woman, of what estate they be" (1899), now becomes the executrix of providence.

From the second scene of the play where they are introduced on stage one by one (403ff), the vices are eager to arrogate power for themselves through conspiratorial moves and manipulative counseling--with the kind of deceits and

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[25] Compare this to Pico's famous glorification of human capability for change, in "Oration on the Dignity of Man" 223-54, especially 225, in Ernst Cassirer's *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*.

voyeurism that Seth Lerer recognizes as rampant in Henry VIII's court.[26] Henrician voyeurism that we encounter quite often in contemporary literary works, according to Lerer, is "not just a literary theme but a cultural condition" (13). In the voyeuristic and spying scenes, Skelton addresses the deceits of courtly politics. The self-serving courtiers are ready to capitalize on Magnificence's favoritism and thus squander his wealth and felicity, at the expense of both himself and the commonwealth. The first deceptive move of Fancy is launched with a forged letter from Sad Circumspection, with the aid of which Fancy hopes to become the king's most trusted councilor and stay within earshot. The forged letter, which Lerer calls "the nodal point of privacy and power, diplomacy and desire" (63), shows a revealing dependence of Magnificence on private correspondence. The misplaced trust of Magnificence on the personal intimacy of the letter can be read as an indirect critique of courtly epistolarity and its excessive public significance (Lerer 63). Within the context of Magnificence's misplaced trust, Skelton touches on the economy of correspondence, in which the possibility of forgery and authentication is ever-present.

The Vice figures delight in, and openly boast of, their violations of trust. For example, Crafty Conveyance exults that, as soon as "folly walks in Magnificence's sight/ All measure and good rule is gone quite" (1316-7). Folly himself also declares proudly, "For be he caiser, or be he king,/ To fellowship with folly I can him bring" (1216-17). To win the royal favor, Collusion promises Magnificence "to do you service after your appetite" (1794) and provide "joy without measure" (1782).

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[26] For a detailed discussion of "a voyeuristic courtly life," see Lerer's chapter 1, "Pretexts: Chaucer's Pandarus and the origins of courtly discourse" (1-33). For Wolsey's use of spies and informants to keep the nobles in check, see Alistair Fox's *Politics* pp 143-47.

Magnificence himself robustly seeks sensual pleasures, commanding Fancy and Liberty to "get you hence then and send me some other. ... Lusty Pleasure is my desire to have" (1451; 1453). When Courtly Abusion urges Magnificence to "fasten your fancy upon a fair mistress" (1551), the vice makes royal desire the locus of political contests. Such an explicit sexual trade for the king's gratification attests to what Bruce Smith calls the male homosocial bonding of the early modern period. Those flatterers and intriguers, like Henry's subjects, are all too ready to cater his taste for lavish spectacles and entertainments such as jousting and pageants. With the proliferation of sycophants in his household, Magnificence is predictably reduced to penury resulting from his unscrupulous dissipation of wealth. Even while watching the ruined and decrepit Magnificence begging for mercy, the sinister vices unleash a virulent tirade of abuse at him.

The rich theatricality of disguise conventions is employed in the machinery of the plot development. Whereas the exposition of the play presents as its central issue administrative prudence, the entire plot is informed by the altering names and disguises of the vice characters. As Victor Freeburg's classic study of disguise convention points out:

> Disguise gives dramatic compactness by compressing two characters into one person. One is the fictitious character, who seems real enough to the people in the play; and the other is the real character, whose presence they do not suspect. (15)

As part of a critique of courtly life, the convention of disguise is employed to designate the feigning and pretense of the vices that betray their licentious intrigues. As in the case of Collusion wearing "two faces in a hood" (710), the attempt to

pretend to be what one is not is a sign of one's evilness.[27] Full of what Freeburg calls

"a disguise of abstract character" (18), Skelton's play involves itself not only with the

changeability of the villains, but also with the act of changing itself; in other words, it

presents the concept of representation as well as the ones who employ it. With the

disguises, the vice characters contrive a series of deceptive and frivolous

representations with which they drive Magnificence into extravagant desires.

With the naming game of the vices, Skelton exposes the discourse of trickery

and concealment that distorts the relation between words and acts. And behind this

false discourse stands the emblematic image of the vices' versatility and mutability.

The name game demonstrates their doubleness, deceit, and untruth, with names

becoming outside signs of their inward nature. In juxtaposition with the virtuous

constancy and transparency of Measure and Sad Circumspection, the vices love to

change their identities like chameleons. In this play, as David Bevington notes, "all

are dissemblers, intent on exploiting the new regime for personal gain. Virtually all

are sycophants of lowly origin, making a rapid fortune, intoxicated with suddenly

acquired power, and fond of lavish costumes" (60). Skelton seems to be anxious to

suppress the chasm between words (names) and reality. He reminds his audience of

the translucent nature of identities as designated by the allegorical names, however

futile it is to establish the stability of signifier-signified relation. The changeability

and changing of name sully the very concept, the name as the foundation of identity,

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[27] According to Freeburg, there are three steps in the development of disguise convention: "First, there was only a change of name, but no change at all in appearance. Second, there was a partial change of appearance, or merely a symbol to represent a change. Third, there came a consistent attempt to make the disguised person really look his part in detail" (18). He takes *Magnificence* as an example of the first step.

and thus disrupt the baptismal act of naming that brings referential power into being. Their alteration of names is often in contrast to the immobile truthfulness of loyal subjects who embody hierarchy and virtue. But the paradox here is that if the identity of the vices is, in fact, an effect of naming, then the disruption of naming shakes the idea of stable identity: the name could be both a false and a true index, thus at once revealing and hiding identity. Skelton's effort to expunge the gaps between the identities and the names falls back into a self-legitimating circularity. Because the nature of those characters is hard to pin down, the game of naming and misnaming inadvertently sheds light on the elusiveness of its referential power.

Invoked to highlight their duplicity, the protean nature of the vices is identified with the binary opposition of reality/appearance, and thus that of inner/outer. We may sense here Skelton's yearning for a visible that would become a fine mirror of the mind. What is challenged in Skelton's representation of the name game, however, is his own assumption that the outward shows (i.e., their behaviors) are expected to represent their inner nature. That the allegorical characters can only come into existence by playing the roles prescribed by their names may defeat the intent of the allegorical play, since his own play is just a counterfeit of counterfeit, or a simulation of simulation. By pitting the playful disguise of the vices against its own playfulness, the play does (whether intended or not by its author) pose a potent criticism not only of the dissimulating characters but of the idea of counterfeit itself and of role playing. The ability of the vices to bank on the sinister power of impersonation threatens to mimic this theatrical representation and thus any performance. Skelton's condemnation of the histrionic power of the vice characters

thereby runs counter to his own theater. As was proposed by early modern anti-theatrical arguments against representation, acting on stage itself is nothing but an attempt to be what one is not. Skelton's endeavor to sever true governance from the theatrical and dissimulating performance of the courtly life, as Lerer says, puts into question "the effectiveness of the very genre it enacts" (58).

As in other morality plays, Skelton's vices are always ready to offer self-revelations. Cloaked Collusion, for example, reveals himself to the audience: "Cloaked Collusion is a perilous thing" that only promotes "division, dissension, derision" (695; 700). He has no hesitation in acknowledging publicly his vicious intentions: "I can dissemble, I can both laugh and grone, / Plaine dealing and I can never agree" (698-9). The indebtedness of the play to morality tradition can also be found in the long soliloquies by the vice characters. In the second soliloquy of the play, Cloaked Collusion triumphantly announces to the audience his readiness to "hurt and hinder every man" (709). The play endows each vice with soliloquies in which he makes a public announcement of his own treacherous attributes. Like typical vices in morality whose theatrics are often embodied in their artfulness, the false courtiers take pleasure in publicizing in a private manner their subversive intentions that are the motor of their interpersonal relationships. The scenes of monologue thus stand at the nexus of moral blindness and subtle theatricality that the vice-courtiers represent in this morality play. These direct addresses to the audience do not, however, show much about any private or inner minds, but instead are indicative of the vices' generic origin. Those scenes remind us of the ambiguities, prevalent in the performance of courtly theater in early modern period, between the

public and the private, presentation and concealment, and openness and secrecy. And such playful manipulation is inseparable from the rhetorical dexterity of the vice-courtiers, including their word plays and bawdy language. The emboldened vices make eloquent public announcements of their true identities, which is in stark contrast to the deceptive language they use to elicit Magnificence's favor.

In the comic bickering between the brothers, Fancy and Folly, over their pets (a hawk and a cur), Skelton draws attention to the vice characters' self-destructiveness and self-indulgence.[28] When they pick on each other, the emphasis is on their wanton and mischievous characteristics and thereby on the dangerous volatility and corruptibility of having them around the court. In this way the farcical brawl of Fancy and Folly, as well as a parallel conflict of Collusion and Conveyance, becomes emblematic of their shallowness, reminding us how ludicrous it is for Magnificence not to see through them. The festive degradation shown here points to the lack of spiritual and ethical depth among contemporary courtiers. Skelton's employment of folly is clearly in the tradition of Erasmian and Morean satires: Counterfeit Countenance, for example, brags that "This world is full of my folly./ I set not by him a fly/ That can not counterfeit a lie" (410-12). I agree with Michael West:

> Skelton's fools...manifest kinship with those Renaissance fools whose folly approaches wisdom. Indeed, in this area, Skelton is Shakespeare's most considerable artistic precursor in England, and thus a distant ancestor of such characters as Touchstone, Feste, and Lear's boy. (24)

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[28] As Ramsey suggests, those two might have dressed themselves as professional court fools (xcvii-cvi).

In addition to the corrupt vice-courtiers, the jarring scene of Folly and Fancy reveals the degree to which this play depends on the tradition of morality play, in that they represent the abstracted, psychological aspects of human behavior. The morality's conventional structure and allegorical stock-characters are employed to celebrate a humanist ideal of "government" in the play.

5

Deprived of his goods and raiment--all the worldly amenities--, Magnificence becomes an embodiment of disease and sickness. Now he has to go through shame, humiliation, and disgust before his spiritual and material renewal, as part of a histrionic undoing that anticipates his ritualistic regeneration. By stressing the pathological elements of Magnificence's suffering, Skelton makes his physical disease an emblem of both moral degradation and financial disaster. Magnificence calls himself "patient" (2389) of "wanton excess" (2410), while Good Hope states "your potecary [=apothecary] assigned am I" (2352). Good Hope, one of the four figures to rescue Magnificence, serves as the "remedy principal/ Against all faults of your ghostly foe" (2329-30). Magnificence can be restored to the "health of body" (2370) only by going through the treatment of "disease and sickerness [in] his conscience" (2371). Playing the role of spiritual apothecary, Good Hope literally provides Magnificence with "a lectuary soft" which, according OED, is "a medicinal conserve or paste, consisting of a powder or other ingredient mixed with honey, preserve, or syrup of some kind" (2356). Under great distress caused by poverty, Magnificence is

even driven by a suicidal urge symbolized by the appearance of Despair. Only Good Hope rushes in to take away the knife from him.

Cure comes both through his repentance and good management of his finances, because his material ruin is the flip side of spiritual degradation. The experience of physical pain as well as economic hardship allows Magnificence to understand his flaws and sins, which can only be cured through his submission to God. Before he can be redeemed, as Redress reminds him, he "shall have more worship" (2471) than he has ever had. Going one step further, Skelton links this pathological rendition of Magnificence's problem of mismanagement with Christian doctrine, because as Good Hope declares, "your physician is the grace of God" (2350). As Maurice Pollet suggests, Magnificence embodies the image of "the Sovereign, upon whom depends the ultimate happiness or unhappiness of the Realm, that is to say, in theological terms, its salvation or damnation" (Pollet 84).

The material and corporal punishment of Magnificence for the failure to govern himself and his household properly thereby paves the way for this redemptive moment with the moral injunction to follow. Still, even though the issue of Magnificence's religious sincerity surfaces in the closing scenes, the play on the whole focuses more on his lack of judgment in making moral and political decisions concerning the temptations of prodigality and sensual pleasure. As Bevington points out, "He [Magnificence] must work out his salvation not in terms of spiritual after-life, but of fiscal sanity in this world" (56). His fault lies not only in breaking the law of God, but in breaching the rules and ethics of secular government. Redemption or

restoration of his soul is evidenced in his return to worldly prosperity, not in the after-world.

As Adversity announces, the sin of Magnificence is that he "knew not himself, [and] his heart is so high" (1889) and thus "he was wont to boast, brag, and to brace" (1892). Skelton makes a close link between the financial and administrative failure of Magnificence and his psychological and religious misgovernment. Magnificence's misgovernment would bring "sorrow and care" to the commonwealth, since Adversity strikes "lords of realms and lands/ That rule not by measure that they have in their hands,/ That sadly rule not their household men" (1939-41). Once Magnificence repents his "wilfulness" (2380), he must learn how to make a proper distribution of "largesse" ("Not thorough largesse of liberal expense/ But by the way of fansy insolence" 2116-17) and a proper use of liberty as is epitomized in Liberty's speech at the end: "I am a virtue if I be well used, And I am a vice where I am abused" (2102-3). The lesson Magnificence, and for that matter Skelton's implied target audience—including Henry VIII and Wolsey—also has to learn is how to know the true inward from its outward appearance. To put it another way, how is one to comprehend somebody else's interior secrets--to find a good servant. With the return of Sad Circumspection, Skelton brings back to Magnificence's household moderation, truthfulness, and stability. As Magnificence finally admits to Sad Circumspection,

> Wel I perceive in you there is much sadness,
> Gravity of counsel, providence and wit. (2472-3)

If Magnificence's trouble starts with the absence of Sad Circumspection, the belated return of that character stands as the ultimate reminder of the importance of

"sadness" (or sobriety) in governance. The play introduces a republican spirit under the aegis of the Christian ideal of the monarch by drawing attention to the need to negotiate between prodigality and frugality, mastery and submission, and medieval hospitality and modernized fiscal management.

<div align="center">6</div>

The bewildering denouement, which itself gives evidence of the morality play, has much to do with Skelton's attempt to curb the play's subversive potential. But this use of theatricality threatens to defeat its manifest intention to bolster the power and autonomy of the prince against flattering courtiers. In such a cultural and political investment in the political constituency of monarchy, we may also see Skelton's ambivalent attitude toward his former royal student. By locating the cause of social ills in those corrupt courtiers, Skelton might have intended to place blame for disastrous political decisions on the king's subordinates and thus avoid destabilizing the monarch. David Bevington even sees the theme of the play as supporting the old aristocracy against the new courtiers, with Skelton as "a poet of deeply conservative instinct" (*Tudor* 54). The dangerous issue that the play implicitly raises, though Skelton struggles to bracket off its subversive potential, is that Magnificence's magnificence resides not in his hereditary estate but in his ability to *enact* the virtues. The implicit message is that the true nature of a monarch is in his performance of good leadership: in other words, he must realize his fullest potential by listening to the good counseling of his subjects. Magnificence can only become magnificent and thus confirm his identity as a truthful monarch by performing his assigned *role*--that

of a virtuous governor. Certainly there is this performative sense of identity, an expectation to follow the prescribed role and code of conduct. Then, what appears to be external (wealth and its management) is a mirror of the inside/inherent qualities of his identity.

The restoration of Magnificence to an ideal state of governance can only be envisioned in a world of mutual understanding and interdependence, to be distinguished from a tyrannical oppression.[29] Hence, the play's ending does not declare the outright triumph of frugality over liberality; rather, liberality of the prince is reinstated within the purview of measure and moderation. The opportune, formulaic restoration of Magnificence, along with the sudden return of Sad Circumspection, thus I suggest, might be considered Skelton's contained effort to avoid the subversiveness that this performative ideal of sovereignty could invite. Skelton negotiates his position within the bounds of monarchical court politics.

This view would explain the curious silence of the play on the issue of doling out proper punishment and reward at the end, despite the perils the Vices caused to Magnificence and the loyal subjects. Because the play does not intend to purge the so-called vicious courtiers completely but, instead, gestures toward a need to compromise, Skelton shows implicitly that his concern is not much with the administrative system and its loopholes, but rather with the ethical obligations of the governor. In *Magnificence*, Skelton represents the issue of royal governance under the guise of a morality play, while trying to hide its ambivalence toward the

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[29] Such an epistemological chasm was unambiguously exploited by John Rastell who published Magnificence around 1530-33, so as to propose Magnificence stages "a false philosopher-king, a counter-representation of the idealized image Henry was supplying of

monarchical order, and thus successfully raises the question of the relationship between economic management of the household and the competent administration of government, as well as that of intersubjective relationship between the monarch and his counselors. As Erasmus says eloquently, "there is surely no more effective method of reforming princes than to present them with a pattern of the good prince under the guise of praising them" (qtd. in David Rundle 72).

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Many modern critics of Skelton's works have focused on their political and topical allusions to contemporary events in an attempt to explain the play's satire. Nan Carpenter, for example, argues that the play reflects the political conflicts at Henry's court between the old aristocracy (represented by the vices) and the new power brokers such as Wolsey (75-82). Greg Walker, for example, sees Skelton as an opportunistic poet who shamelessly tried to get promotion by taking chances and publicizing his superficial antagonism toward Wolsey.[30] While recognizing that Skelton's desire to recover lost patronage might be the driving force behind writing the play, however, I am reluctant to read the play as a reflection of Skelton's alleged predicaments and subsequent resentments in his relation with Wolsey. Heiserman, I

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himself in his propaganda" (Warner 113). For the ideological effects of publishing and recycling the play by John Rastell in 1530s, see Warner 118-20.

[30] Greg Walker demonstrates that Skelton might have written *Magnificence*, not in 1515-16, but 1519 or later, based upon the similarities of the courtier characters to the four minions purged in 1519 from the Henrician court (*Skelton*). Instead of pursuing whether the play is about Henry VIII or Wolsey, I'm more interested in the place of Skelton's play in the intellectual geography in the early 16th century England. Personally, I take Walker's four minion theory to be most persuasive. See also Harris chapter 2 "Wolseyan Satire Re-Examined").

think, provides a timely warning against finding "a consistent set of political, ethical and theological ideas" and thus labeling Skelton's work as a whole "either revolutionary or reactionary--depending on one's predilections" (*Skelton and Satire* 11). The ambivalent attitude Skelton reveals toward his material, I believe, is not separable from his unique position in history, is suggested by Elizabeth Carmichael: "while most modern critics have seen Skelton as a conservative Catholic ideologue, and as an unyielding partisan of the medieval social and political order, his near contemporaries saw him as a political subversive, and his unconventional poetics as a rhetoric of religious, social, and political dissent" (20). I agree with Richard Halpern that "Skelton is neither the conservative prophet nor the self-serving courtier, neither the consistent opponent nor the consistent parasite of the Tudor court, but someone who oscillates erratically between these positions, and whose career is therefore full of strange folds and detours" (*Primitive Accumulation* 110). Skelton is indeed "a Mr. Facing-Both-Ways, difficult to fit into the classifications of his time" (Ian Gordon 45).

CHAPTER 4

"THER LAWFULL KYNG" AND "HIS ELECT VYNEYARDE": JOHN BALE'S
KING JOHAN AS REFORMATION THEATER

> The adminystracyon of a princes gouernaunce
> Is the gifte of God and hys high ordynaunce.

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Well known for its 1538 performance in Thomas Cranmer's house at the

expense of Thomas Cromwell, John Bale's *King Johan* takes as its subject historical

figures and events and transforms them into embodiments of contemporary political

and religious affairs. Bale's anachronistic representation of King John and its timely

performance in 1538, indicative of what David Kastan calls "the poetics of

propaganda" ("Holy" 267), exemplify the political and religious agenda of the

English Reformation as well as the role of theater in Reformation politics. The

former Carmelite, who joined the order in East Anglia at the age of eleven, converted

to Protestantism around the late 1530s. After the conversion, he played a crucial role

in the Cromwellian propaganda machine when Henry VIII was not only being

threatened by the Pope with excommunication and interdiction, along with the

prospect of invasion by Catholic neighbors, but also challenged by a variety of

domestic resistance.[1] As a supporter of Henry's royal supremacy and the

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[1] For the detailed discussion of political environment in 1538, see Walker's *Plays* 196-7. See
also Alistair Fox's Chapter, "Propaganda and Polemic" in *Politics*. For the controversies
surrounding Henry's divorce, see Virginia Murphy.

Reformation cause after the beheadings of Sir Thomas More and John Fisher in 1535, the overzealous and convinced reformer worked as a principal agent of Henry's state- and stage-craft in an deliberate attempt to serve the interests of Protestantism.[2]

In Cromwell's employ, Bale launched a scurrilous attack on the Pope and the Roman Church to promote changes in religious doctrines and practices through his plays and other writings. The Henrician context of religious and political reformation enabled the early modern Reformist to redefine the distinction and the relationship between the government of a prince and of the Church.[3] The play's caustic representation of the Pope and papal associates in *Kong Johan*, as I will show, is complemented by the Reformist promotion of the idea of government--both administration and ministration. In this polemical play, Bale turns King John into not only a nationalistic Protestant hero embattled and martyred by the subversive forces of Catholicism, but also the mouthpiece for the Henrician Reformists' attack on the Roman Catholic Church. In order to legitimize his views, Bale "invents the past" on a stage in which the truth both reflects and is constituted through rhetoric, image-making, and representations. With the rejuvenated image of King John who, spiritually and politically, cares so much for his people, Bale's play presents what Leslie Fairfield calls an "epic view of the nation's past in which England had striven heroically (if in vain) down through the centuries to keep out Romish spiritual

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[2] See Happé *John Bale*, chapter 1 & Fairfield 34-6. Bale himself mentioned Henry's break with Rome as one of the main occasions to convert him from the Carmelite Order. John N. King calls Bale "the most influential English Protestant author of his time" (56).

[3] For this topic, see Quentin Skinner, vol. 2.

corruption and political subversion" (94).[4] Such a Protestantization of King John is couched in the new idea of government advocating a reform of the political apparatus as well as of devotional practices and ecclesiastical administration. By presenting John's performance as an epitome of the Christian king, the play intends not only to mold the English into obedient subjects, but also to acculturate the contemporary English with Protestant ideology.

As part of the Tudor project "to encourage the king to assert his power against Rome, and to place such an assertion of power in the context of a Protestant reformation" (Warner 20), Bale's *King Johan* unequivocally promotes the idea that the godly prince should be in charge of temporal and spiritual matters in his realm. With his main focus on the issue of godly government, Bale loads the play with political and religious arguments to deny the Pope any right to intervene in domestic and secular affairs. Bale draws on the prevalent anticlerical feelings of the early Tudor period in his insistence on placing the corrupt Church under the control of the godly king. The Henrician audience of *King Johan* might have still well remembered, for example, the infamous case of Richard Hunne during the early years of Henry VIII. Revolving around the *Praemunire* statutes, the Hunne case quickly became a symbolic incident of conflict between the spiritual and temporal jurisdiction.[5] As a

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[4] For this, see Carole Levin's *Propaganda*. John's image as a proto-Protestant went through a different turn in Elizabethan and Jacobean writers (for example, Shakespeare and Robert Davenport). For a detailed discussion of Elizabethan transformation of John's image, see Carole Levin's "Lust" and her book, *Propaganda* (85ff).

[5] See A.G. Dickens, 90-96. The London merchant was tried for slandering the Church officials regarding the bearing sheet of his dead son and he countersued the Church for violating the *Praemunire* Statutes. But he was found dead in prison on December of 1514, which caused several disturbances in London.

representative case of contemporary conflicts between ecclesiastical and secular government in early 16th century England, the turmoil surrounding Richard Hunne epitomizes the widespread disputes over the Church's judicial independence or even its superiority to royal government in the realm of England. Bolstering the anticlerical sentiments of lay people, as well as of the Reformists, against the excessive power of the Church and the clergy who exempted themselves from obedience to the king, Bale's play unswervingly pounces on the prerogatives of the Church as ungodly and unwarranted. As one critic points out, "widespread anticlericalism, exacerbated by the failure of the English Church under Wolsey to reform itself, proved a fertile seedbed for heterodoxy" during the Henrician regime (Fox 210). By associating Protestantism with godly and national government and thus identifying papal force as the source of both internal and external threats to the godly nation,[6] Bale tries to configure the idea of reformed government, in the middle of the institutionalized reformation in 1530s, around the king's vehemence against the ecclesiastical and devotional abuse of Catholicism.[7]

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To promote the legitimacy as well as godliness of royal governance, Bale turns to the early Reformists' endorsement of the obligation of obedience to the king--

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[6] The problems of ecclesiastical court in the Hunne case were highlighted by many anticlerical pamphleteers more often to reveal the enormity of the papal Church with a view to promoting the disseverance of secular matters from ecclesiastical control.

[7] For the institutional changes of 1530s, see G. R. Elton's *Tudor Revolution in Government*; for differing opinions on Elton's Cromwellian "revolution," see *Revolution Reassessed* edited by Christopher Coleman and David Starkey.

the duty of absolute submission to the temporal sovereign. In the portrait of John as a godly and patriotic type of king, Bale tries to establish the theological and political necessity of his reign fighting against Roman Catholicism. The opening scene of the play featuring John and Widow England creates an image of royal personality that conforms to the Protestant idea of government and thus bestows on King John the exemplary role of Protestant hero.

> By the wyll of God and his high ordynaunce
> In Yerlond and Walys, in Angoye and Normandye,
> In Ynglond also, I have had the governaunce.
> I have worne the crown and wrowght vyctoryouslye,
> And now do purpose by practyse and by stodye
> To reforme the lawes and sett men in good order
> That trew iustyce may be had in every bordere. (15-21)

His "governaunce," King John says, has focused, "by practyse and stodye," on reforming the laws and instituting the social order among his people. He here labors to (re-)present himself as a model of obedient subjection to God, which in turn enables him to enforce the submission of his subjects. With an invocation of Peter and Paul (4) whose teachings allegedly support subjects' unfailing obedience to the monarch, John advocates the holy duty of "a rightfull kyng/ Apoyntyd of God" (128) to command his godly government ("the governance/ By the gyft of God" 123-4).[8] We need to note here the ways the playwright tries to place the legitimacy of the beleaguered king beyond dispute, in contrast with Shakespeare's *King John* where the king's legitimacy is marked as one of the main issues, while the religious controversy seems to be peripheral or, at best, reduced to a matter of political or personal motivation. When Bale's play, from the opening scene on, attempts to

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[8] John also says "God hathe me ordeynned in this same princely estate" (171).

establish the monarchy and obedience as god-given ("all pepell shuld shew there trew

alegyauns/ To ther lawfull kyng" 5-6), such a hyperbolic exposition of John's

legitimacy attests to exactly what is at stake and thus proves the volatility of his

insistence on the royal legitimacy over worldly and religious matters.[9] Thus we can

see why Bale wants to portray John as working heroically for the good of England

and the people, especially Widow England and Commonality, with his earnest

concerns.

The actions of the play are intertwined with this conviction that royal

governance is given and shored up by God, and thus they serve to sanction the

theological legitimacy and duty of the Protestant king.[10] Bale does not simply make

a demand for unconditional obedience and service, but wants to establish the biblical

and moral legitimacy of royal supremacy that must be the ground for absolute

obedience to the king by all ranks. Once the play opens, the impoverished and grief-

stricken Widow England comes forward and asks for princely justice to rectify her

grievances against the Clergy who took from her "cattell, howse and land,/ My

wodes and pastures, with other commodyteys" (62-3). She charges that "Thes vyle

popych swyne hath clene exyled my hosband" (107) who is "God hym selfe, the

spowse of euery sort/ that seke hym in fayth to ther sowlys helth and comfort" (109-

10). John is determined to establish, against papal absolutism, "trew iustyce" by

reforming the laws of the land and setting his subjects in good order. In a

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[9] See Quentin Skinner, vol. 2, chapter 1, "The Principles of Lutheranism." In *The Vocacyon of John Bale*, Bale calls England "his elect vyneyarde" (86).

[10] King John argues, "The powr of princys ys gevyn from God above,/ And, as sayth Salomon, ther hartes the lord doth move./ God spekyth in ther lyppes whan they geve iugement./ The lawys that they make are by the lordes appointment" (1342-5).

conversation with the disgruntled Clergy, Nobility testifies that John is "so noble a prince/ As this day raygneth in only Cristyen province" (567-8). As Interpreter also suggests at the end of Act I, King John "was of God a magistrate appointed/ To the gouernaunce of thys same noble region/ To see maynteyned the true faythe and relygyon" (1088-90).

The contentious character of royal supremacy becomes apparent in Bale's eagerness to portray King John as not only a legitimate but also a gracious king who really cares about the welfare of his subjects. John is "a man to peyne himself for hys own countreye" (2260) who always pursues what is best for the people:

> Neuer prynce was there that made to poore peoples vses
> So many masendewes [=poorhouses], hspytals and spyttles howses
> As your grace hath done yet sens the worlde began. (2146-8)

Confronted by incessant resistance from the papist faction, John's effort to cure ecclesiastical decay and to recover all his wayward subjects seems to bear little political fruit. In the battle of his just cause against the corrupt and privileged Clergy, John turns out to be a scapegoat of the Pope's Machiavellian expediency. Even when Clergy yields to John for a short while (506), he instantly turns his back against John and drums up many intrigues to undermine the royal authority. The price John has to pay for his loyalty to God and his compassion for the country is nothing less the interdiction of England and his own excommunication by the Pope. Under the relentless assaults by papal associates, John's compassionate effort to reform the country proves to be of no avail (1279-83) and, before long, John himself has to give up "both crowne and princely dygnyte." When interdiction and excommunication compel John to submit himself to the Pope and thus hand over the country as a

fiefdom, he does so with the passionate desire that "my swete Ynglond perysh not in this sheppwracke" (1659):

> O Englande, Englande, shewe now thyselfe a mother;
> Thy people wyll els be slayne here without number.
> As God shall iudge me, I don not thys of cowrdnesse
> But of compassion, in thys extreme heauynesse.
> Shall my people shedde their bloude in suche habundaunce?
> Naye, I shall rather gyue vpp my whole gouernaunce. (1717-22)

He speaks in a language more befitting a saint than a ruler. Hence, his resignation of the crown is portrayed as based rather on his love for his subjects than on his concern with safety and political gain. Bale's hagiographic portrayal of a compassionate John, I suggest, is intended to graft the idea of godly government on John's body politics where the public good is not distinguishable from his private desire and morality. Bale's narrative of John plays upon the concepts of pollution and contamination to the degree that the king becomes the lamb sacrificed ("destroyed and lost for ryghteouse doyng" 2188) to purge the polluted country.

When John thinks of himself as a godly guardian of his country and people, it is not difficult to see that Bale wants to fuse the image of John as a true protector of the common people with that of Henry VIII as defender of the faith.[11] In accordance with other Reformers such as Simon Fish and William Tyndale, Bale draws a parallel between the restless years of John's reign and the religious and political concerns of the Henrician Reformation, particularly in John's fight with Pope Innocent III. We see a propagandistic image of Henry in Imperial Majesty who finally brings together, with the help of Verity, three ruling classes--Nobility, Civil

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[11] According to Civil Order, Imperial Majesty does "Of the Christen faythe play now the true defandar" (2427).

Order and Clergy--to work for the commonwealth. With a timely distribution of pardons and rewards, Imperial Majesty is able to resolve the predicaments while making all the subjects a sincere pledge to obey the king and accept their true duties. Imperial Majesty's embrace of Nobility and others who have been easily swayed points to the political challenge that the Tudor radicals faced in mobilizing different classes for their goal. In a sense, this play's concern with the dominant classes is a reformist response to anxiety over widespread intrigues among the nobility, for instance, the threat posed by Reginald Pole as a potential heir to the throne.[12]

The political need to solicit consensus and conformity for the cause of Reformation among different classes and sects certainly forced the Reformers to lay out an idea of the relationship between the monarch and his subjects and thus to fashion their identities within the schema of godly kingship. Bale's play tries to promote a new sense of Nobility, as well as those of the Clergy and Commonality, based not only on birth and inheritance but also virtues and merits ("vertu, fayth and grace ... in the obeydance of kynges" (1524-27). Bale's portrayal of Nobility as duped and deceived by Sedition and other Catholic factions, therefore, expresses his humanist concern with whether nobility consists in "nature... [or] in parentage" (1522-3). The play's attempt to position different classes on the map of Reformation politics, as in its portrayal of three personified characters of the ruling classes, is fixated on the idealized picture of king as the centripetal force, within the consolidated, territorial boundaries, to check the class conflicts that, for example, are marked in the first speech of Nobility attacking commonality (315-6).

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[12] For more detailed discussion of Reginald Pole as a threat to the crown, see Walker's *Plays*

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This reformist play envisions a religious and national identity of England organized around the godly monarch as the unifying force of diversified factions and parties. As is evident in the play's ending where all sects and classes come together under the banner of Imperial Majesty's (Henry's) godly government, Bale's *King Johan* speculates on the absolute authority of the monarchy on which the very possibility of the early modern nation-state is anchored. Henry's struggle with the Pope over his divorce gave rise to the idea of an English nation that would become one of the dominant strands in English social thought in the following centuries. If the Henrician efforts to advance the Reformation were deployed in connection with the idea of the English nation and its political self-assertion, Bale's nationalism unfolds in the context of the Reformation fight against the papal hegemony, and, in turn, the Henrician re-constitution of church and state.[13] Jeannette Dillon points out that "the creation of a new kind of English-language drama at this specific point in time aims to unify the English nation both politically and religiously" (94).

The emergence of a Protestant nation in early modern England went hand in hand with the growth of the country's national consciousness as an independent polity and the sense of being Englishmen. The political need to protect the country and its sovereignty from the encroachments of the Pope and his foreign allies was certainly boosted by Protestant Reformists' efforts to promote the idea of England as the elect nation--as the divinely ordained country. What Fairfield calls "unabashed

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194-6. As for Historical John's trouble with barons, see Carole Levin's *Propaganda* 31-3.

[13] For Bale's nationalism, see Leslie Fairfield's *John Bale: Mythmaker for the English Reformation*, especially chapter 4 "The English Past."

Anglocentricity of Bale's sense of the past" (106) is therefore at one with Bale's antiquarian effort to identify the prototypical Protestant saints who could be used to promote nation-building in early Tudor England. In order to achieve England's political and spiritual independence, early Reformists were ready to make a nationalist appeal to popular sentiment and thus assert the national character of the polity by distinguishing the inside from the outside.

When, for instance, John is defiant and tries to "reforme the tythes and offrynges/ And intermedleth with other spyrytual thynges" (910-1), the Pope is depicted as being always ready to drum up an international force to subdue him (cf, 1628ff). And Clergy steals the inherent rights of the king and the English people under the tutelage of the Pope who, according to Widow England, is nothing but "Of blody Babulon, the grownd and mother of whoredom" (369). "With ... Latyne howrrs, serymonyes and popetly plays" (415), the Clergy and Roman Church are busy causing "the spoyle/ Of her londes, her goodes, and of her pore chylderes toyle" (418). The Pope, as Sedition and Dissimulation testify, is the one behind the scenes pulling the strings of all seditious activities in England (218-20), while trying to advance his political cronies in England (990) and manipulating "pardowns and purgatory" (1022) for his political gain.[14] When John chastises Sedition for being callous and destructive to England, Sedition retorts that he is not born in England but under the Pope in the "holy cyte of Rome" (183). The introduction of foreign powers under the papal command would surely stir xenophobic resentment from the

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[14] Bale's play draws also attention to the diverse sects within Catholics: "a swarme of grasshoppers and flyes--Monkes, fryers and priestes" (2425-6). For the long catalogue of various sects, see 439-60.

English audience against foreigners. The foreign-born Sedition who from the outset aligns himself in public with the Catholic camp brags that "the pope ableth me to subdewe bothe kyng and keyser" (99).

> For his holy cawse I mayntayne traytors and rebelles,
> That no prince can haue his peples obedience,
> Except yt doth stand with the popes prehemynence. (218-20)

The emphasis on Sedition's nativity discloses the chauvinistic sentiment, as well as Bale's conscious effort to paint English problems as imported ones: that is, no other but the foreign-born leads the way for the foreign powers to encroach the English sovereignty.

Dissimulation boasts several times that the usurpation of power in the English nation is part of the international conspiracy to establish papal supremacy. In the name of supporting "chyrches lyberte" (901), Dissimulation is ready to connive with other papal forces to subvert King John's government.

> Kynge Iohan of Englande, bycause he hath rebelled
> Agaynst holy churche, vsynge it wurse than a stable,
> To gyue vp hys crowne shall shortly be compelled. (1005-7)

In the portrayal of clergy's exploitation of England and John's losing battle for "the pore wydowes cause" (129), the audience again cannot miss a nationalist resonance that the current corruption and misery of the country in England are mainly due to foreign influences. So goes the intrigue of Cardinal Pandolphus to instigate other Christian kings of Europe to join the papal campaign to dethrone John: "Destroye, burne vp both cytie and towne,/ That the pope of Rome maye haue hys scepture and crowne" (1646-47). With repeated revelations of conspiratorial intrigues by the Catholic characters, the play directly taps into the resentment of the Henrician

audience toward foreign princes and countries who threatened English liberties on behalf of the papacy. The implied involvement of the Pope in this international maneuvering enables the playwright to establish the notion that the papacy has no legal or scriptural authority to interfere in the ecclesiastical and secular affairs of an individual kingdom or even to depose anointed kings. David Kastan calls *King Johan* a "timely articulation of the anxieties of the godly nation in the face of increased Catholic efforts to reimpose papal authority upon it" ("Holy" 270). Because of the volatile international situation in 1530s, as well as domestic schisms, as Quentin Skinner puts it, "the cause of the Reformation is thus equated with the true destiny of the nation" (vol. 2, 107).

In this context, Bale takes up the use of vernacular language as a ground for national and religious identity, offering a contrasting picture of the plainness of the vernacular pitted against the ornate Latin phrases used by the Catholics.[15] When the play features the use of macaronic language and untranslated Latin tags by the Romish Church, it is to bolster the legitimacy of the Reformist condemnation of Mass, matins, lauds, prime, and vespers of the Catholics. In employing Latin liturgies as a lip service to God, for example, Dissimulation declares, "we wyll no servyce to be songe,/ Gospell nor pystell, but all in Latten tonge" (718-19). By preventing people from understanding the contents of the Bible and the litanies, the priests can keep them in a condition of ignorance: "that is in Latin that no man shoulde it knowe" (1841). Considering that many Reformists saw the vernacular

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[15] As David Kastan says, "it is a cliché of sixteenth-century history that the translated Scriptures were also both the mark of England's emergent nationalism and a primary agent of it" ("Noyse" 46).

scripture as a device to bring spiritual liberation to England, it is not surprising that Bale's play refuses the Latinity of church history and medieval Christendom under the rule of the Roman Church. As a medium for foreign forces to impose their wills on England and her people, Latin is "construed here as the outward sign of a religion that protects a self-seeking and elitist clergy" with superficial piety and lack of inner faith (Dillon 92).[16]

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Bale's attack on Catholicism is first of all involved in theological issues and matters of religious doctrine, including the Scripture, idolatry and anti-clericalism. As Keith Thomas reports, "the denial of the efficacy of the Catholic rituals of consecration and exorcism became central to the Protestant attack" (52). The late medieval English Church was thus "saddled with the tradition that the working of miracles was the most efficacious means of demonstrating its monopoly of the truth" (Thomas 26).[17] The Catholic Church is guilty not only of economic exploitation and political subversion in England, but also of having disregarded scriptural authority. Under the leadership of the Pope, "the wyld bore of Rome" (71), the clergy have "gret plesure to walowe them selvys in myre" (82) and take "Dylyght in mennys

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[16] As Jeannette Dillon indicates, there is a certain ironic recognition of Latin in the play even in its attack: "Thus, even within a play that attacks Latin as a means of excluding, deluding and profiteering, Latin retains some of its aura of authority. The audience, while clearly summoned to liberate itself from the exploitation and control that Latin represents, is still called upon to respond to its traditional appeal" (105). In fact, many of Bale's polemical tracts were written in Latin, probably because of his desire to be heard among intellectuals. For this dilemma of the Reformists, see Peter Burke 36ff.

[17] For the medieval investment in religious relics and rites, see Keith Thomas, chapter 2.

draffe and covytous lucre" (85).[18] John declares the Roman Catholic Church is "no holy chyrch nor feythfull congregacyon,/ But an hepe of adders of Antecristes generacyon" (492-93), and the Clergy, "blynd leaders of the blind," are "ageynst all right and iustyce" (34; 28). While driving Commonalty into outward blindness by poverty and adversity, the papist Clergy misleads him into spiritual blindness with the aid of superstitious images and relics.

A close linkage is established between the place of the Scriptures in the church and the place of king in the state so as to put forward the idea of a godly king who has divine authority to rule the church as well as the commonwealth. The play endeavors to ensure that God's words will be the final authority on the matter of proper government for the individual, the church, and the state. For example, John and Widow England, the main sufferers of papal intrigues, very quickly align themselves with the words of the Bible, an action put into a sharp contrast with the Catholics' blunt disregard of God's words. John yields himself to the Scriptures for guidance in his political and religious governance, which Bale underscores to promote the idea that the god-given authority should allow a king to lay claim to sovereignty in spiritual matters as well as political administration. Whereas John has recourse to the Bible whenever he is faced with seditious activities of his subjects ("Prove yt by scriptur, and than wyll I yt alowe" 1435), the rebellious Clergy argues publicly "That Scripture doth not is but a lyght fantasye" (2399).

In contrast to John's conscientious effort to reform the country and the church, the Vice characters representing the papacy frequently stake out superstitious claims

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[18] Bale's exploitation of the image of Babylon and its problematic misogyny, see McEachern.

to external trappings and acts of devotion which are not based on the Bible. For example, Dissimulation boasts in his soliloquy:

> The dead sayntes shall shewe both visions and miracles;
> With ymages and rellyckes he shall wurke sterracles [=spectacles].
> He [=U. Power] wyllmake mattens, houres, masse and euensonge
> To drowne the scriptures for doubte of heresye;
> He wyll sende pardons to saue mennys sowles amonge,
> Latyne deuocyons, with the holye rosaye.
> He wyll apoynt fastynges and plucke downe matrimonye;
> Holy water and breade shall dryue awaye the deuyll;
> Blessynges with blacke bedes wyll helpe in euery euyll. (996-1004)

With its rituals and relics, the church "lacke[s] neyther golde nor sylwer, girdles nor rynges,/ Candles nor tapperes nor other customyd offerynges" (712-2).[19] As the blind Commonalty indicates, the adversities of the country are due to "pristes, channons and monkes, which do but fyll ther bely/ With my swell and labour for ther popych purgatory" (566-67). When Stephen Langton presides over the rite of absolution with "a bone of the blyssyd trynyte,/ A dram of the tord of swete seynt Barnabe . . . a feddere of good seynt Myhelles wyngs, a toth..." (1215-1230), the scene more resembles the incantation of a magician than a prayer of a Christian priest, the outlandishness of which allows Bale to paint Catholic practices as absurd. Church's worship of outward signs and external ceremonies is indicative, to the eyes of Henrician Reformists, of its lack of inward faith. The scene of ridiculous rites by the popish subordinates serves not only to discredit the ceremonies of the Catholic Church but also to create the illusion of corruption, decadence, and superstition. In the mocking scenes of confession and absolution, the preposterous practices also

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[19] As Edwin Miller duly notes, a fifth of the entire play is about the Catholic rituals and accompanying devices, doctrines, and objects (803).

function to reveal the absence of both moral and logical coherence in the ecclesiastical community.

The image of clerical corruption in exploiting the state of England economically, spiritually and politically is augmented by the sexual laxity of the Catholic clergy. When John surrenders, Sedition declares that, if the Pope hears the news, "Our holye father maye now lyue at hys pleasure/ And haue habundaunce of wenches, wynes and treasure" (1686-87). There is even an insinuation that Sedition might have committed rape (2596), not to mention his earlier attempt to seduce the Widow England. Certainly Bale taps into the stock metaphor of moral looseness and promiscuity, when, for example, the four Vices exchange bawdy jokes about the Pope's ass while conspiring against John. Bale's play invokes the necessity for a social and moral reform, as well as religio-political reform, in England when Stephen Langton as the Archbishop of Canterbury at once displays and absolves the Clergy's sexual promiscuity. In support of the self-discipline imposed by monogamous marriage, Bale portrays clerical chastity as a thin veil for ungodly behaviors--whoring and committing other sexual sins.[20] His satiric depiction of the Catholic practice of clerical celibacy here provides the Reformation audience with new ammunition for its anticlericalism. Kendall points out that "the Catholic faith in voluntary chastity was viewed by Bale as a dangerous form of spiritual regression, a doomed effort to return to the safety of a presexual infancy" (96). In criticizing priests for their hypocritical sexual lives and confessional practices, Bale campaigns for the need to

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[20] For the issue of clerical marriage, see Eric Josef Carlson, "Clerical Marriage and the English Reformation" in *Journal of British Studies* 31(1992) 1-31.

deal with, but not to avoid, sexuality as a way of governing and mastering himself, the church, and the country.

The elaborate parody of Roman rites was part of the Cromwellian campaign against superstition and papal supremacy and therefore is deployed to provide a rationale for John's dramatic seizure of Church properties and, by extension, for Henry's dissolution of the monasteries. With the beginning of the dissolution of the monasteries in 1536, there was also the first outbreak of widespread iconoclasm in England.[21]

> The establishment of an English Church not only denied the supremacy of the pope, fulfilling the imperial desires of Henry that were perhaps apparent even as early as 1509 with his amendments to the coronation promises, but also provided the state… with resources, both institutional and financial, essential for the effective consolidation of power. (Kastan "Holy" 270)

During the first phase, the iconoclasm was officially directed against images which had been the object of allegedly superstitious veneration, including ritual acts such as censing, kneeling, and prayers. So it is not difficult to see the rationale for Bale's disparaging Catholic priests with their dogmatic emphasis on the horrors of Purgatory and the means whereby sinners could mitigate them. Against the Catholic clergy's reliance on such superficial things as litany and costumes, the play envisions the religious authenticity of Protestantism as based on inner belief and the Scriptures. And when Imperial Majesty finally emerges as an embodiment of spiritual and temporal authority, he is first enjoined to clean up the mess:

> If ye wyll make sure ye must exyle sedicyon,
> False dyssymulacyon, with all vayne supersycyon,

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[21] See Eamon Duffy 379-423 and Scarisbrick 331-54, for iconoclasm during the Henrician era.

>And put priuate welthe out of the monasteryes;
>Than vsurped power maye goo a birdynge for flyes. (2441-44)

His apocalyptic mission can only be accomplished on the condition that he resolve the religious and political problems John faced during his turbulent reign because of his faithfulness to God's words. In the picture of John's naivety and vulnerability, which result in his tragic ending under the barrage of the Catholic intrigues, however, we cannot but notice that, despite its teleological optimism, Bale's *King Johan* admits the need for a godly king to be armed not only with moral and spiritual fortitude based on God's words, but also with practical (sometimes, even Machiavellian) skills for adroit governance.

5

Quite a few critics have suggested that Bale's representation of John has little to do with judicious handling of historical evidence, and that the play illuminates not so much the historical events of King John's reign as Bale's own positions on historiography, contemporary politics and religion.[22] Taking his facts from the chroniclers but altering the details and point of view, Bale transforms King John into both a Reformist saint opposing ecclesiastical decay and a predecessor of the Henrician reformation. Closely related to his rereading and rewriting of the Catholic-oriented chronicles, Bale's obvious anachronism operates in conjunction with the need of Henrician Reformists to enhance a sense of a corporate solidarity

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[22] For a factual discussion of what happened to King John, see C. R. Cheney. Considering Bale's political agenda, the silence of the play about the Magna Carta or the death of Arthur (John's nephew) which plagued the reign of historical John, is after all not so perplexing.

and thereby legitimize Henry's claim to royal supremacy. The polemical dramatization of historical events within the purview of biblical precedents is grounded on the "new learning" which, though unknown to John and his age, is envisioned as the way to purge the corruption the Pope and his subordinates have brought to John's England. The fact is that early Tudor Reformers had no compunction in transforming historical facts to suit their need to offset the medieval portrait of John as a cowardly king who pursued his private desire at the expense of public welfare.[23] Bale himself is well known for his vigorous compilation of a vast number of English chronicles, as part of the Reformist project to revive the national past as a precursor of the reforming present.[24] Along with his antiquarian endeavors and polemical tracts, *King Johan* was part of Bale's continuous project to imagine the lives of Protestant saints, to re-create the saint's-life literature within the Protestant spirit, and to provide a Reformist vision for the nascent Protestant nation.[25] Bale's reinterpretation of King John as the secular antipapal hero corresponds to the typical Reformist campaign, initiated by Tyndale, to see history from a Protestant perspective.[26] Thus, when Bale's play repositions John's quarrel

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[23] For this, see Carole Levin's *Propaganda*.

[24] Timothy Graham and Andrew Watson recently edited some of early modern English bibliographies on chronicle documents by Protestants such as John Bale and John Joscelyn under the title of *The Recovery of the Past in Early Elizabethan England*. For Bale's influence on John Foxe and other Protestant martyrologists, see Levin's *Propaganda* and Fairfield.

[25] For Bale's Protestant martyrology, see Fairfield, chapter 5. See also King 71-5.

[26] As Fairfield suggests, "Certainly much of what Bale said [after conversion] was consistent with the Erasmian spirit of reform--his emphasis on understanding the faith, his stress on biblical preaching and on liturgy in the vernacular, his opposition to the cult of saints, and so on" (47).

with the Pope as part of the age-long struggle between good and evil, it is to pave the way for supporting Henry's fight against the papacy as a long march to the completion of what John began.[27]

Drawing upon "Tyndale's Catholic-conspiracy theory of chronicle writing," Bale challenges the objectivity of traditional historiography to restore divine history, allegedly garbled by Catholic chroniclers (Pineas, *Anti-Catholic* 19). As King John himself predicts in the play, the papist chroniclers castigated the king as a "wyckyd tyrant" because of his incessant efforts to eradicate Catholic abuses from his country ("The prystes report me to be a wycked tyrant/ Be cause I correct ther actes and lyfe vnplesaunt" 1402-3).

> Yow pristes are the cawse that Chronycles doth defame
> So many prynces and men of notable name,
> For yow take vpon yow to wryght them euermore;
> And therfor kyng Iohn ys lyke to rewe yt sore
> Whan ye wryte his tyme, for vexcyng of the clergy. (585-9)

The Catholic chroniclers are accused of having falsified the past in their annals, as is clear in Verity's indictment: "A trayterouse knaue ye can set vpp for a saynte,/ And a rghteouse kynge lyke an hatefull tyraunt paynte" (2299-2300).[28] The new historiographical idea enabled Bale to relate the national past to the problems of contemporary England, such as the struggle for supremacy between King Henry VIII and Pope Clement VII. With the anachronistic appropriation of the historical John, Bale shores up the Reformist representation of Henry as a true Christian king who

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[27] John is even alluded as "a faythfull Moyses" (1107).

[28] Bale takes issue with the Catholic reverence of Thomas A Beckett (2597ff). In his *A Brief Chronicle*, Bale criticizes Polydore Vergil for "polluting our English chronicles most shamefully with his Romish lies" (qtd. Skinner vol. 2. 49).

launched a holy war against the devilish Pope. King John's conflict with Pope Innocent III over papal authority and national sovereignty becomes, for the Tudor Reformists, a historical mirror to reflect contemporary situations. So we may even argue that when Imperial Majesty plays the essential role in perfecting the reformation and thus the state in the play, Henry's struggle for independence from the Pope retrospectively serves to illuminate the significance of John's troubles caused by the papal power.

The play's attempts to distinguish the Protestant version of history as a testimony of God's providence from the Catholic chronicle as a perjury, however, runs counter to the problem posed by history writing that, as narrative, can be both testimony and perjury.[29] In the process of rewriting the English history in terms of Protestant tradition, the Reformist playwright turns beliefs into symbolic representations under the name of "the new lernyng" (1158). But when his account deviates from a straightforward factual reporting, Bale's own challenge to medieval chronicle writing falls back on itself, registering the contradictions of Protestant historiography: on the one hand, an ironic recognition that history writing could be a false testimony; on the other, a denial of the fact that his renditions could be false. I think this is where Bale needs the Bible to justify himself and his historical narrative, which testifies exactly to "a theology of truth and secrecy" (Baudrillard 12) in which God becomes the final judge who separates true from false, reality from the sign. As Kastan indicates, "The circularity of Bale's procedure is unmistakable and

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[29] Interestingly the play not only positions King John in the new historiographical context but also makes him show a self-awareness of his place in history.

inescapable: history demands Scripture to be known truly, and Scripture demands history" ("Holy" 278). Only after establishing the Scriptures as the foundation of truth is Bale's Protestant historiography able to calibrate the slippery distinctions of true and false histories and thereby sanction his own polemical use of history and representation. At the moment when he foregrounds God's words as the ultimate source of truth and history, his program falls into inevitable circularity in that what has to be proved is already its own proof.

6

Alongside his endeavor to differentiate Catholic chronicles from true history is Bale's undertaking to establish a permanent and invariable distinction between true and false representation on the ground of its truthfulness to God's words. Unlike the Elizabethan Puritans who were hostile to the stage, the Henrician Reformist embraced the effectiveness of drama as a polemical force in religious and political disputation and thus took advantage of theatricality to facilitate the dissemination of Protestant ideology. As an effective means of appealing to popular audiences, Bale made an enthusiastic use of the conventional techniques of the morality plays by putting biblical knowledge in a new social and historical setting. The audience's preconceived notion of Vice as an evil force, for example, enabled him to flesh out his vision of Protestant doctrines against those of the old religion.[30] The allegorical elements inherited from the medieval dramatic tradition were adopted as a way not

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[30] Worth noting is that John is not seduced to the temptation but victimized by the conspiracy of the vices.

only of advocating ethical or religious principles as in the typical morality play, but also of attacking specific institutions--the Catholic Church and the papacy--and their practices.

With the introduction, from morality tradition, of visual symbolism such as the changing of costumes, the play is quick to disparage the theatrical displays of the Catholic Church and its associates. For example, Sedition as the main vice proves an adept performer from the outset and is always ready to impersonate whomever he is not.

> In euery estate of the clargye I playe a part:
> Sumtyme I can be a monke in a long syd cowle,
> Sumtyme I can be a none and loke lyke an owle,
> Sumtyme a channon in a syrples fayer and whyght,
> A chapterhowse monke sumtym I apere in syght,
> I am ower syre Iohn sumtyme, with a new shauen crowne,
> Sumtym the person and swepe the streets with a syd gowne,
> Sumtyme the bysshoppe with a myter and a cope,
> A graye fryer sumtyme, with cutt shoes and a rope;
> Sumtyme I can playe the whyght monke, sumtyme the fryer,
> The purgatory prist and euery mans wyffe desyer.
> …
> Yea, to go farder, sumtyme I am a cardynall;
> Yea, sumtyme a pope, and than am I lord ouer all,
> Bothe in hevyn and erthe and also in purgatory,
> And do weare iij crownes whan I am in my glorye. (194-210)

Sedition seduces the otherwise loyal Nobility by putting on a garb of religion while Dissimulation wears a monk's habit (718-27). And Usurped Power, like other papist tricksters, assumes the role of the Pope with his gorgeous outfit. Such frequent changes of costume by the clerical characters underscore their protean power as well as their untrustworthiness, because insofar as the costume changing is exposed to the audience, the technique, in a dramatic sense, serves to discredit whatever the characters say or do. The vice characters are portrayed as "[a]ddicted to the pursuit

of play, [and]... exult in impersonation, disguise, and deception" (Kendall 97), as is the case with Dissimulation's assurance that "Thowgh we playe the knavys, we must shew a good pretence" (688).

As a visible manifestation of corruption in the Church, the Catholic exploitation of costumes and spectacles becomes the underlying rationale for Bale's codification of Protestant theater as a chaste medium that is not adulterous or idolatrous. The medieval theatrical tradition of the Vice helps Bale make a distinction between truthful and preposterous representations. The true martyrdom of John, for example, is in sharp contrast to the mimicry of Dissimulation whose stereotypical trickery mocks his self-styled martyrdom. The contaminated behaviors of the Catholic vices attest to the very possibilities of dignity and authenticity that Bale wants to assign to the Protestants. With its portrait of Catholic theatricality as a sign of untruthfulness, Bale's own theater puts paradoxically in motion the juxtaposition of Protestant literalism and Catholic representationalism. In this sense, Walker is right in saying that the play is "as much a creature of the catholic world it rejects as of the reformed one which it heralds" (*Plays* 194). With the help of medieval tradition, Bale's "truthful" theater of Protestantism is envisioned as being able to turn the inside of Catholics out as much as externalize the depth of John's interiority.

Bale's attempt to position his Protestant theater as a purveyor of truth, however, runs counter to a self-defying logic with the result that, as Claire McEachern argues, "the effort to distinguish the true church from the province of false signs stumbles on the oxymoron of a true sign" (262). Inasmuch as the play is

thematically anchored by the demarcation between true and false churches and between true and false theaters, the play's underlying claim rests on the assumption that the opposition between true and false signs should be illumined only by God's words--the Scriptures. However, the hermeneutic difficulties of interpreting God's words, which can only be transmitted through human language, must qualify Bale's attempt to authenticate his own representation. His exposure of Catholic theatricality, as is in the case of history, calls into question its own condition of possibility at the very moment of production and thus casts doubt on his claim to the purity of Protestant theater. Bale's *King Johan* thus prefigures the later development of anti-theatrical positions in the Elizabethan and early Jacobean era in its effort to establish the distinction between manipulative and faithful theatricalities. Bale's iconoclastic theater bears witness to the problem of its criticism of the Catholics by dramatizing "theatricality" and representing representation, which anticipates the Puritan nervousness about theatricality and representation. As David Kastan suggests, Bale's questioning of drama with drama "threatens to collapse its fundamental opposition between godly rule and papal duplicity in the very condition of enactment" ("Holy" 272). Inasmuch as the play portrays Roman Catholics as Machiavellian, Bale's own attempt to use this propagandistic entertainment resembles the very practice he criticizes. His godly theater, in other words, is constantly in danger of collapse by questioning its own theatricality, which betrays both the desires and anxieties of the Protestant playwright. Only the presumed transparency of God's word is there to save his own godly performance of a paradox

that, until the plain rejection of theater by the Puritans, slips through the presentation of truth built with theatrical representation.

<center>7</center>

In relation to the dissimulating theater of the Church, a close attention should be paid to the ways that Bale represents the secret activities of Catholics in which dissimulation, hypocrisy and intelligence converge. Along with the strategic uses of dissimulation and theatricality, Bale illustrates how the Catholics exploit the disciplinary potential of auricular confession and excommunication. The play brings to light the secrecy of the old religion that, in league with its manipulative exercise of theatricality, involves the intentional concealment and revelation of secrets to organize social and power relations. As is shown in England's complaint that she has suffered from "thes same subtyll spyes" (126), the network of Catholic spies was organized by the Pope to gather information and thereby control the authorities of secular power.[31] Sedition indicates proudly his role in the papal intrigues to overcome secular rulers all over Christendom:

> In abbeys they haue so meny suttyll spyes.
> For ones in the yere they haue secret vysytacyons,
> And yf ony prynce reforme ther vngodly facyons,
> Than ij of the monkes mvst forthe to Rome by and by
> With secret letters to avenge ther inivry. (245-9)

He openly brags about their intelligence system whereby the Pope could be aware, at every moment, of anyone working against his interests. Even with "Argus eyes,"

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[31] Sedition could be found in "every towne... [among] any sect monastycall" (257-8). And see Sedition's revelation of the Catholic intrigues and conspiracies in 2512 ff.

John would not be able to defend his crown from the secretive intrigues of Catholics (1189). The Pope's international network of spies, mostly consisting of monks and priests, served to collect intelligence so that the Roman Church could discipline any monarchs and groups who might be defiant or independent. This allegation of covert operation of Catholic spies clearly reflects the early Reformists' suspicion that the Church establishments worked for the Pope in gathering information pertaining to any anti-Catholic activities.

Along with the insidious espionage of the popish factions, the Catholics are ready to hide behind the ceremony of auricular confession as a way of disguising themselves. Sedition, for example, plays the role of "a pryste and a traytour… under *Benedicite*" (1811-2).[32] The seal of secrecy would prevent officials from uncovering seditious conspiracies, while allowing the Church to maneuver against the state.[33] When Sedition employs confession in his scheme to talk Nobility into deserting the king and following the bidding of the Pope (1150-86), Nobility's confession has little to do with its penitential purpose but much to do with a political maneuvering to insure his treason. The scenes of confession highlight the immorality of the Pope in employing priests as informants with economic and political motives. This political exploitation of confession by the Church breaks the trust between the confessor and priest and is nothing more than a political machine of generating knowledge and power. The confessional confrontation in early modern England was played out

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[32] Benedicite is what the penitent says at the beginning of confession (Miller 806).

[33] Sedition boasts that "by confession the holy father knoweth/ Throw owt all Chrsitendom what to his holynes growyth" (272-3). And Dissmulation also suggests, "The popys powr shall be abowe the powrs all,/ And eare confession a matere nesseary" (1019-20).

against the struggles between the king and Church, and between a variety of political

and religious factions. The Pope himself suggests that the use of confession, as well

as of many other devotional devices, is to strengthen the power of Church:

> Fyrst eare confession, than pardons, than purgatory,
> Sayntes worchyppyng than, than sekyng of ymagery,
> Than Laten service with cerymonyes many,
> Wheby owr bysshoppes and abbottes shall get mony. (1076-9)

As Greg Walker argues, the play makes "formal confession, with its ritualistic

gestures and stylized language, both one of the major motifs in the play and the chief

device by which his clerical characters suborn the lay estates" (*Plays* 212). The papal

manipulation of auricular confession in Bale's play registers the slide of confession

into a strategic device in early modern power relations.

Auricular confession in *King Johan* does not deal with its theological aspects

such as the forgiveness of sin (267-68) or the meaning of confessing one's private sins

and inner mind to a priest. Bale's play is rather interested in a penetration of the

ecclesiastical power of Church into secular governance, and much less in the

individual's psychological interiority as a breeding ground for the inner religious life

that later became the center of Puritan discourse. With its critical portraits of

invasive ecclesiastical investigations into domestic politics and individual lives, Bale's

play took part in developing the social idioms of secrecy and espionage as

institutional practices of information gathering. His portrait of confession bears

witness to the process of the discursive formation of secrecy and thus of discovery.

The discourse of secrecy is deployed to condemn Catholic meddling with domestic

and secular matters. In addition, John himself proves part of the game, inasmuch as

spying presumes epistemologically the precedent of concealment and the need for

revelation. In the confessional scenes, the priests' game of secrecy involving disguise and spying, concealment and revelation, anticipates the Elizabethan debate on individual conscience and casuistry, not to mention Walsingham's spy network. Bale's language of confessional polemics gestures toward an early modern way of fashioning subjectivity through secrecy and surveillance, to the degree that his configuration of confession as a political machine to discover the secrets and thereby to structure power relations rests on the presumption that something is hidden to be disclosed.[34]

The discourse of secrecy in the play sheds new light on the slip of the tongue as a theatrical device that parallels the inadvertent self-condemnations of vice characters. On a simple level, the slip of tongue, a reminder of the play's debt to medieval drama, works as a dramatic and theatrical device in moving the plot as well as revealing the villainy and hypocrisy of the vices. But it is also deployed in the context of secrecy--concealment and revelation--in which Bale locates Catholic iniquity, in contrast to Protestant transparency. Sedition speaks inadvertently and retracts immediately his covert objective in front of John: "I haue a great mynd to be a lecherovs man--/ A wengonce take yt! I wold saye, a relygyovs man!" (304-305). The slip of the tongue is employed to demonstrate the deviousness of the old religion he professes and the hypocrisy in his continuing to support it. Just after submitting himself to the king, Clergy also lets slip his inner mind:

> *K. John.*   Aryse, Clargy, aryse, and ever be obedyent,
>   And as God commandeth yow, take vs for yowr governnere.
> *Cler.*   By the grace of God, the pope shall be my rulare.

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[34] As Peter Happé suggests, while discussing Bale's *Vocacyon*, "the sense of the self in the Protestant ethos may be further sharpened by the rejection of auricular confession, and the consciousness of persecution which intensifies the idea of a personal struggle" (46).

> K. John.   What saye ye, Clargy? Who ys yowr governer?
> Cler.   Ha! Ded I stomble? I sayd, my prynce ys my ruler.
>   (510-14)

As a rhetorical and dramatic device, the slip of the tongue spells out Bale's idea of the

relation between representation and truth. Despite the vices' immediate retraction

or, rather, because of it, the slips of the tongues are a perfect place for the playwright

to reveal their evil nature and, thus, the worthlessness of the course they advocate.

The game of concealment and revelation informing the slip of the tongue scenes

enables Bale to reveal the natures and intentions of Catholic vices notably by their

own admission and then to confirm them by the subsequent developments.

8

John Bale made a crucial contribution to the development of Protestant

biblical drama, which became an effective machine of propaganda during the

tumultuous years of Henrician Reformation.[35] As one of the most prolific and

belligerent Reformist writers, he tapped into the dramatic tradition, as well as the

flood of propagandistic pamphlets and writings, to further the reform movement in

early Tudor England after Henry VIII's break with Rome over the divorce crisis. He

was the first Reformist writer to use drama as a polemical weapon in dealing with

the problems and issues of post-Reformation England. Under the auspices of

Cromwell and Cranmer, the English stage witnessed in the late 1530's and 40's the

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[35] See Blackburn 29ff and Pineas *Anti-Catholic* 5ff. Pineas considers Bale as "the first Reformer to recognize the propaganda potential of the stage." Patrick Collinson calls Bale as "an incorrigible and irrepressible propagandist who knew that dramatic performances which appealed to instincts and prejudices below the belt and somewhat beneath the level of the highest intelligence were a more effective means of spreading the new religion than learned treatises, more telling even than sermons" (103).

culmination of Protestant interludes and moralities as a powerful means of publicizing reformed doctrine. Bale formed a company of touring actors known as "My Lord Cromwell's players" (Bevington, *Mankind* 52), or, as Paul White calls them, "Bale and his fellowes" ("Patronage" 40),[36] that performed with considerable frequency at court, on village greens, and in guildhalls and churches all over England. In an attempt to advocate Protestant doctrines and royal supremacy, the playwright found in the theatrical conventions of medieval drama a ready-made arsenal of provocative techniques.[37] Drawing upon the Morality convention, Bale could easily arouse anti-Catholic feeling and discredit the rival way of Catholicism by associating the vice's objectionable features with superstition, dissimulation, hypocrisy, and secrecy in the Roman Church.

The play's distinct departure from the conventions of the English morality takes place when the allegorical figures turn into historical figures. In taking the risk of anachronism, Bale configures a new kind of theater to deal with his contemporary political and religious issues within the purview of Protestant historiography.[38] As the play progresses, the audience observes the multiple transformation of Usurped Power into the Pope, Private Wealth into Phandolphus, Dissimulation into Symon

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[36] See also Kastan "Holy" 269. Walker says that Bale might have been "leading a troupe of actors who performed before Cromwell" around 1538-9 (*Plays* 170).

[37] Considering the political inclination of Reformists against the papacy, it is no surprise to know that the development of Protestant biblical morality is in coincidence with the decline of the medieval mystery play. With regard to the Catholic mystery and morality play, we have to keep in mind that the attacks of the Protestant interludes acted as an indirect cause of the discontinuance of a large portion of the old religious stage. For the decline of mystery and morality plays, see Gardner and O'Connell.

[38] For a book-length study on the transformation of John's image in early modern England, see Carole Levin's *Propaganda*.

of Swyasett, and Sedition into Stephen Langton.[39] As soon as the contemporary

settings and events are introduced, the characters that are social types (ie, Civil

Order; Private Wealth) and abstractions (ie, Sedition; Dissimulation) become

historical figures with proper names, offering "a striking illustration of the

secularizing trend at work in sixteenth-century art and life" (Bevington, *Mankind*

132). By mixing up historical personages with contemporary events, Bale is able to

stage the Protestant narrative of 400-year national struggle that culminated in the

Henrician Reformation. In the later revisions where Bale replaces Henry with

Elizabeth as Imperial Majesty (2671-84), he even extends the royal genealogy of

reformation from John through Henry to Elizabeth.[40]

King Johan's chief contribution to the English stage, as McCusker points out,

"is the introduction of historical characters in place of such personifications as the

seven deadly sins" (90). The idiosyncratic mingling of historical and allegorical

characters, unprecedented in the history of English drama, makes *King Johan* a

pioneer piece of Protestant biblical theater used to promote the doctrines of

Reformation.

> *Kynge Johan* is our first history play because it deliberately uses
> chronicle material in order to accomplish several legitimate historical
> purposes. It is, in the first place, a nationalist work dedicated to the
> greater glory of England. ... Secondly, the play attempts ... to interpret
> history, in turn, as support for that doctrine. Thirdly, in typical
> Renaissance fashion, it uses an historical event of the past to throw
> light upon a political problem of the present and to offer a guide for its
> solution. (Ribner 39)

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[39] The first moment of historicization comes when the allegorical Sedition turns into Stephen
Langton, the Pope's choice for the Archbishop of Canterbury whom John refused to
recognize (941ff; 1056ff).

[40] For the revision(s) of the play, see Adams' "Introduction."

Based on Reformist historiography, Bale could (re-)interpret historical examples and fit them into current political and religious circumstances. *King Johan* was intended to provide the early Tudor audience with an exciting *exemplum* of what happens when English subjects obey a "foreign potentate" (the Pope) rather than the word of God and their own prince. What makes this play extraordinary in terms of dramatic history, however, is less its heavy debt to the Vice tradition than the fact that it opens up a way for the Elizabethan dramatists to amalgamate allegory and history. Bale's *King Johan* marks a watershed in the history of English theater, which anticipates such great Elizabethan plays such as Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*, Dekker' *The Whore of Babylon*, and Shakespeare's histories. Bale's *King Johan*, which James Bryant calls "a curious combination of the Morality play and the proto-chronicle play" (46), is a dynamic merging of history and theological politics, where we can recognize the problematic of appropriating the past and applying it to the present in the context of the Reformation.

CHAPTER 5
"LEARN THEN TO RULE US BETTER AND THE REALM":
HOMOEROTIC POLITICS AND REGICIDE IN CHRISTOPHER
MARLOWE'S *EDWARD II*

> But what are kings, when regiment is gone,
> But perfect shadows in a sunshine day?[1]

> What does it mean to be a monarch or an aristocrat,
> if not to be powerfully objectified?

1. Christopher Marlowe, *Edward II,* and the Art of Government

Christopher Marlowe's *Edward II* is an uncanny play that, as many critics

have duly noted, seems to crisscross with the playwright's own life and its obsessive

lure of always challenging the boundaries. Marlowe's short, tumultuous life--his

temperament, alleged homosexuality, spying activities, and career in the theater--

may well inform the themes of *Edward II,* his only play with an English setting.[2]

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[1] The first quotation is from *Edward II*, Scene 20, lines 26-7; and the second quotation is from Peter Stallybrass, "Value" paragraph 3. All references to *Edward II* hereafter are taken from the New Mermaids series 2nd edition (NY: W. W. Norton, 1997), edited by Martin Wiggins and Robert Lindsey. Following the original quarto version, this edition has no act division different from the conventional five-act division.

[2] Many critics have related Marlowe to "atheism, blasphemy, and homosexuality" (Nicholl, "Faithful" 1) and "spontaneity, opportunism, recklessness" (Cheney 4). As Charles Nicholl reports, Marlowe was charged as "a dabbler in magic, a smoker of tobacco, a forger of counterfeit coins, [and] a brawler in the streets" ("Faithful" 1). Paul White refers to Marlowe as "a practicing spy, professed atheist, occasional felon, and notorious homosexual love" ("Introduction" xi). For discussions on Marlowe's sexuality, see Nicholl and Stephen Orgel. For his role in Elizabethan espionage, see Nicholl's *Reckoning* and "Faithful" as well as

While recognizing the fascinating insights to be derived from readings in terms of Marlowe's "self-fashioning" or his psychological problems, however, this chapter attempts instead to see the play as a register of Marlowe's concern with the Renaissance idea of government, an umbrella term that I offer to account for its political and historical concerns.[3] As Stevie Simkin observes, *Edward II* has been interpreted "as a story about the conflict between the personal and the political; as a story of the legitimacy of revolt against an inadequate and ineffectual monarch; as a homosexual love story; and as a story of an 'overreacher'" (174). In what follows, those different aspects of the play are accounted for by the principle that the art of government mediates the dynamic divergences and conflations between the sexual and the political, and between the private and the public as well. In its portrayal of Edward as "a man whose lack of self-government parallels his inability to govern the realm" (Parks 281), I would argue, *Edward II* subjects the early modern idea of government to critical scrutiny, in terms not just of whether a king is fit to govern the country but also of what it means to *govern* and govern *well*. Even the play's "concern over the sexuality of the monarch" that has generated many critical interpretations, as Carole Levin suggests, is part of Marlowe's rigorous endeavor "to focus on questions of good governance" ("Lust" 255).

Roger Sales. For a general discussion of Elizabethan espionage, see Curtis Breight, Alan Hayes, and Allison Plowden.

[3] See Greeenblatt, chapter 5. And Matthew Proser, in his psychological interpretation of Marlowe's life, posits that the aggression and flamboyance of the characters in his play are closely connected to his temperament that is rooted in his troubled childhood. See chapters 1 & 2 of his book. For a critical re-formulation of the author-function in literature, see Foucault's "What is an Author?"

Edward II is, in this general sense, a product of Marlowe's engagement in Elizabethan politics and social issues,[4] while drawing on the actual historical events from English chronicles. The political environment in England of the late 1580s and early 1590s, as well as Marlowe's own activities, elucidates the play's political urgency in contemplating the matters of government, including such varied issues as private desire vs. public duty, sexuality and self-mastery, royal favoritism, court politics, social mobility, and the legitimacy of resistance and regicide. Marlowe's play registers a historical process in which the medieval concept of the "King's two bodies" (body natural and body politic) is metamorphosed into the dyads of the public and the private, and of the political and the sexual, by challenging the early modern English political system based on royal intimacy and favoritism, that is, what Curtis Perry calls the "politics of access" that took the central place in the Tudor political landscape since Henry VIII's installment of the Privy Chamber as the main machine of royal administration early in the sixteenth century.[5]

2. Royal Favoritism and Court Politics

The play opens with Edward's letter asking Gaveston to "share the kingdom with thy dearest friend" (1.2), informing the audience that Edward has just called Gaveston back from his banishment in France against the will of his deceased father and the barons. After greeting Gaveston ecstatically, Edward lavishly endows him

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[4] For the relation of the play with contemporary politics, see Mark Burnett's "*Edward II* and Elizabethan Politics," 91-107.

[5] See David Starkey's essays, "Innovation," "Representation," and "Household." Also see Curtis Perry 1054-79.

with titles and estates: "I here create thee Lord High Chamberlain,/ Chief Secretary

to the state and me,/ Earl of Cornwall, King and Lord of Man" (1.153-3). Edward's

frivolous heaping of rewards on Gaveston triggers resentment among the nobles over

the sudden ascendancy of the king's "base-born" favorite, bringing the king into

tension with the barons who also vie for royal access.[6] When Gaveston walks "arm

in arm" with Edward or sits by him "leaning on the shoulder of the king" (2.20-3),

the nobles are concerned with the political power that Gaveston enjoys through such

close physical intimacy.[7]

At the center of the play's conflicts, therefore, is King Edward's unflinching

affection toward his minions, first Gaveston and later Spencer. Edward's infatuated

relation with them, as his peers indicate, is evidence of his failure to govern the

kingdom properly. He wastes the royal bounty by means of which the monarch is

supposed to manage his realm and subjects. As Mortimer points out, Edward

squanders the treasury of the commonwealth in deifying his personalized friendship

("prodigal gifts bestowed on Gaveston/ Have drawn thy treasure dry and made thee

weak" 6.155-6). Now his bounty rather serves to disrupt the accepted protocols and

institutions under royal patronage, as well as to render titles and offices insignificant.

Edward further compounds his failure of management by bribing the peers for a

momentary reconciliation with them: Threatened with Gaveston's expulsion, he tries

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[6] The nobles call Gaveston as one "that hardly [is] a gentleman by birth" (4.29); a "base
upstart" (12.21); "base and obscure Gaveston" (1.101); "a night-grown mushroom" (4.284).

[7] Of course, when Isabella notes with burning jealousy that Gaveston "clasps his cheeks and
hangs about his neck,/ Smiles in his face and whispers in his ears" (2.51-2), it is a rather
sexually charged one. Their homoeroticism is more plainly constructed in the mind and
through the eyes of jealous Isabella.

to sway the barons with titles and estates (4. 65-9). And the bribery of the nobles severely undermines the symbolic significance of royal bounty in Edward's governance. Edward's prodigality is, therefore, indicative to the nobles of his failure to manage properly his own desire, the royal household, and the kingdom.

When the Mortimers bring up the list of names of those known for their amorous relationships with kings, their main concern is the social and material advantages Gaveston gains through royal favoritism. Admitting that "The mightest kings have had their minions" (4.392), Mortimer Senior takes Edward's attachment to Gaveston as just a youthful fling ("For riper years will wean him from such toys" 4.402). On hearing Mortimer Senior's enumeration of classical precedents for royal friendship with minions, the younger Mortimer grumbles:

> Uncle, his [Gaveston's] wanton humour grieves not me,
> But this I scorn, that one so basely born
> Should by his sovereign's favour grow so pert
> And riot it with the treasure of the realm,
> While soldiers mutiny for want of pay. (4.403-7)

Mortimer Junior's anger is directed not at the alleged sexual deviance in the Edward-Gaveston relationship, but at the way the relationship disrupts social order. In fact, both Mortimers tolerate Edward's affection for Gaveston as a matter of royal prerogative. Jonathan Goldberg finds it "a radical move" that the play has "the Mortimers contend that although Gaveston has not remained in his proper place, there is nothing improper in his sexual relationship with the king" (121). When they set Edward's private pleasure against the public duty of kingship, the judgment of the Mortimers attaches no moral stigma to Edward's homoerotic relation. And on a

cursory reading, the Mortimers appear to separate the political from the sexual as unrelated realms of governance.

I would argue, however, the essence of the radicalism lies rather in its discursive erasure of the distinction between the private and the public at the moment of its production. If the peers separate political problems from the king's personal frailties, they do so only to conflate them later with the notion of proper government. In reality, the particular remark of Mortimer elder rather opens up for them an epistemological possibility of pitting the private against the public, the sexual against the politic, and the inside against the outside. Inevitably, the disgruntled nobles challenge the *object* of Edward's affection. Hence a few scenes later, Lancaster calls the scandalous friendship of Edward with Gaveston "England's high disgrace" (6.186). By conceiving Edward's personal relation already as pertaining to the kingdom, the peers quickly close off the tenuous distinction between the private and the public. And the same is true when, confronted by the peers, Edward belatedly tries to isolate personal desire from public duty ("Will they appoint their sovereign/ His sports, his pleasures, and his company?" 12.174-5). Edward's self-defense only confirms that his homoerotic relation and the subsequent misuse of royal bounty are inseparable in terms of Edward's (mis-)conduct as the king. In this sense, the play "both conceals and reveals the paradoxical link between patronage and homoeroticism as subversive practice and social bond" (Archer 77). Thus I disagree with Joan Parks's characterization of "Marlowe's thesis that the

public, political world is constituted and determined by private forces" (283).[8] I

suggest that, instead, the system of royal favoritism in Edward's court serves to

disguise and obscure the nature of his homoerotic friendship, and vice versa. As

Emily Bartels argues in her discussion of *Edward II*'s debt to Holinshed, the

homoerotic friendship of Edward enables Marlowe not only to separate but also to

collapse "the two categories, using the sexual to incriminate the political and,

reciprocally the political, the sexual" (148).

Whereas the peers see the reemergence of Gaveston as a threat to the sense of

hereditary nobility, Edward takes their defiance as interference with his royal

prerogatives. In the face of baronial discontent over the promotion of Gaveston,

Edward blatantly retorts: "Were he a peasant, being my minion,/ I'll make the

proudest of you to stoop to him" (4.30-1). He taunts and humiliates the fuming

nobles: "What, are you moved that Gaveston sits here?/ It is our pleasure; we will

have it so" (4.8-9). Even with the threats of looming "civil wars" by the nobles,

Edward is determined to have his way ("The headstrong barons shall not limit me;/

He that I list to favour shall be great" 6.259-60). The resistance of the barons angers

Edward, because he takes it as a challenge to his authority:

> My swelling heart for very anger breaks!
> How oft have I been baited by these peers
> And dare not be revenged, for their power is great?
> Yet, shall the crowing of these cockerels
> Affright a lion? Edward unfold thy paws
> And let their lives' blood slake thy fury's hunger. (6.197-202)

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[8] Joan Parks suggests that the play is concerned about "the self-interest that lies behind all history and political action" (283). The play "delineates and focuses on a private realm, which he sets up in opposition to the public as a volatile source of decisions affecting the state" (276).

Edward's absolutism thereby runs counter to the aristocratic autonomy of the nobles who refuse to accept the role of passive political obedience. Taking his favoritism as a sign of his power, he claims the unrestricted right to give out titles to whomever he likes: "I will have Gaveston; and you shall know/ What danger 'tis to stand against your king" (1.95-6).

The interconnectedness of royal favoritism and homoerotic intimacy becomes clearer when we look at the role of Spencer. Spencer's meteoric rise is, to a certain degree, a surer example of social mobility depending on royal favoritism than Gaveston's in terms that the nonsexual nature of the Edward-Spencer relation may signal a subtle change in the play's focus from homoeroticism. Edward repeats a few times to swear that he would "either die or live with Gaveston" (1.137), but he is all too ready to embrace Spencer once Gaveston is killed:

> You villains that have slain my Gaveston.
> And in this place of honour and of trust,
> Spencer, sweet Spencer, I adopt thee here;
> And *merely of our love* we do create thee
> Earl of Gloucester and Lord Chamberlain,
> *Despite of times, despite of enemies.* (11.142-7; emphasis added)

Certainly we cannot help noticing that Edward here promotes Spencer less "despite" than "because" of the presence of time and enemies, and that the embrace of Spencer as his new minion thus becomes an expression of sheer contempt for the nobles.[9] Edward is here revengeful, wanting to show the nobles that the stake is not Gaveston

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[9] As of this theatrical repetition, Greenblatt calls it as "the renewal of existence through repetition of the self-constituting act" (201). The result of this repetition, says Greenblatt, is "that the objects of desire, at first so clearly defined, so avidly pursued, gradually lose their sharp outlines and become more and more like mirages" (217). Marlowe collapses the historical gap of nine years between Gaveston's death and Edward's adoption of Spencer Junior as his new minion.

but whether he can exercise his power absolutely. Spencer becomes more or less a replacement minion and Edward's relation with him does not appear to be homoerotic, unlike that with Gaveston.[10] In this exercise of favoritism, Edward's sense of power takes precedence over the stability of his kingdom. So it is no surprise to hear Edward swearing that he would not mind making "England's civil town huge heaps of stones/ And ploughs to go about our palace gates" (12.31-2).

In place of Joel Altman's argument that Edward's "ultimate failure as a king was that he had no *idea* of kingship" (367), therefore, I would suggest the play represents the ways in which Edward's fantasy of unlimited power challenges accepted notions of sovereignty.[11] The personal desire of the king comes to a head with the political demands of the barons and thus drives his kingdom into "a fundamental breakdown of the delicate political balance" (Simkin 177). When Edward embraces Gaveston and later Spencer, he inadvertently undermines the very system that puts him at the top of the linear hierarchy. Edward's naïve concept of sovereign power disturbs the established order of things and thus causes a social injury to the entire society. When Lancaster bluntly asks Edward to "Learn then to rule us better and the realm" (4.39), he expresses the contractual relationship between the monarch and the feudal barons. The same is true of Warwick's response to Edward's threat to arrest them: "We know our duties; let him know his peers" (4.23).

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[10] When Derek Jarman's recent film portrays the Edward-Spencer relation as homosexual and erotic, it does tell more about Jarman's objective than Marlowe's.

[11] In fact, the historical Edward said in his letter to a cardinal, "since we are ruling in the hereditary kingdom of England, one thing should be weighed above all with foresight and careful, how… the rights…of our Crown and royal dignity may be preserved without diminution" (qtd. in Kantorowicz 380).

Edward's attitude, the barons feel, annihilates the commonwealth as a corporate realm based on the alliance between king and magnates, both of whom are jointly responsible for maintaining the kingdom and his rights. In his refusal to recognize the baronial demands, Edward violates this reciprocal principle.

When Edward is stripped of his clothes after being captured by the rebels, the scene points to the core of kingship that resides not in his body as a deposit of inherent power, but in his relation with his subjects. An exemplary conflict between the king and his peers happens just after the peers exchange verbal insults with Edward on Gaveston's return from the second exile. On hearing the news of Mortimer's uncle who has been captured by the Scots (6.113ff), Edward declines to pay the ransom for him. Mortimer considers the ransom a matter not of money but of royal responsibility to aristocratic subjects. Since his uncle is "taken prisoner in his [Edward's] wars," Mortimer protests, "who should defray the money but the King [?]" (6.116-7). By the same token, Lancaster takes it as a royal attack on the status quo that is supported by both church and aristocracy, when Edward lets Gaveston have the Bishop of Coventry thrown into a muddy ditch and confiscates his properties--an ironic foreshadowing of the sacrilegious scene of torturing Edward (2.3-6).[12] Thus acting as the mouthpiece of the angry nobles, Mortimer reprimands Edward:

> Thy court is naked, being bereft of those
> That makes a king seem glorious to the world--
> I mean the peers whom thou shouldst dearly love. (6.171-3)

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[12] Edward demands that Gaveston "throw off his [Bishop of Coventry's] golden mitre, rend his stole,/ And in the channel christen him anew" (1.186-7). This certainly pushed the Bishop of Canterbury to join the rebelling nobles with disgruntlement that "the bishopric of Coventry is his [Gaveston's]" (1.2.45).

Being "unkind to thy nobility," Mortimer taunts, is "how thou art maimed" and causes "the ruin of the realm" (13.29-30; 2.32).

Thus Edward's conflict with the nobles calls into question the meaning and function of royal patronage that endows wealth and power on those mostly from nonaristocratic backgrounds. In Edward's court where "'Love' is structured within reward and patronage," the peers themselves seek royal affection and political preferment (Shepherd 204). By promoting his minions, the nobles protest, the king did "incense" his loyal "peers/ That *naturally* would love and honour" him (1.98-9; emphasis added). As Goldberg sums up succinctly, "The peers, as much as the minions, want the king's love" (119). Gaveston's direct appeal and access to the monarch ("My knee shall bow to none but to the king" 1.19) drive a wedge into the early modern court politics that would impose upon the courtiers fierce competition over royal favor. With the royal accessibility, Gaveston boldly refuses to accept the existing hierarchy ("Farewell base stooping to the lordly peers" 1.18) and holds the nobles in contempt:

> Base leaden earls that glory in your birth,
> Go sit at home and eat your tenants' beef,
> And come not here to scoff at Gaveston,
> Whose mounting thoughts did never creep so low
> As to bestow a look on such as you. (6. 74-8).

Acting like a king's equal, even making a provocative, speculative speech ("Were I a king" 4.27), Gaveston scoffs at noble privileges as well as at "the multitude that [are] but sparks,/ Raked up in embers of their poverty" (1.20-1). Gaveston's homoerotic relation with the king gives him free access to political power over the heads of the nobles, which in turn upsets the established order.

3. Friendship, Homoeroticism, and Gender[13]

Homoerotic favoritism is the focal point of Edward's governance to the extent that Edward's obsessive passion for Gaveston ("love-sick for his minion" 4.87) leads to his failure to master his pleasure and thus to govern the realm. Edward's homoerotic friendship brings to the surface the dynamic reciprocity in early modern society between the politicization of sexuality (as in the indignation of nobles) and the sexualization of politics (as in Edward's insistence on keeping his minions). Marlowe's play constantly configures royal favor as a love between two males, which threatens to negate the uneven status between the patron and the patronized. If, as Curtis Perry points out, "the language of friendship, intimacy, and reciprocity was privileged" and "friendship between men was understood to be the key public relationship, the very stuff of civility and social order" (1058), Edward's affective relation with his minions brings into clash the crisscrossing social desires of friendship and homosexuality.

The barons incriminate Edward's favoritism not only because it leads him to become tyrannical but also because it makes him effeminate. Edward is criticized because his intimate relation with Gaveston has made his "treasure dry" and thus causes him to be "weak" (6.156). The emasculated Edward rather chooses Gaveston

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[13] For a discussion of the play from the perspectives of sexuality and politics, see Claude J. Summers' "Sex, Politics, and Self-realization in *Edward II.*" According to Summers, "the radicalism of *Edward II* resides in the play's intersection of sex and politics and in Marlowe's refusal to moralize either" (222). But I would argue Marlowe actually does *moralize* them in his own unique way. See also Bruce Smith (209-23). Homosexuality and/or homoeroticism have been the focal point of recent criticism on *Edward II.* For example, see DiGangi, Bartels, Goldberg, Bray, Guy-Bray, Bredbeck, and Summers.

over the realm, and at length proposes that the nobles divide the country among them:

> If this content you not,
> Make several kingdoms of this monarchy
> And share it equally amongst you all,
> So I may have some nook or corner left
> To frolic with my dearest Gaveston. (4.69-73)

In the eyes of his nobles, such a rhetorical suggestion is an indelible evidence of Edward's misgovernment. Mortimer chastises Edward:

> Nothing but Gaveston; what means your grace?
> You have matters of more weight to think upon (6.7-8)

His political irresponsibility is well summed up by the fact that Edward responds to this chastisement with "a trifle!" (6.10). Even amid domestic and international crisis, Edward dreams of an idyllic space in which he may freely frolic with Gaveston. While seeking refuge at an Abbey, Edward expresses, though in a passing manner, his yearning for a monastic life where he may share with Gaveston a romanticized relation ("Father, this life contemplative is heaven,/ Oh that I might this life in quiet lead" 19.20-1). Such an extreme pastoralism is the flip side of his determination that he would not mind leading the country into a civil war for the sake of his love.

Edward's escapism feeds on his emotional attachment to Gaveston as he is forced to experience a repetition of losing and gaining back Gaveston under the aggressive opposition from the baronage. When Gaveston is again forced into exile, Edward cries out: "Thou from this land, I from my self am banished" (4.118). Though he is supposed to be "the embodiment of the land and its people," as Greenblatt points out, Edward "lives in his own country like an exile" without

Gaveston (196). When confronted by Mortimer, Edward defines Gaveston's love as almost sublime:

> Mortimer Jr. Why should you love him whom the world hates so?
> Edward. Because he loves me more than all the world. (4.76-7)

Edward's spirited defense of Gaveston is close to a sign of his naivete. Edward even finds in himself Gaveston's alter ego ("Thy friend, thy self, another Gaveston" 1.142). While he may genuinely love Edward, Gaveston's concern seems rather to secure his political position through Edward's affections, fulfilling what Thomas Cartelli calls Gaveston's "fantasy of self-enrichment" (124). It is true that Gaveston does not seem to wear the mask of an affectionate friend just for political gain, but his relationship with Edward certainly raises him on the arena of court politics whose operation depend on royal intimacy and courtly competition. "Marlowe's Gaveston," as Bredbeck points out, "demonstrates tacitly that ... the construction of the apolitical is always in and of itself political" (60).

This homosocial bonding between males is inseparable from a misogynistic attitude, as is well shown in Edward's contempt for Isabella in early scenes. The "miserable and distressed Queen" can only "live in grief and baleful discontent" because the king "dotes upon the love of Gaveston" (4.170; 2.48-50). Edward drives the marriage to the brink of breakdown, leaving her no choice but to become part of the courtly intrigues. For his part, Edward finds his marital tie with Isabella useful only when she serves as a mediator in getting Gaveston back or for a diplomatic mission to France. He embraces his wife again only when she succeeds in talking the peers into letting Gaveston return ("Once more receive my hand, and let this be/ A second marriage 'twixt thyself and me" 4.184; 335-6). From early on, Isabella's

frustration with the unfaithful Edward draws a certain degree of the audience's sympathy. Edward treats her with coolness in dramatic contrast with Isabella's desperate effort to patch up their troubled marriage. At first, there is not much reason to doubt Isabella's loyalty and sincerity. In fact, she frequently expresses her desire to reconcile with Edward--despite his indifference and Gaveston's charge of adultery. She continues to play the role of a patient Griselda. When Isabella shows an excessive grief ("Like frantic Juno will I fill the earth/ With ghastly murmur of my sighs and cries" 4.178-9), her invocation of mythological Juno serves as an example of "the gendering of language" (Shepherd 190).[14] In her repetitive lamentation over Edward's affection to Gaveston, she fictionalizes her position as a suffering wife and puts her own grief in a cosmic context.

The marriage of Isabella with Edward, however, is based on a diplomatic alliance between France and England. However sympathetic the audience might be to Isabella, the diplomatic coalition between her brother and husband formed through her body is never private and personal, but always political and gendered. The strained spousal relation is thus emblematic of (mis-)government in the royal household. Eve Sedgwick points out in *Between Men*

> that concomitant changes in the structure of the continuum of male "homosocial desire" were tightly, often causally bound up with the other more visible changes; that the emerging pattern of male friendship, mentorship, entitlement, rivalry, and hetero- and homosexuality was in an intimate and shifting relation to class; and that no element of that pattern can be understood outside of its relation to women and the gender system as a whole. (1)

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[14] Simon Shepherd suggests, "her language of private grievance feels almost embarrassingly overwritten in the context of the rest of the play" (192).

When Edward rewards his wife with a ceremonial restoration of marriage for her contribution to Gaveston's return, the gesture only confirms the inseparability of personal intimacy and political order in their diplomatic marriage. Gaveston's marriage also evidences the "traffic in women," particularly in the context of a male homoerotic relation.[15] When Edward willingly marries off Gaveston to his niece (in scene 5), it is clear that male friendship takes precedence over marriage. This male homosocial desire explains a rather curious speech Edward makes just before being murdered:

> Tell Isabel the Queen I looked not thus
> When for her sake I ran at tilt in France
> And there unhorsed the Duke of Cleremont. (24. 67-9)

This chivalric prowess Edward remembers and asks Isabella to remember says less about his genuine affection for her than about a traditional display of masculine virtues to get Isabella as a trophy.

Isabella's disgrace, then, serves to scandalize the homosocial desire between men, which is shown to be detrimental to marital love. Her transformation from an abused wife to a scheming adulteress underscores the bifurcated stereotypes of women in early modern society. When Isabella joins the revolting nobles, she sees Edward as the source of all troubles. Like many others in the play, she finds the cause of the domestic and international disorders in Edward's sexual laxity:

> Misgoverned kings are cause of all this wrack;
> And Edward, thou art one among them all,
> Whose *looseness* hath betrayed thy land to spoil
> And made the channels overflow with blood.
> (17. 9-12; emphasis added)

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[15] For a classical discussion of this issue from an anthropological perspective, see Gayle Rubin's "The Traffic in women: notes on 'political economy' of sex."

Referring to both her husband and the French king as "Misgoverned kings," she thereby justifies her alliance with the rebellious peers to overthrow the dissolute king. Mortimer in turn is eager to exploit an amorous relation with her for his own ambition, and Isabella's illicit love affair signifies another kind of collapsing of the sexual and the political, converging with their common political interests.[16] At first opposed to the idea of revolt against the king ("Then let him [Gaveston] stay; for rather than my lord/ Shall be oppressed by civil mutinies,/ I will endure a melancholy life/ And let him frolic with his minion" 2.64-7), Isabella slowly becomes a determined conspirator to invade England and transfer Edward's crown to his son. With these contrasting images of Isabella, Marlowe plays upon the binary conception of female passivity and aggression, both of which surely served the ideological need to tame women in early modern period.

4. Social Mobility, Theatricality and Espionage

Edward's homoerotic favoritism touches on what Bruce Smith calls "an eroticisation of class difference" (216). The sudden ascensions of Gaveston and later Spencer set off the nobles' anxiety over the eroding system of class and their concern over the social mobility of middling sorts. In a society where clothing functions as a signifier of social identity, Gaveston loves to flaunt his extravagant Italianate dress ("He wears a short Italian hooded cloak,/ Larded with pearl; and in his Tuscan cap/

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[16] As for Isabella, Bevington says that Marlowe "uncovers a quality of absolute evil in her nature, and accounts for her apparent change by a gradual unmasking of her true identity" (*Mankind* 241). Sara Deats, though a bit more sympathetic to her, is in agreement with Bevington on this.

A jewel of more value than the crown" 4.414-6). As a usurper of royal affection, the nobles suggest, he defies the political system that assigns to individuals a certain place in the hierarchical social order ("Thou proud disturber of thy country's peace,/ Corruptor of thy King, cause of these broils,/ Base flatterer" 9.9-11). Referred to as "Midas-like" or "Proteus, god of shapes" (4.409; 412), Gaveston loves to create his own identity through role-playing, which feeds on the fantasy of social and political advancement. When they hint that Edward's minions would contaminate the royal body by this physical proximity, the nobles impart to the crisis of polity the sense of disease coming from Edward's wrong company. Like Helen of Greece, Lancaster protests, Gaveston, the "monster of men," lets the whole country plunge into war (9.14). Mortimer places the blame on Gaveston's protean character (4.408-16), seeing him as foreign and as pathological ("that sly inveigling Frenchman" 2.57). Gaveston's nationality provides for the English nobility a convenient scapegoat, whose foreignness, as with those of Isabella and Lightborne, is invoked only in connection with the subversiveness of his behavior.

The contamination of Edward's governance is also identified with his love of "the idle triumphs, masques, lascivious shows" (6.154). The theatricality of Edward and his minions is consistently associated with corruption and effeminacy, and linked further with the metaphorical association between femininity (*contra* male friendship) and effeminacy. Even in the battlefield, Edward looks like a king of players or a player king:

> thy soldiers marched like players,
> With garish robes, not armour; and thyself,
> Bedaubed with gold, rode laughing at the rest,
> Nodding and shaking of thy spangled crest

Where women's favours hung like labels down. (6.180-4)

Royal entertainments become a mirror for the political theater in Edward's court, as is evident in Gaveston's plans to stage masques for Edward. With "Italian masques by night,/ Sweet speeches, comedies, and pleasing shows" (1.54-5), Gaveston carefully organizes the courtly entertainments to secure his power in Edward's court. Gaveston would employ "wanton poets, pleasant wits,/ Musicians" (1.50-1), and thereby control "the pliant king which way I please" (1.52). The courtly actor/producer, Gaveston, orchestrates and politicizes theatrical entertainments in Edward's court that, in the nobility's vocabulary, are closely linked with the theatricality of devious behaviors. In scene 5, Spencer provides Baldock, a humanist scholar, with a good commentary on the courtly life as well as on the manners they have to pursue in court. Spencer grasps well the mechanism of Edward's government ("he that hath the favour of a king/ May with one word advance us while we live" 5.8-9) and is keen on exploiting royal favoritism for his proclaimed ambition and aspiration. In the courtly theater, Spencer says, success depends on one's ability to play the political game by controlling and manipulating one's appearance. In order to thrive in Edward's court that is "a dual world of visual and of secret hypocrisy" (Bevington and Shapiro 267), Spencer advises Baldock to "cast the scholar off/ And learn to court it like a gentleman" (5.31-2). They "must be proud, bold, pleasant, resolute,/ And now and then stab as occasion serves" (5.42-3). As courtly politicians, they should wear "curate-like ...attire," "[t]hough inwardly licentious enough/ And apt for any kind of villainy" (5.49-51).

In contrast to those social upstarts, the nobles at first seem to renounce display and spectacles. For example, when Edward prepares a tournament and pageant for Gaveston's return (4.378ff), they insult him with pointed reactions and thus sabotage Edward's welcome party with "homely" contrivances "against the stately triumph" (6.12-3). While Gaveston milks the royal pastime, the nobles defy Edward's love of entertainment and enactment. This subversion of the royal pageant, however, is not necessarily a sign of antitheatricality, but rather a challenge to Edward's excessive celebration of Gaveston's return. In fact, despite his attack on the theatrical displays of Edward and Gaveston, Mortimer often proves himself a superb actor. Pretending to accept the Protectorship with reluctance, Mortimer plays a role of a bashful recipient.

> They thrust upon me the protectorship
> And sue to me for that that I desire.
> While at the council table, grave enough,
> And not unlike a bashful Puritan,
> First I complain of imbecility (23.54-8).

Though repeatedly dismissing it as a sign of corruption, the nobles themselves embrace theatricality as an integral part of courtly politics. As the major players in this courtly spectacle, they are not hesitant in exploiting the theatricality of power relations whenever necessary.

Like any other early modern court, the Edwardian palace abounds with spies and spying activities. Dissembling and disguising, for example, are main skills Gaveston displays in the opening scene. The competitive system of royal favoritism in early modern court politics, at one with theatricality and espionage, "becomes the prime way of dealing with these new political relations" (Archer 79). When he

encounters three poor men, Gaveston says to himself: "it is no pain to speak men fair;/ I'll flatter these, and make them live in hope" (1.41-2). Eager to manipulate people with staged performance, Gaveston is not shy at playing a flatterer or hypocrite. Mortimer is not much different in his emphasis on manipulation and secrecy, proving himself a crafty manipulator when he plots to commit the regicide. The conspiring peers also see to it that things are done under secrecy; as Lancaster tells his coconspirators "Be resolute and full of secrecy" (6.123). By means of a concealed liaison, Spencer acquires information about Gaveston's sudden return ("A friend of mine told me in secrecy/ That he's repealed and sent for back again" 5.17-8). The earl of Kent is both wary of Mortimer's sinister ambition and afraid of his espionage: "calm this rage;/ Dissemble or thou diest.... Proud Mortimer pries near into thy walks" (18.20-1; 26). Under the watching eye of Mortimer, Kent becomes belatedly aware of the need to dissimulate his suspicions of espionage and change of heart. The play's intense concern with deceit, entertainment, and spying, I would argue, is a condition, not just a symptom, of Edward's corrupt court.

If theatricality and surveillance are central to politics and interpersonal relations in Edward's court, the play's interest in surveillance and secrecy is also closely related to the circulation of letters. Private letters in the play epitomize secrecy as a "subjective practice in which the oppositions of public/private, inside/outside, subject/object are established" (D. A. Miller 207). By employing letters as a register of both revelation and concealment, Marlowe's play taps into the early modern economy of epistle within the purview of which the play blends the

personal intimacy with the public affairs.[17] Opening with the notorious love letter from Edward to Gaveston, *Edward II* is full of both private and official letters. There are many diplomatic correspondences that are about international and religious matters: for example, the Bishop of Canterbury's letter to the pope and Spencer's letter to Levune. Whether personal or official, letters are often overheard, as when Margaret reads letters from Gaveston and Edward. Military reconnaissance is arranged through letters, as in the letter from Scotland with the news that Mortimer's uncle has been captured. Letters become at once a medium of interpersonal relations and a mediator between the public and the private, as well as the inside and the outside. Epistles also reflect the unequal power relations between the sender and receiver, as in the letter of Mortimer to the prison guards of Edward, Maltravers and Gourney. The same is true when, in a histrionic response to the imminent death in scene 20, Edward tears off a piece of paper with Mortimer's name on it. This desperate action, however cathartic, proves only a "poor revenge" (20.141) because the torn signature does not erase the reality.

Perhaps the most remarkable letter in the play is Mortimer's ordering the assassination of Edward, a prime example of how letters are involved in the game of concealment and revelation. Mortimer's perfect crime draws on the multiplicity of meaning he creates in the letter by manipulating the punctuation. In this twisted direction to (mis)lead the assassins, Mortimer plays on the ambiguity of a Latin phrase and lets them (mis)read his intention. His strategy for regicide involves a

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[17] For the significance of the letter exchanges in *Edward II*, see Shepherd 118-22. And see Claudio Guillen for a succinct discussion of epistle/letter as a literary genre and against other genres.

double move, for letters presume the absence (or absent presence) of author and the presence (or present absence) of his intention, which by nature comes into existence through the act of reading.[18] "With its mutually concealing and seemingly contradictory instructions," as Marjorie Garber maintains, Mortimer's letter "sums up the conflict at the center of the play, for both of its statements are true" and thus the letter exposes "the essential ambiguity of the play--*is* it good to kill the king, either politically or morally?" (16).

5. Resistance, Torture, and Regicide.

In Edward's mismanagement of the kingdom caused by his indiscreet conveyance of titles and properties to upstart minions, the peers find a justification for their resistance to the king as a matter not just of class interests, but also of national security. Edward's assaults on the social system, mainly on the exclusive privileges of aristocracy and the church, lend themselves to the legitimacy of the baronial rebellion against the tyrannical king. With "a burning zeal/ To mend the King and do our country good" (4.256-7), Mortimer claims, the aristocrats transcend their class interest in working for the good of the country and the people. The peers present Edward as the figure of tyranny by turning his homoerotic transgression into a social and political infraction against the commonwealth.[19] On capturing Gaveston,

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[18] Isn't any secret already a double move in that it can wield power only because it is implied to be hidden from others? See Derrida's "Signature Event Context." And for a Derridian reading of the play, see Harraway 51-77.

[19] Bevington calls Edward II a "misguided, inexperienced, and pleasure-seeking" king (*Mankind* 243). For the Renaissance debates on the issue of resisting a tyrant, see Skinner Vol. 2 & Bushnell's *Tragedies*.

Warwick declares "it is our country's cause/ That here severely we will execute/Upon thy person" (9.22-4). When the peers succeed in forcing Edward to sign a document expelling Gaveston, Pembroke declares: "This will be good news to the common sort" (4.92). If Edward breaches the feudal contract between them, Lancaster claims, there should be no obligation on them to defend the kingdom when it is in jeopardy. The nobles are not afraid of launching "civil mutinies" (2.65) in order to purge "the realm of such a plague" (4.270). They rationalize it as duty and right for them to resist an autocratic prince and thereby preserve the commonwealth even with "unnatural wars, where subjects brave their King" (11.86). For the sake of the commonwealth, therefore, they are obliged to "remove these flatterers from the king,/ That havocs England's wealth and treasury" (18.25-6).

However, when Mortimer threatens a rebellion ('The King shall lose his crown, for we have power/ And courage too, to be revenged at full" 2.59-60), their invocation of the commonweal sounds more like self-empowering and self-authorizing rhetoric. Their justification of rebellion is undercut, for instance, by what Mortimer does and says during his confrontation with Edward and also after seizing the power. Mortimer shows clearly from early on what his political agenda is ("Curse him if he refuse, and then may we/ Depose him and elect another king" (4.54-5). Under the guise of public interest, the aristocrats' rhetoric conceals a class anxiety about their exclusion from royal politics. The feudal nobles are interested in keeping the social and political privileges they used to enjoy. Lancaster is more blatant in his threat to Edward:

either change your mind,

> Or look to see the throne where you should sit
> To float in blood, and at thy wanton head
> The glozing head of thy base minion thrown. (1.129-32)

Acting as the spokesperson of the nobles, Mortimer is quick to take advantage of the political and religious turmoil caused by Edward's failing government. Their resistance to the king in the name of the people and commonwealth gives rise to a competing idea of kingdom in opposition both to Edward's concept of kingdom as his monarchical property and, as a consequence, to a separation of the crown from the national well-being, which becomes the true object of their loyalty. Their effort to legitimate acts of political resistance to a tyrannical king, unwittingly and fleetingly, lends itself to an antimonarchial impulse and thus to a republican idea.

It is ironic that, once in power, Mortimer quickly becomes a mirror image of Edward's failure to understand the practices of government. As the play progresses, the irascible, impatient young noble changes to a Machiavellian villain.[20]

> The prince I rule, the queen do I command,
> And with a lowly conge to the ground
> The proudest lords salute me as I pass.
> I seal, I cancel, I do what I will.
> …
> Now is all sure: Queen and Mortimer
> Shall rule the realm, the King, and none rule us.
> Mine enemies will I plague, my friends advance,
> And what I list command, who dare control? (23.46-9; 63-6)

Mortimer turns himself into an embodiment of what he has allegedly fought against for the sake of commonwealth. His fortune is emblematically coupled up with that of Edward. His conventional invocation of Fortune is only mockheroic rhetoric

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[20] For the notion of "the overreacher" in Marlowe's plays, see Harry Levin. Many see Mortimer's fall as a typical example of an ambitious character that ends up falling on Fortune's wheel.

(25.59-64), coming as it does right after Edward's horrific death. Mortimer's ascension and fall at once rupture and confirm the patrimonial lineage of royalty, in that his public execution in the end serves to sanction the succession of Edward by Edward ("Edward's name survives, though Edward dies" 20.48).

Threatened from within and without, the kingdom is encroached upon by foes on all sides.

> Thy garrisons are beaten out of France,
> And, lame and poor, lie groaning at the gates;
> The wild O'Neill, with swarms of Irish kerns,
> Lives uncontrolled within the English pale;
> Unto the walls of York the Scots made road
> And, unresisted, drave away rich spoils. (6.159-64)

With the whole realm besieged, Edward fails to see himself as the source of the problem, but instead blames Isabella: "Here comes she [Isabella] that's cause of all these jars" (6.221). Edward's inability to accept his own responsibility (or lack of self-knowledge), which surely deprives him of any tragic stature, points to the heart of his problem as a failed governor. He often makes puerile decisions in matters that could affect the entire kingdom, in contrast to Young Edward's swift action at the end of the play. Even Edward's manly declaration ("in this bed of honour [I would]die with fame" 18.7) only proves untimely and belated. As Baldock says, "the princely resolution/ Fits not the time" (18.8-9). In the face of a serious military quarrel with the barons, Edward rather envisions a life of frolicking with Gaveston or a pastoral life (19.20ff). Even though Edward shows a certain level of maturity as a sovereign after the nobles launch a civil war, he still falls short of being a competent king, committing, for instance, a fatal error in allowing Mortimer to survive.

In comparison to the peers who are primarily interested in reaping the benefits of political conflicts with the monarch, Kent, Edward's brother, is the only figure genuinely concerned with the status quo of the political system. He voices a concern about the sudden, excessive promotion of Gaveston, without aligning himself with the nobles (1.106ff). At the same time, Kent warns the nobles by invoking the memory of his father's days when the monarch commanded respect from his subjects merely by his looks (1.108-14). Thus Kent's change of affiliation becomes symbolic as much as dramatic. He joins the rebels because he cannot brook that "slaughter he [Edward] did nobleman and cherish flatterers" (14.8-9). But he changes the allegiance back to Edward once he sees the dark side of the Mortimer-Isabella alliance ("Mortimer/ And Isabel do kiss while they conspire" 18.21-2). Kent's alteration, done for his "country's cause" (14.3), coincides with every turning point of the play. Yet, the futility of his efforts to save Edward's life and the kingship points to the ineffectiveness of his stance on this political quicksand, from which he cannot get away without losing his own life. When he laments after attempting in vain to rescue Edward ("O, miserable is that commonweal, where lords/ Keep courts and kings are locked in prison" (22.63-4), he becomes rather an index of the failing system.

This crumbling relationship between the monarch and his subjects is exemplified through what Bevington and Shapiro call "a decay of ceremony." Mortimer, for example, is not afraid of drawing a weapon and injuring Gaveston in the face of Edward (6.83). Furthermore, despite the guard's words of warning, he barges into Edward's private moment with the news of ransom (6.128ff). This

intrusion upon royal privacy not only exemplifies how he imposes his will on the king but also points to the breakdown of decorum in Edward's court. Along with the decay of ceremony, there is a certain reversal of emblems confirming the already distorted relation between the king and his subjects. The traditional emblems of royalty ("cedar tree," "eagles," "lion," and "sun") only point to the ineptitude of such legitimizing signs of the royal government and its authority.[21] The emblems that are supposed to function ideologically in the symbolic register stop working when the king fails to perform his assigned role in the political system. The images of the sun/light and dark only subvert the heliocentric metaphysic of kingship (20.61ff). Once the political order is disturbed, the play features quite a few reversed emblems, as is in the torture scene where the king becomes a "wren" and the murderer a "lion" (22.34), or when the young king is like a "lamb" surrounded by "wolves" (20.41).

In the play's second half, Edward's tyranny is displaced by Mortimer's tyrannical exercise of power. Now Edward becomes the victim in a spectacle of suffering, an improbable martyr whose tragic moment stands as a poignant mockery of tragedy. Edward's gradual decline is most graphic in the changes of his costume, from his royal robes to those of monk, and in the divesture of his clothes by the prison keepers. Edward's new position of subjection culminates in the torture scene that disturbs a certain kind of politico-religious imagination, and thus rises to an inevitable irony in that the royal monopoly on violence is subverted. Once Edward falls from power, the image of his tyranny is metamorphosed to monstrosity of his torture and murder to the extent that torture becomes "a sadistic parody of [his]

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[21] For a general survey of emblem and decorum in the play, see the essay by Bevington and

sexual delinquency" (Donaldson 56). The grotesque brutality of torture and death mimics the royal theater of terror in the early modern political environment. As Karen Cunningham argues,

> when Marlowe transfers violence from the executioner's to the theater's scaffold, he exaggerates what the ruling figures sought to minimize, the profound ambiguity of artifice, thereby undermining the persuasiveness of the moralizing that accompanies spectacles of torture and transforming a theater of pain into a drama of subversion. (210)[22]

Lightborne's theater of cruelty is reflected by the medium of theater in those secretive and unspeakable scenes.[23] By staging the torture and regicide, Marlowe produces "radical ambiguities, which he can display because of the defamilarization the stage permits" (Cunningham 214). The savage irony is brought into play, Roger Sales points out, because of "the way in which it is the ruler himself who has many of the characteristics of the alien stranger" (131).

In a negation of the royal identity, torture dissolves the boundary between inside and outside, producing what Elaine Scarry calls "an almost obscene conflation of private and public" (53).[24] What occurs through torture in general is "the translation of all the objectified elements of pain into the insignia of power, [that is,] the conversion of the enlarged map of human suffering into an emblem of the

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Shapiro.

[22] According to Cunningham, Marlowe's plays "contest the propagandizing of Tudor spectacles of punishment," by exaggerating "the elements of dramatic art to expose the multiple meanings of executions" (220).

[23] As Harry Levin suggests, the fact that Lightborne is "a translation of 'Lucifer'" might be suggestive of the play's close relation to the medieval dramatic tradition and traditional themes of Morality (124).

[24] For the "againstness" of pain -- though it happens "inside of me" and "part me," but it is "not me" and "against me"-- see Elaine Scarry 51-9.

regime's strength" (Scarry 56). "In torture," Scarry suggests, "it is in part the obsessive display of agency that permits one person's body to be translated into another person's voice, that allows human pain to be converted into a regime's fiction of power" (18). In Marlowe's play, however, the sadistic violence of Lightborne against the vulnerable Edward is indicative more of the divestiture of Edward's authority than of the exercise of the torture's power. Not so much for public consumption, the torture serves as a reminder of the deposed king's abjectness. But what makes the torture more ironic is when we see it along with the deposition of Edward, which, though a public event, allegedly happens in private and yet is still performed on stage in this public theater.

What Edward, with Gaveston, did to his enemies now comes back to haunt him. When Maltravers and Gourney shave off Edward's beard with the puddle water, this shameless deed invokes an overlapping image of his and Gaveston's assault on the Bishop of Coventry (1.186-7).[25] Mario DiGangi argues that, in the shaved and tortured body of Edward, the play "locates the political crime of sodomy in a rebellious peer's transgressive access to the royal body" ("Marlowe" 209). Kept sleepless for ten days with the sound of drum beating, Edward cries with dejection:

> My daily diet is heart-breaking sobs,
> That almost rents the closet of my heart (22.21-2)

In the gruesome moment of his death, punctuated by the penetrating "red-hot" "spit" of Lightborne (24.30), "the king's body becomes a site both for the power of the usurper to play itself upon and for Marlowe to anatomize and demystify" (Cartelli

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[25] For a detailed discussion on these foreshadowing, see Wiggins and Lindsey, "Introduction," xxxiii-xxxv.

132). Playing upon the audience's emotional engagement and detachment, Marlowe leaves the audience with an indelible feeling of violation and horror.[26] The playwright's tantalizing delay of the imminent execution of Edward offers the audience a chance to scrutinize the pain and suffering he faces. With both pity and terror we experience during his agony, Marlowe emblazons the dramatic chapter of Edward's days on a structural pattern of the moralized narrative in his ascension and declension.

6. From Edward to Edward

The entire tragedy is unfolded between the two royal funerals: the disrupted funeral of Edward I in the beginning and the proper burial of Edward II by Edward III at the end.[27] Edward's inadequate mourning of the dead king/father is complemented by the sentimental surplus of the young Edward's filial piety. In addition to the redemptive punishment of Mortimer, such proper mourning and burial allow the new king to establish his royal authority.

Edward II's reign began with the two symbolic incidents: the invitation of his minion to share the country and the interrupted "exequies" of his father. When his letter is read aloud by Gaveston at the beginning ("My father is deceased; come Gaveston,/ And share the kingdom with thy dearest friend" 1.1-2), it is quite striking

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[26] Torture and Murder are not distinguishable. After all, as Elaine Scarry says, "physical pain always mimes death and the infliction of physical pain is always a mock execution" (31).

[27] For a detailed discussion about the significance of the symmetricality of the play's opening and ending see Sara Deats's "Marlowe's Fearful Symmetry in *Edward II*": "like a mirror image, the structural progression of the drama is reversed in the second half of the play; and the series of parallels and contrasts developing in obverse order create a dramatic chiasmus" (241).

that Edward shows no sign of bereavement over the death of his father or that sense of responsibility he should inherit from it. Furthermore, Edward literally interrupts the funeral rites when he gets into a verbal squabble with the bishop of Coventry who is on his way to conduct the ceremonies for his father (1.175ff). We know it is his father's will to expel Gaveston from England (see Mortimer in 1.81ff).[28] The dead father haunts Edward's kingdom and reign, along with the barons who rejuvenate the will of the dead to feed their political interests.

The political maturity of Edward III is in sharp contrast with the immaturity of his father who is more excited about getting together with Gaveston than concerned about the gravity of his responsibility. The young king restores royal power first by revenging the murderer ("Traitor, in me my loving father speaks" 25.41) and then offering a proper funeral for his father. Unlike his father who abandoned the will of the deceased king, the young Edward is ready to follow his dead father's testament ("Command me to my son, and bid him rule/ Better than I" 20.121-2). With this theatrical representation of his relation to his father in the funeral procession, the son holds his father in *remembrance*, in the double sense of remembering and internalizing--something that his father fails to do. The rather excessive claim of the young Edward about his innocence is ritualized, and thus politicized, through his gesture of revenge on Mortimer, cutting off his head and putting it on the funeral hearse.[29]

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[28] Kuriyama (194) and Proser (180-5) have suggested that Edward's defiant embrace of Gaveston is Oedipal.

[29] The young king's last words are "Be witness of my grief and innocency" (25.102). And Edward III's resolute and swift rebuttal of his mother's plea ("If you be guilty, though I be

Marlowe's *Edward II* commemorates the kingdom suffering from the (mis)government of a monarch in the clash of contrary matters such as the private and the public, the sexual and the political, and friendship and homosexuality. The play highlights the weak English king and his troubled reign, by transforming a historical personage into a literary and cultural one. The idea of government in the play is presented as a dynamic and often impossible compromise between many conflicting forces and between contrary issues. When Mortimer, after a private meeting with Isabella, tries to persuade his colleagues into letting Gaveston come back, for instance, Lancaster pronounces: "In no respect can contraries be true" (4.249).[30] Yet a moment later, along with other nobles, Lancaster is brought into Mortimer's scheme. How come, if we may return his question back to him, the false become the true in a moment? The major impetus of dramatic movements rests on such "contaries": Edward as a tyrant and a martyr, Isabella as a Griselda and a scheming adulteress, Mortimer as a righteous noble and an ambitious Machiavellian, and Gaveston as a faithful friend and as a lecherous courtier. Marlowe's play is built upon this "symmetrical arrangement of parallels and antitheses complementing the larger pattern of ascent and descent" (Deats "Symmetry" 243). Can these antinomies, indeed, be true at the same time? That question is certainly echoed in and by the play itself.

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your son,/ Think not to find me slack or pitiful" 25.81-2) certainly becomes a contrast to his father's political impotence with equivocal attitudes.

[30] This is why I think Ian McAdam is only partially right when he argues "Marlowe's text shows how personal rule reproduces itself through an unquestioned ideology of leadership" (206).

CHAPTER 6
"OF GOVERNMENT THE PROPERTIES TO UNFOLD":
PASTORAL POWER AND THEATRICALITY
IN WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE'S *MEASURE FOR MEASURE*

> And what art thou, thou idol ceremony?
> What kind of god art thou, that suffer'st more
> Of mortal griefs than do thy worshippers?
> --- *Henry V,* Act 4 scene 1

1. The art of Government, Measure and Knowing the Self

Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* (ca. 1604) opens with a noteworthy

dialogue between the Duke and his elderly courtier, Escalus, about the "science" of

government. Unduly diffident about his own knowledge, the Duke makes an

enthusiastic compliment to his elderly subject:

> Of government the properties to unfold
> Would seem in me t'affect speech and discourse,
> Since I am put to know that your own science
> Exceeds in that the lists of all advice
> My strength can give you. (1.1.3-7)[1]

With a scrupulous understanding of "the nature of our people,/ Our city's

institutions, and the terms/ For common justice" (1.1.10-12), the Duke goes on,

Escalus has shown himself "pregnant" in the "art and practice" (1.1.12-3) of

government. Shortly after this conversation that "unfolds" the matters of government,

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[1] All references to *Measure for Measure* are based upon the Oxford edition, edited by N. W. Bawcutt (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991).

the Duke abruptly decides to appoint Angelo to govern the realm during his absence. This distinctive, expository scene, as do many opening scenes in Shakespeare, sets the tone for the play by predicting the issues of science and practice of government as the major theme of *Measure for Measure*.[2] This chapter takes a cue from the opening, and attempts to show that Shakespeare's problem play is indeed about the art of government, in the sense of both statecraft and governing one's self. My argument is that, in a way somewhat reminiscent of "Measure" in John Skelton's *Magnificence, Measure for Measure* grafts the traditional themes of justice and mercy onto the idea of government. Whereas Skelton's "measure" is deployed to highlight the theme of financial and political prudence, Shakespeare's "measure" seems to signal the politico-religious and judicial ramifications of government. Shakespeare's play displays "measure" less as the codeword of (talion) justice and more as an index-word for the complexity of early modern governmentality as it confronts intertwined legal, ethical, and religious problems.

Many scholars have read *Measure for Measure* as indicative of Shakespeare's political, as well as ethical, engagement with contemporary circumstances, particularly in terms of the new king, James I. Brian Gibbons, for example, argues that the play's "theme of justice and temperance in princes" is equivalent to

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[2] The word "government" is used three times in the play. While talking to the disguised Duke about Angelo's tyrannous exercise of power, Isabella cries out: "oh, how much is the good Duke deceived in Angelo! If ever he return and I can speak to him, I will open my lips in vain or discover his *government*" (3.1.195-7). Provost also uses the word while explaining how Barnardine's guilt has been confirmed under Angelo's government (4.2.136). All three usages are related to government as a political and legal institution.

"Shakespeare's first response [to James I]" (12).[3] Other critics have also untangled

the complex relationships of the play's topical allusions to contemporary social and

political occurrences. Surely, Shakespeare may have had in his mind the new king,

James I, while writing this problem play, but I question whether the topicality of the

play is essential to comprehend its historical and political significance. Instead, I

would argue that it is more worthwhile investigating the ways Shakespeare here

represents the dynamic interactions of political, social, ethical and religious issues. I

thus hope to elucidate Shakespeare's play in terms of how and where political and

social control intersects with the techniques of the self in the early modern period. In

doing so, we can justly view *Measure for Measure* as concerned not so much with

the parallel between the Duke and James I, as with what it means to *govern* and

become a (good) *governor*.

Drawing upon the convention of the disguised monarch genre, *Measure for

Measure* represents the practices of government as involving two complementary

techniques of supervision and internalization, and thus embosses a critique of

pastoral power that renders surveillance an essential part of government.[4] By

disguising himself in friar's clothes, the Duke is able to restore order in Vienna by

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[3] For critical interpretations of taking this play as an *exemplum* of contemporary situation, see Ernest Schanzer (127-28), Francis Fergusson (79), and Marion Trousdale (152), to name a few. For more direct topical allusions in the play, see also Bawcutt, Hayne, and Bernthal. Criag Bernthal and Richard Wilson have proposed a possible connection between Sir Walter Raleigh's trial of 1603 and the play. For an exciting discussion under the aegis of "local reading" on the connections between Shakespeare's Vienna and contemporary political and diplomatic situations, see Leah Marcus's *Puzzling Shakespeare: Local Reading and Its Discontents,*160-202. For a trenchant critique of these topical readings, see Levin (171-93). My position is close to Jonathan Goldberg's: "No exact replay of James at all, the play yet manages to catch at central concerns" (*James I* 235).

[4] For the convention of disguised monarch plays, see Ivo Kamps and Stephen Cohen.

employing Angelo as his deputy, while keeping his princely dignity and personal probity. In his furtive, voyeuristic scheme, the Duke will put his subjects under microscopic observation, and thereby identify and correct deviant behaviors. The posture of the Duke as a hermit in withdrawal and contemplation tells less about his personality than about his notion of government. Inasmuch as the Duke's pastoral disguise enables individuals to make themselves available for his inquisitive probing as objects of knowledge, it becomes a testimony that the early modern art of government is involved not only in the proper administration of the law, but also in mastering one's self. What happens in the play, I believe, should be accounted for in terms of the Duke's understanding of the self and self-government.

When he picks Angelo over Escalus, however, the sudden deputation boomerangs to the extent that the Duke turns himself into a subject of his test and contest. His project to reform his wayward subjects, in its course, doubles back on an implicit test of his deputy and his government. Throughout the play the Duke seems to embrace the idea of government that associates the knowledge of one's self with mastery of the realm. The Duke is as much concerned with justifying himself and controlling his image as he is with cleansing the city of sexual license. According to Escalus, the Duke is, or wants to be, "one that above all other strifes contended especially to know himself" (3.1.488-9), as well as "a gentleman of all temperance" (3.1.492). When the old courtier makes this statement to the disguised Duke without knowing the inquirer's true identity ("I pray you, sir, of what disposition was the Duke? 3.1.486-7), this episode comes as no surprise, considering the Duke's profound anxiety over the representation of himself in the eyes of the

commoners. And when Vincentio envisions himself as "a scholar, a statesman, and a soldier" in a tart reply to Lucio's disrespectful comments (3.1.406), it certainly echoes what we hear from Ophelia about Hamlet ("The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's, eye, tongue, sword" 3.1.153).

2. The Delegation of Authority

The opening scene ends with a royal delegation of authority, a practice which was indispensable in the development of early modern English nation-state since the installment of the Privy Chamber during Henry VIII. Despite his initial compliment to Escalus on his knowledge of government, the Duke decides to give Angelo the full power either to exercise the law or even modify it:

> We have with special soul
> Elected him [Angelo] our absence to supply,
> Lent him our terror, dressed him with our love
> And given his deputation all the organs
> Of our own power. (1.1.18-22)

Endowing Angelo with absolute power ("In our remove, be thou at full ourself" 1.1.44), he hopes that Angelo "may in th'ambush of my name strike home" with the authority proffered to him (1.3.41). Angelo is asked to carry the laws into the "hopeful execution...of [his] commissions" (1.1.60-1), as if "the body politic be/ A horse whereon the governor doth ride" (1.2.157-8). As "a man of stricture and firm abstinence" (1.3.12), Angelo can submit his personal feelings to public duty. The Duke believes that Angelo is the "one that can my part in him advertise" (1.1.42), whose iron fists would root out disorderly behavior with "the needful bits and curbs

to headstrong jades" (1.3.20). The Duke suggests to Angelo that a man's virtues are validated only when used for the public good:

> Thyself and thy belongings
> Are not thine own so proper as to waste
> Thyself upon thy virtues. They on thee. (1.1. 30-32)

His suggestion advances the need for an individual to work for and in government: "if our virtues/ Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike/ As if we had them not" (1.1.34-36). In this address to mobilize Angelo's agreement to serve in his absence, the Duke underscores the good subject's duty to put his virtues to work and thus play the role assigned to him by society.[5] The idea of government helps the Duke at once to separate and conflate private likings and public duties, as in the case of his speech to Angelo on the necessity of pursuing a virtuous life (1.1.27-43).

This transfer of power to Angelo brings into question the issue of Vincentio's government. The delegation of authority has been considered by many critics to be a deceptive way of thrusting on Angelo the responsibility for what has occurred during the previous fourteen years and thus distancing the Duke from the awkward political situation. While seeking a possible exit from the predicaments caused by his own leniency, the Duke makes a precipitous getaway from the ducal responsibility with dubious reasons.[6] Though admitting his share of responsibility in letting the statutes slip, the Duke still wants to avoid blame in the process of their restoration:

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[5] For a discussion of the play in terms of role-playing and metadramatic impetus, see Sidney Homan 140-151.

[6] Marcia Riefer, for example, criticizes the Duke: "Far from having Vienna's best interests in mind as he claims…the Duke is actually setting up Angelo for a fall while protecting himself…and at the same time betraying the public as well, a public whom he admits he has effectively 'bid' to be promiscuous through his permissiveness" (160-1).

> I do fear, too dreadful.
> Sith 'twas my fault to give the people scope,
> 'Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them
> For I bid them do.   (1.3.34-7).

Even though the subsequent events are dictated by his sudden exit, the Duke leaves

unanswered the questions of what makes him leave so hastily and what are the

"matters of needful value" (1.1.56), by insisting only that he has "a purpose/ More

grave and wrinkled than the aims and ends/ Of burning youth" (1.3.4-6). Graham

Bradshaw, for example, calls him "a negligent governor who now believes that he

must confront, but still wants to evade, a problem which he has helped to create"

(166-7). By delegating his power to a hard-nosed deputy, the Duke could certainly

minimize his own accountability and thereby come out untainted in the end by

declaring himself a problem solver. The Duke's intent to see *incognito* if Angelo

"dukes it well in his absence" (3.1.358) suggests a kind of Machiavellian tactic, in

that he successfully conjures up a rationale for exercising his art of government

through a progressive rehabilitation of Angelo's tyrannical exercise of authority. So

it is no wonder to hear Elizabeth Hanson suggesting that, "figured as a duplicate, the

deputy must prove to be duplicitous, a representative who does not figure his own

identity" (64-5). After all, Angelo turns out to be a symbolic double of Vincentio

when he stands in for the absent duke/governor. As Marc Shell points out,

"Vincentio, for whom Angelo is the sexual surrogate as well as the deputied political

substitute, is, to all intents, the principal caitiff in *Measure for Measure*, the one

whose conscious and unconscious intents Angelo acts out" (93).

  As the Duke anticipates, Angelo hands out a rigid punishment to Claudio.

Against Isabella's appeal that he must "condemn the fault, and not the actor of it"

(2.2.37), Angelo defends himself by arguing that "it is the law, not I, condemn your brother" 2.2.81). Angelo's inflexible notion of government ("the state whereupon I studied" 2.4.7) leads him to define justice literally: "What's open made to justice,/ That justice seizes" (2.1.21-2). When Angelo's sentence comes into conflict with Isabella's appeal for a judicious interpretation of the law, what is challenged is Angelo's perception of his power as a deputy that resides in standing fast as "the voice of the recorded law" (2.4.61). But the royal deputy is given discretionary power and entitled "to *enforce or qualify* the laws/ As to your soul seems good" (1.1.66-7; emphasis added). He is supposed to uphold the law ("Mortality and mercy in Vienna/ Live in thy tongue and heart" 1.1.45-6), but not without discretionary power for, as the Duke declares, "Your scope is as mine own" (1.1.65). From Isabella's perspective, thus, Angelo is a "pelting petty officer" (2.2.114) using the "giant's strength" tyrannously (2.2.109) when he insists on his own reading the law.

These early scenes between Angelo and Isabella bring to the fore the issue of the limits and problems in delegating authority. This becomes more apparent in the case of Elbow, "the poor Duke's officer" (2.1.169), who, through his verbal confusion, unwittingly endorses the moral economy of Viennese sexual deviance. With lexical mix-ups and obscurities, this low-level agent inadvertently exposes the problems in the enforcement of Vienna's legal authority, in a somewhat different way from Angelo's case.[7] Elbow's confusion of "benefactors" with "malefactors" (2.1.49-51), for example, serves to blur the line between authority and deviance, the virtuous

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[7] For the issue and place of constables in Shakespeare's plays and age, See Leinwand's "Negotiation and New Historicism."

and the vicious, and benevolence and malevolence. The Duke's constable, who has been unfairly subjected to this duty for "seven year and a half," only complicates in his report already murky problems (2.1.40ff). In Harry Berger's terms, "the figure of Elbow thus dramatizes the way the Duke's complicity is inscribed in the flawed chain of command and deputation that implicates him in the very disorder from which he tries, by deputation, to distance himself" (357). This whole episode around Elbow thus underscores the current situation of how the enforcement of law in Vienna is distorted. Provost and Escalus might be considered as the ideal agents of the law. But Escalus already proves himself ineffective when Angelo frustrates him on the issue of Claudio's sentence, whereas the honest Provost has to tip-toe in the gray area between being loyal and traitorous throughout the Duke's rescue plan. When the Provost is praised for his "care and secrecy" by the Duke in the final scene, such an acclaim thus warrants Vincentio's apologetic defense of the Provost's violation: "Forgive him[Provost], Angelo, that brought you home/ The head of Ragozine for Claudio's;/ The offence pardons itself" (5.1.535-7).

Hence in the Duke's confident defense of Angelo even when he hears Isabella's accusation, we discover a certain kind of irony: "Angelo had never the purpose to corrupt her; only he hath made *an assay of her virtue*, to *practise his judgment* with the disposition of natures. ... I am confessor to Angelo" (3.1.164-9; emphasis added). So predictable is when the Duke finds the cause of crisis in his fatherly indulgence and his reluctance to impose the "strict statutes and most and

biting laws."[8] Of course, Angelo's government is already a liability of the Duke's administrative decision in choosing him over Escalus ("Old Escalus,/ Though first in question, is thy secondary" 1.1.46-7). We cannot but notice here an interesting self-referentiality in Vincentio's defense of Angelo, as much as in Duke-Lodowick's accusation of the dukedom (5.1.299-323). When Vincentio examines Angelo's "capacity to govern well, to discharge his responsibilities fairly and conscientiously, but also ... his incorruptibility" (Thatcher 34), the Duke's own practice of dissimulation thus overlaps inevitably with that of his deputy. When he endows Angelo with the power, the Duke knows very well that he is culpable for the current crisis. As Friar Thomas indicates, the Duke himself has the means to resolve the situation ("It rested in your grace/ To unloose this tied-up justice when you pleased" 1.3.31-2) but shoulders the responsibility on a subject he knows has a faulty character. On trial here are not only the virtue of the magistrate and his belief in the invulnerability to temptation, but no less the Duke himself and his government. This delegation is, from the beginning, at once a political ruse to solve the current problem and a character test of Angelo ("Hence we shall see,/ If power change purpose, what our seemers be" 1.3.53-4).

The subsequent events prove that Angelo is far short of the man whom everybody believes him to be.[9] With his extreme asceticism, he is even seen as "a man whose blood/ Is very snow-broth; one who never feels/ The wanton stings and

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[8] See for example the following speech: "fond fathers/ Having bound up the threatening twigs of birch/ Only to stick it in their children's sight/ For terror, not to use" (1.3.23-6).

[9] For instance, the Duke considers him as "a man of stricture and firm abstinence" (1.3.12), while the foul-mouthed Lucio calls Angelo "a motion generative that's infallible" (3.1.373).

motions of the sense" (1.4.57-59). At the beginning of the play, Angelo cherishes

applying the rigid discipline to sexuality, both his own and others'. When Isabella

appeals for mercy to mitigate Claudio's capital punishment, however, Angelo turns

himself into the very thing he detests and has just punished in the name of justice.

Now Angelo ventures to exercise power, surreptitiously and unchecked, in order to

seek his own sexual gratification. His sudden attraction to Isabella signals the

moment when he loses the mastery of himself. Isabella's beauty, along with her

rationality and coldness, tantalizes him and triggers his self-denying desire ("She

speaks, and 'tis such sense/ That my sense breeds with it" 2.2.143-4). Once he asks

for a sexual favor in exchange for her brother's life ("Fit thy consent to my sharp

appetite" 2.4.162), he has to face the dissolution of that personal integrity that has up

to now been his strength. As McCandless points out, "no sooner has he safely

enchained and imprisoned Claudio than Isabella, figuratively speaking, enchains and

imprisons Angelo" (93).

Angelo's suppressed desire is at odds with his private principles as well as

with his public duty as judge. The conflict in his psyche between his identity as an

ascetic and the newly-found desire for Isabella forces him to oscillate between self-

inculpation and self-exculpation. Angelo gives voice to this conflict in his soliloquies,

confessing "in my heart the strong and swelling evil/ Of my conception" (2.4.6-7).[10]

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[10] As regards this soliloquy and its dialogic form, Karen Newman points out very
persuasively that the adroit shift of pronouns (between "I" and "you"; "I" and "we") sets
Angelo's feelings "in a larger context of masculine temptation and human frailty" (10). In
other words, Angelo portrays himself as a typical example of masculine desire for the female
body. Newman goes on to say that "The organization of Angelo's soliloquy as dialogue
creates the dramatic illusion of a mind divided and persuades the audience of Angelo's inner
conflict" (13).

Angelo's dangerous mix-up of private desire and public duty undermines the binary opposition between them upon which he had built up his identity. By the same token, his stereotype of women either as "strumpets" or a "virtuous maids" collapses, as he admits to himself "Never could the strumpet/ With all her double vigour, art and nature,/ once stir my temper, but this virtuous maid/ Subdues me quite" (2.2.186-7). Realizing the hollowness of his uncompromising abstinence ("Ever till now/ When men were fond, I smiled, and wondered how" 2.2.189-90), he now experiences agony over his identity and principles. William Empson finds in this self-reflexive moment an Angelo who is "genuinely astonished by his desires" (274). It becomes now apparent even to himself that his decision to execute Claudio is nothing but a punishment for "faults of his own liking" (3.1.522). In Angelo's confessional soliloquies, Shakespeare's play brings to the surface "the homology of the confessional subject who discloses the 'natural guiltiness' within his bosom and the hypocrite who conceals 'strong and swelling evil' under 'false seeming'" (Hanson 70).

Angelo's perfidy destroys his legal and moral authority. His behavior obscures the distinction between "a judge" and "a prisoner," as is epitomized by Isabella's invocation of the judge's affinity with the criminal (2.2.69-70). As Angelo acknowledges in his soliloquy, "Thieves for their robbery have authority/ When judges steal themselves" (2.2.179-80). Angelo's violation is at once ethical and politico-juridical, which later retroactively justifies the Duke's testing of his own deputy.[11] As Angelo admits to himself when his dirty secret is finally exposed, "[he]

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[11] For a critical survey of so-called "test" theory, see David Thatcher.

should be guiltier than [his] guiltiness/ To think [he] can be undiscernable" (5.1.368-9). Angelo proves that the government cannot always be just, since it is too easily exposed to individual whims. This corruption of authority is more detrimental to society than Claudio's violation of the law because it strikes at the very heart of government. In the failure of Angelo's government, therefore, Shakespeare establishes a close relationship between political government and the government of one's self. *Measure for Measure* presents, as a failed ideal of government, the medieval asceticism of saints that Angelo has allegedly pursued at the beginning of the play.

3. Social Ills and Sexuality in Vienna

The first political actions Angelo takes as the deputy is to clean the low lifes off the streets and condemn Claudio to death for illicit fornication. Angelo's prosecution brings to light the play's investment in the early modern techniques of domination, in terms of the authoritarian construction, displacement, and demonizing of deviant behavior (Dollimore 72-87). Identifying Viennese moral corruption with sexual license, Angelo launches the crackdown against bawds and prostitutes by applying the full rigor of the law. His rigorous prosecution brings down the world of Pompey and Mistress Overdone; as Pompey cries, "All houses in the suburbs of Vienna must be plucked down" (1.2.94-5). When the deputy invokes, with the implicit consent of the Duke, the need to regulate the uncontrollable or those who fail to govern themselves, "Angelo stands for a regime characterized by

rigorous discipline" (Thomas 176). The disorder in Vienna is frequently linked to the lower levels of the society, who are given in to an ingrained anarchy.[12]

In its portrayal of promiscuity, prostitution, and debauchery taken as the causes of a host of societal problems, the play reveals the degree to which early modern society has invested in the matter of sexual (im-)proprieties. Angelo's government associates sexual matters with class, and thereby exposes the ambiguous relationship between sexuality and community. As Jonathan Dollimore states succinctly, "sexuality became subject to intensified surveillance working in terms of both an enforced and an internalized discipline" (75) in early modern Europe. These administrative and judicial activities of Angelo bear witness to what Brian Gibbons calls "a polarization of social life into opposed extremes" (25). Or, to borrow Bakhtinian terms, the play puts under scrutiny, as well as juxtaposes, the grotesque bodies (Lucio, Pompey, Overdone) and the classical bodies (Angelo, Isabella, Vincentio). Against the first group of people who indulge themselves in somatic desire, the play juxtaposes those elite characters that are eager to close it off. The irony is that, despite their initial denial of corporal and emotional forces, the latter are also attracted to the very things they detest. When the elites in Vienna make a strong investment in the distinction between illegal sexual incontinence and true

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[12] For example, Dollimore anchors his interpretation on the binary opposition and conflict between the ruling class and the low class, and argues that "the origin of the problem is not intrinsic to the low-life but a hostile fraction of the ruling order" (78). Harry Berger criticizes Dollimore's interpretation as "generic" for his use of the Duke as "an illustration or embodiment of the way patriarchal authoritarianism manifests and deals with fears endemic to a social structure in which exploitation is mystified as hierarchy" (338). Opposite to Dollimore's reading is Cynthia Lewis's: she argues, "*Measure for Measure* involves not only the regeneration of Vienna's citizen's but also the inner growth of Vienna's ruler" (273).

marriage, sexual behavior becomes "a site of intersection between authority and popular will" (Hayne 9).

Worth noting in examining the governmental crisis in Vienna is Angelo's prosecution of the premarital sexual relationship, or of what Lucio calls "a game of tick-tack" (1.2.188), between Claudio and Juliet by reviving a rusty statute.[13] Claudio's case hints at the fact that the problem of Vienna is not truly the class issue that Angelo's prosecution seems to suggest. By deferring their public commitment and enjoying their premarital sexual relationship, Claudio and Juliet trap themselves in both a legal and ethical quagmire (1.2.126-36). Angelo takes an unusually harsh view of their failure to complete the marriage with proper decorum.[14] The new deputy makes Claudio go through a public humiliation and ritualistic penitence by parading in the street, making a public spectacle of "the stealth of [their] mutual entertainment" (1.2.152). Such an investment by the social system corresponds to his disciplinary strategies of embarrassment and shame to control unruly subjects and their bodily desires. Public shaming in early modern England, as Lauran Knoppers points out, served "as deterrent for the people, [as a] means of amendment for the penitent" (453). Angelo's regime successfully instates public repentance as a

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[13] For a recent discussion on the legal ambiguities in the process of marriage formation, see Victoria Hayne's "Performing Social Practice: The Example of *Measure for Measure*." Hayne cites a case of John Cotgreve and Alice Gidlowe in 16th-century England who, though they publicly exchanged vows and kissed before their friends, never formally married. When Alice formally married another man, the case was brought to the ecclesiastical court (1-2; also see 5-6).

[14] We may add the case between Lucio and Kate Keepdown. According to Mistress Overdone, "Mistress Kate Keepdown was with child by him[Lucio] in the Duke's time, he promised her marriage" (3.1.455-6). This is another case of having sexual relationships before marriage with a promise of matrimony.

precondition of forgiveness and regeneration, which, as I will show later, is collapsed
with the disguised Duke's project to make inwardness a locus where the self is
something to be discovered and revealed--with "hidden" secrets. The punishment of
shame and embarrassment forces the individual to visualize the soul on the surface of
the flesh as a denominator of its depth or shallowness. And it works successfully to a
degree that the repentant Claudio exclaims in his public spectacle, "Our natures do
pursue/ Like rats that ravin down their proper bane/ A thirsty evil, and when we
drink, we die" (1.2.127-9). The same kind of mechanism of punishment works in the
prison scene where the disguised Duke turns the enlarged belly of Juliet into a literal
sign of her culpability, and thus imbues her with the fear of "the dying horror"
(2.3.42) caused by "too much liberty" (1.2.124).

If the excessive sexuality of the lower class is the target of legal regulation, an
austere version of sexuality in Angelo and Isabella is also under scrutiny. Along with
and against Angelo's degeneration discussed above, Isabella's stance is tested and
contested. The play makes the two ascetics, Angelo and Isabella, both of whom
initially place an excessive weight on the purity of life, work against each other. And
I find the same kind of double-edged operation toward Isabella in the Duke's
government when he mobilizes Angelo as the deputy. In the character of Isabella,
the play takes up the issue of government that involves negotiating the conflict
between the reproduction of subjects and moral/sexual austerity. As the one who
seeks "a more strict restraint/ Upon the sisterhood" (1.4.4-5), Isabella embodies the
paradoxical problem in Vienna. Female chastity is essential, but her outright refusal
of sexuality and its reproductivity would prove hazardous. Chastity is valued, but

the refusal of sexual activities could be detrimental to society. As Barbara Baines suggests, "Chastity is the definitive virtue precisely because it is a site and mode of secular power" (284). Isabella's status as a novice nun already foretells and thus complicates her resolution to place her honor above Claudio's life, as she cries "Then Isabel, live chaste, and brother die:/ More than our brother is our chastity" (2.4.185-6). Her desire for an anchorite existence, which requires giving up the secular world and accepting isolation, is not psychologically far removed from her refusal to make a sexual bargain.

Symbolic then is Isabella's coming back from the nunnery, which contrasts with Hamlet's argument for urging Ophelia to enter one. Isabella is caught up in the liminal space between the Abby and the city, which leads her to a paradoxical existence destabilizing the patriarchal social order. Patriarchal Vienna needs to tame Isabella's excessive chastity that becomes both a foundational ideology of male dominance and a threat to it. Isabella's desire for a cloistered life is checked first through Lucio's and then Vincentio's invitation to rejoin the secular world she desires to leave--the world of marriage and family. Some critics, such as Slights and Holmes, even see Isabella's investment in chastity as "an instrumental part of her spiritual vocation and a material condition of her desire to devote herself to God" (285) and believe that "Isabella's desire to lead a cloistered existence defies early modern gender norms and suggests ways in which women could find self-affirming affective life together" (263).

Once compelled to come back to the city for the purpose of pleading for Claudio's pardon, Isabella repeatedly makes the reservation that she is doing so

against her conviction. Her reluctant return to the world can only be, for her, justified as family duty. In addition, Isabella's blunt suggestion to mend Claudio's mistake ("let him marry her!" 1.4.49) shows both her naivety and her practical keenness to the social mechanism of Vienna that anchors on marriage as an instrument of effective social control and harmony. In fact, the Duke resolves, in the end, all the troubles with the multiple marriages. In the case of the rapist Angelo, "marriage retrospectively converts illicit sexual possession--whether consensual or not--into lawful ownership" (Bamford 126). The sexually aggressive males, as Isabella suggests earlier, end up marrying the women they have violated. The same kind of recuperation is forced on Lucio when he is married off to Kate Keepdown ("If any woman wronged by this lewd fellow…let her appear,/ And he shall marry her" 5.1.512-15).[15] The Duke deploys marriage both to curb Lucio's predatory sexuality and to restrain the disruptive power of his abusive rhetoric. Viennese women can socially be recognized only through their relationships with men, like the veiled Mariana who is "neither maid, widow, nor wife" and who thus has no social status ("why, you are nothing then" 5.1.177).

Symbolic is then that both Isabella and Mariana are willing to be part of the Duke's scripted plot, though it involves Mariana's loss of her virginity through a rape and Isabella's endorsement on a morally dubious transaction. Even when the Duke passes her off as another woman or asks her go through a treacherous and

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[15] In relation to this issue, we may need to remember that Angelo begged "Immediate sentence then, and sequent death" (5.1.374) and Lucio complained "Marrying a punk, my lord, is pressing to death, whipping, and hanging" (5.1.525-6). Depending upon the perspective, the harmonious resolution of the Duke could still be seen as problematic, no less than was the issue of order and sexuality at the beginning.

humiliating scheme, Isabella does not shy away from being his willing subordinate. In contrast to her unflinching refusal to surrender her virginity for her brother's life, Isabella is easily persuaded to connive with the Duke in framing Angelo. Nor does she question the Duke when he lays out his trick: "It is a rupture that you may easily heal:/ and the cure of it not only saves your / brother, but keeps you from dishonour/ in doing it" (3.1.235-7). Unlike Angelo's anticipation of her silence ("But that her tender shame/ Will not proclaim against her maiden loss,/ How might she tongue me!" 4.4.21-3), for example, she jeopardizes her reputation by making a public confession of being violated by Angelo.[16] Her self-incrimination in public, as well as Mariana's (5.1.169ff), enables the Duke to hand out a public punishment and then a pardon to Angelo.

When the Duke reclaims his authority from his deputy, he is able to lay claim to what his deputy so coveted--Isabella. Isabella is dragged out of the convent and tested before she can be reincorporated into the society of Vienna as the new duchess. After all, the play ends with "the Duke's display of his newly-fashioned wife--silent, chaste (but not too chaste), and obedient" (Knoppers 471). Taming Isabella is inseparable from the project of regulating sexuality in Vienna.[17] In the Duke's secret

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[16] Laura Knoppers suggest, "the play's overt and explicit concern with the shaming of men for political offences is dependent upon a buried process of shaming of the women in the play. Under the guise of comic correction and transformation, Isabella undergoes a punitive process of juridical shaming and ends as silent spectacle, disturbingly like the whores who do not appear" (460).

[17] Of course, the play represents the societal impetus to reposition the women as the objects of male desire within the patriarchal social order. As Katharine McLuskie points out: "the women characters [in *Measure for Measure*] define a spectrum of sexual relations from Mistress Overdone (Overdone by her last husband), the elderly bawd, through Juliet who is visibly pregnant, to Isabella whose denial of sexuality is contained in the visual definition of

project, thus, Isabella is turned into "sexual common ground, a vehicle for men's knowledge of one another, by articulating a subjectivity formed by the doubling sense of male authority" (Hanson 72). When the Duke's art of government culminates with the euphoric celebration of marriage based upon hetero-normative sexuality, as Hanson points out, "what is produced are not simply sexualized subjects but a particular organization of state authority, one which positions men and women differently, and genders them by writing its ways of knowing onto their bodies in quite precise ways" (65). As Steven Mullaney puts it, "his proposition [of marriage] situates Isabella all the more forcefully as an object of male desire" (110). Whether or not Isabella would be a "willing ear" for Vincentio's proposal (5.1.526-9), as Slights and Holmes indicate (286-9), is open to the imagination of the audience. But what is apparent is that the Duke's proposal leads to a subjugation of Isabella to a normative relationship of marriage. When the Duke reclaims the position of the sole lawgiver at the end, as Harry Berger suggests, Isabella's silence might be her only "escape from the debilitating moral effect of the leniencies and remissions that thinly conceal the coerciveness of the Duke's matchmaking and his monopoly of the instruments of Happy Ending" (364).[18]

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her nun's habit. Mariana's ambiguous position as 'neither maid, widow nor wife' affords her no autonomy but is seen as problematic" (95-6).

[18] For a convincing discussion of open silences in the play, see Philip McGuire's *Speechless Dialects*.

4. Disguise and Pastoral Power

Vincentio's success in disciplining and educating his subjects is anchored on his (dis-)guise as a meddling friar that enables him "not only to observe but to shape events as well" (Freeburg 7). Leonard Tennenhouse argues that the folkloric convention of royal disguise helps the play "demonstrate the power inherent in the patriarchal principle itself" through its invocation of "a regressive and magical-mythic notion of monarchy" (*Display* 159). To a certain degree, the Duke's disguise as a friar works as a theatrical device that has led many readers to associate him with divine benevolence or omniscience. [19] The popular theatrical convention of the disguised monarch provides Shakespeare with an avenue to show the problems of "government" from a different perspective. The sanitized position of priest-confessor allows the Duke to author and authorize a series of deceptive plans, while keeping a moral distance from the corruption and degradation in Vienna. While placing himself at a safe distance from the turmoil of Vienna, the Duke can establish his moral superiority and invisible power. As he admits in his soliloquy:

> So disguise shall by th'disguised
> Pay with falsehood false exacting
> And perform an old contracting (3.1.534-6).

The Duke's attempt to oversee the workings of his deputy behind the scenes is ironically anchored on the power of early modern monarch that relies on his/her visibility. If, as Jonathan Goldberg suggests, "Power-in-absence is the central stance of absolutism necessary to maintain prerogatives and the secrets of state" (*James I*

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[19] As F. R. Leavis points out, the Duke himself, "the more-than-Prospero of the play, ... initiates and controls the experimental demonstration--the controlled experiment--that forms the action" (159).

235), the Duke's disguise shows how the royal excess of visibility and thus of invisibility is aligned with the inverted positions of the discoverer and the discovered.

A sharp contrast between the world outside and the self within is established and negotiated, as the disguised Duke has not only a chance to hear confession but also to overhear the conversation between the brother and the sister.[20] The Duke-friar hears confessions from Juliet, Claudio, Mariana, mostly about secrets of sexual transactions, which by nature signifies the subtle transformation of sexuality into knowledge under Vincentio's regime. Vincentio pledges to teach Juliet "how you shall arraign your conscience/ And try your penitence" (2.3.21-2) and talks her into acknowledging her "most offenceful act" (2.3.26). His making her publicize what is inward to her confessor (however catechistic it may be) is an obverse of the public trials before the crowd, first by Angelo and later by the Duke. In the same vein, Vincentio leads Claudio to arrive at the resolution that he "most willingly humbles himself to the determination of death" (3.1.499-500). For example, after his secrets are exposed, Angelo pleads guilty and then asks for the death sentence: "Immediate sentence, then, and sequent death/ Is all the grace I beg.... I crave death more willingly than mercy" (5.1.374-5; 479). With the repeated threats of death and reprieve, the Duke builds up his superiority at the expense of his subjects' fear and

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[20] As Karen Newman suggest, "Angelo's disguise is a disguise of the mind" (21). Brian Gibbons points out that "Shakespeare seems to have been the first Elizabethan dramatists to use the disguise-ruler story as a frame plot, for in Henry IV plays he shows the future Henry V, Prince Hal, consciously choosing to re-enact the role of the disguised ruler, choosing to adopt the disguise of a prodigal and so observe the people and the officers of the law... as a prelude to thorough reform" (15). Compare this play with Marston's *The Malcontent* and Middleton's *The Phoenix*.

anxiety.[21] The disguised confessor forces the sinner to explore him/herself by focusing on guilt and weakness whereby the act of confession falls back on the confessed.[22] His guise as a friar places him at the apex of power through the intelligence he gathers about what people think and do, which, in turn, gives him access to individual motives and intentions. With the power derived from the information he withholds, the Duke can control each of his subjects whose knowledge of the situation is insufficient. The Duke-friar attempts to reform the inner lives of the sinners through the manipulation of anxiety.[23] Lloyd Davis points out that "by having its revelation withheld and timed, disguise can help translate identity into power. Even indirectly participating or assisting in such unmasking may realize cultural capital" (9). The Duke's secret knowledge of the others makes possible his machinations, offering a contradictory picture of the actual legal and political workings of Vienna--some of which are clear violation of his own laws. In this manner, the play envisions an ethical tie binding the governor to the subjects in terms of their lives as well as their behaviors.

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[21] Greenblatt observes that "Renaissance England had a subtle conception of the relation between anxiety and the fashioning of the individual subject, and its governing institutions developed discursive and behavioral strategies to implement this conception by arousing anxiety and then transforming it through pardon into gratitude, obedience, and love" (*Negotiations* 138).

[22] Jeremy Tambling argues, "Those addressed by a confessional discourse are 'interpellated' (hailed, singled out by name), and are subjected, i.e. made to define themselves in a discourse given to them, and in which they must name and misname themselves; and secondly, made to think of themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible for their acts" (2).

[23] For a thorough discussion of techniques of arousing and manipulating anxiety in *Measure for Measure*, see Stephen Greenblatt's *Shakespearean Negotiations*, 129-42.

As shown by his voyeuristic overhearing of the sibling dispute, the Duke is ready to exploit his privileged position. This attitude explains his sadistic trifling with Isabella's despair by withholding till the last moment the news that Claudio is alive ("I will keep her ignorant of her good/ To make her heavenly comforts of despair/ When it is least expected" 4.3.106-8). The Duke likes to play upon the psyche of the guilty, employing confession as a way of unveiling the depths of the soul and scrutinizing the lives of people in terms of external acts and internal desires. The confessional intervention by the Duke does not intend to "force" what the ruler wants the sinner to do, but rather to make him internalize the moral and ethical codes. The Duke's monitory eyes and ears, in fact, become involved in creating the very distinction between inwardness and outward appearance, and thus the depth and surface of the self through which the discourse of subjectivity operates. What the Duke-friar does is to make his subjects recognize and acknowledge the iniquity of their lives, for the acceptance of one's guiltiness becomes an essential item in the condemnation and the recuperation of the guilty.

His furtive actions as an eavesdropper and voyeur, as well as his confessional counseling, can be explained by an idea of government based on pastoral power. His love of withdrawal is perfectly compatible with his eagerness to spy on the affairs of his subjects. In his visit as a disguised friar to "the afflicted spirits" (2.3.4), Vincentio literally fuses religion with his political strategies and blends a spiritual vocabulary with worldly attributes. With this fusion, he easily mobilizes his subjects as part of his intrigue (Isabella, Mariana, and Provost). Assuming his role as a shepherd, the Duke lays out a pastoral dream for the wayward members of his flock: "Look,

th'unfolding star calls up the shepherd" (4.2.199-200). As the shepherd of men, he will gather together the dispersed sheep and restore order among them. As the spiritual leader, the disguised Duke invokes inwardness for inquisitional probing and leads them to the discovery of personal virtues. Employing the disguise as a "contrivance to mediate between the character's secret, subjective worlds and the external domain of publicly administered law" (Maus 178), the Duke can place under his governance the well-being of each and every individual in the realm. It is ironic, then, when Isabella says, "Thoughts are no subjects" (5.1.454-6), while trying to defend Angelo for the sake of Mariana. After all, what the Duke wants in his quest to take care of individual souls is not just the body but also the mind or thoughts. In his pastoral disguise, the Duke dreams of (con-)fusing the juridical form of power with the disciplinary one.

5. Substitution: Bed-trick and Head-trick

Measure for Measure abounds with the images of coining, stamping and copying, along with the fact that the deputy is a substitute for the Duke and the Duke himself is now a counterfeit friar. The disguised Duke is interested in finding out if Angelo will prove to be what he looks like ("Hence shall we see… what our seemers be'" 1.3.54). Once he discovers Angelo's duplicity, Vincentio laments, "O what may man within him hide,/ Though angel on the outward side!" (3.1.525-6). The Duke has "stamped" himself on Angelo who becomes nothing but a replica or re-presentation of the Duke. When chosen by the Duke to govern in his place, Angelo pleads, "Let there be some more test made of my mettle,/ Before so noble and so

great a figure/ Be stamped upon it" (1.1.49-51). In another occasion, Angelo himself

associates Claudio's bastardizing with making counterfeit coins ("their saucy

sweetness that do coin heaven's image/ In stamps that are forbid" 2.4.45-6). As

Marc Shell suggests, "Angelo's comparison between minting and begetting, or

counterfeiting and bastardizing, is crucial to the political economy of Vienna, where

both monetary and sexual commerce involve the 'figure' of political authority" (98).

This theme of the play--counterfeiting, substituting, deputizing, and

exchanging--culminates in the twin substitutions of one head for another, and one

body for another. The switching of heads, exemplified by Pompey the bawd in his

witty conversation with Provost on "head" and "woman's head" (4.2.1-4), dominates

the second half of the play. As Jonathan Goldberg sums up effectively, "Hence the

whorehouse becomes a prison, a bawd an executioner, men's heads pay for

maidenheads" (*James I* 234). Vincentio's scheme to reform Angelo rests on the

exchanges of two different kinds of heads: that of maidenheads (Mariana's with

Isabella's) and of literal heads (Claudio's with Ragozine's). Indicative of "a critical

commensurability of head and maidenhead" (Shell 97), his plot testifies to the play's

profound interest in substitutions and vicarious feelings.[24] The bed and head tricks

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[24] For example, in an attempt to sway Angelo's sentence, Isabella asks Angelo to put himself in Claudio's position (2.2.64-6). Escalus, while contesting Angelo's resolution, argues in the same vein that Angelo should contemplate "whether you[he] had not sometime in your[his] life/ Erred in this point which now you[he] censure him[Claudio]" (2.1.13-4). Though such an experience will be happening only in the imaginary level, the bed-trick and head-trick involve a series of corporeal exchanges. An emphasis on the vicarious experience has also much to do with the theatrical experience of the audience. The audience is continually invited by the play to put themselves in the shoes of the characters and in the given situations. For detailed discussions on the pervasiveness of substitution in the play, see Alexander Leggatt's "Substitution in Measure for Measure" as well as James Black's "The Unfolding of 'Measure for Measure.'"

become an ultimate fantasy where the Duke may exercise total command over his subjects--bodies and souls. As Katherine Maus suggests, "The bed trick drives a wedge between corporal performance and the intention that the law generally assumes attaches to performance, complicating, for the male protagonist, the relationship between the inner domain of intention and subjective awareness and the 'external' behavior for the body" (168-9).

The dramatic convention of bed-trick, however effective it may be as theater, is here morally dubious in that it works for the Duke's political end by sanctioning implicitly the social perception of women as men's property.[25] While justifying his employment of "craft against vice" (3.1.531), the Duke talks Mariana and Isabella into his plan to substitute the former for the latter upon Angelo's solicitation. In his effort to talk Isabella into his plan, the Duke, of course, enumerates all the ritual steps of betrothal between Angelo and Mariana (3.1.198ff). When he elicits Mariana's consent to go with his plan, he labors the point:

> He[Angelo] is your husband on a pre-contract:
> To bring you thus together 'tis no sin,
> Sith that the justice of your title to him
> Doth flourish the deceit. (4.1.70-73)

He is eager to justify her sexual encounter with Angelo even though he already condemned a similar case of Juliet's so-called prenuptial intercourse with Claudio. As Karen Bamford suggests, "the bed trick simultaneously satisfies the requirements for lawful intercourse and transforms the victim into the loving wife necessary for the villain's redemption" (125). The Duke's acts of substitution "are designed to protect

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[25] For detailed studies on the significance of the bed-trick in Renaissance drama, see Marliss C. Desens and Julia Briggs.

the institution of marriage" (Tennenhouse "Representing" 147). The bed-trick of Isabella-Mariana, in league with the head-trick of Claudio-Ragozine, is deployed by the Duke to restore the legal, political, and social order. Isabella and others are choreographed into this show of concealment and revelation without their recognizing the overall scheme. The success of the Duke's plan is, most of all, contingent on the willingness of the subjects to accept him and his plans without a doubt.

When the seemingly airtight tricks of the Duke experience a few setbacks, the limit of his pastoral power becomes manifest. Angelo's decision to kill Claudio anyway not only endangers the dissimulating scheme but also renders the concept of king as the *character mixtus,* both sacred and human in a single entity, problematic. As a matter of fact, the Duke commits blunders in both roles, in his failure as the monarch to keep order in Vienna and as a disguised friar assessing Angelo and Barnardine. If the Duke has misjudged Angelo at the beginning, here he does it again. In a parallel with the bed-trick of Isabella-Mariana, the Duke must improvise now by replacing Claudio's head with Barnardine's. But the critical blow comes with Barnardine's refusal to die. His defiance of the authority, both legal and religious, puts the Duke-friar off guard. In stark contrast with Claudio for whom he is a replacement, Barnardine rejects the offer to hear his confession before execution, thus defying the Duke-as-Friar's power as a shepherd. Barnardine is "a man that apprehends death no more dreadfully but as a drunken sleep, careless, reckless, and fearless of what's past, present, or to come: insensible of mortality and desperately

mortal" (4.2.142-5).[26] The unregenerate Barnardine, "unfit to live or die" (4.3.61), defeats Vincentio's script by asserting his will to live (however sordid his life may be) when he refuses to accept the scheduled execution ("I swear I will not die today for any man's persuasion" 4.3.56). Filled with an animalistic desire for existence, the lost sheep does not see himself as such. The exercise of the Duke's power over life and death becomes meaningless unless Barnardine learns how to live well.

In these twisted tricks, Shakespeare's play allows the audience to glimpse the vulnerability of pastoral power when the subject has no inner vision or is content to remain at the bestial stage. By creating an impasse for the Duke, Barnardine reminds us of the gap between the Duke's ambition and reality, although the sudden, fortuitous death of Ragozine rescues the Duke from this unsettling stalemate. Without much legal ground, therefore, the Duke has to pardon Barnardine ("for those earthly faults, I quit them all" 5.1.486), whose guilt of multiple murders is already "most manifest, and not denied by himself" (4.2.139). This lackluster pardon is a reminder of how the practice of the Duke's power operates and where it can go awry. Only when his subjects--Claudio, Angelo, and Barnardine--are ready to give up their lives can the Duke solely exercise the power of life and death.[27] His *incognito* interventions thus confirm the gap between the penal power of secular

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[26] As Bradshaw notes, "Everything we learn about Barnardine's case in Act 4 casts doubts on the Duke's judicial competence and motives" (171). According to the Provost, the Barnardine case has been forgotten and it is in fact Angelo who works through "the backlogs of ducal messes" with his preciseness.

[27] Therefore, it is not surprising that, as Bradshaw notes, "the play bristles with stark antithesis involving birth and death, and the engendering or taking of life" (216). Juliet's pregnancy could be seen as an emblem of this theme.

authority and the ethico-religious commands he wants to exercise with his religious garb.

6. Contending Theaters: A Slandering "Fantastic" and a Fantastic Duke

What is most subversive to the Duke's pastoral power, however, is neither Angelo nor the criminals such as Pompey or Barnardine, but rather Lucio who loves to mimic the royal monopoly on language and theatricality. Lucio is all too ready to invert official discourse and challenge the royal theater. Lucio's distorted statements, similar to those of Thersites in *Troilus and Cressida*, are subversive of the sovereign power, even though they might be quite acute and accurate.[28] Vincentio finds himself at a loss with Lucio's pungent statement: "It was a mad fantastical trick of him [Duke] to steal from the state and usurp the beggary he was never born to" (3.1.355-6). There is so much in common between Lucio, "a fantastic," and "the old fantastical Duke of dark corners" (4.3.154-5), when Lucio duplicates, with his rhetorical skill, the art that the Duke himself practices. Like a small crack in a dike, the scandal-monger creates a flood of discord, which directly affects the Duke's anxiety over the representation of himself in the eyes of the commoners. In Lucio, Vincentio sees one of his own kind--someone who loves to appropriate the power of theatricality and the theatricality of power.[29] Keen on his rhetorical and theatrical talent, he mocks the Duke, exchanges sour repartee with the two gentlemen, teases

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[28] There is no doubt that Lucio is theatrically successful in producing very climactic and hilarious effects in theatrical performance.

[29] Interestingly, Duke wearing the friar's robe makes a similar accusation of himself as an unjust ruler in 5.1.296-9.

the arrested Pompey with his witticisms, and generates trenchant badinage about Mistress Overdone. Lucio's theatrical versatility shines, for example, when he goads Isabella to appeal for her brother to Angelo.

With his calumnious remarks about Vincentio ("A very superficial, ignorant, unweighing fellow" 3.1.400), Lucio invokes the perverse image of the Duke's dark private life. The Duke, in Lucio's presentation of him, is a womanizer, an intriguer, and a prodigal: "he would mouth with a beggar though she smelt brown bread and garlic" (3.1.440-1).[30] As Harry Berger observes, "Lucio misdirects his comments from the Duke as cause of lechery to the Duke as lecher.... The displacement represents in the Duke the effects of his lax policy" (375-6). His defamatory statements, however vehemently Vincentio contests them, point indirectly to the Duke's problems as the governor of Vienna. Lucio's remark that the Duke "yet would have dark deeds darkly answered, he would never bring them to light" (3.1.434-5) uncannily strikes at the heart of Vincentio's activities. Despite self-justifying and self-exculpatory gestures, the truth is that the Duke himself is a rumor-mill and a dark manipulator (1.3.15; 4.2.193ff). While talking to Friar Thomas just after handing over his power to Angelo, the Duke falsely maintains that it is his "nature never in the fight/ To do in slander" (1.3.43-4).[31] But the Duke feels no compunction in spreading false stories about his whereabouts at the beginning or make slandering remarks about the dukedom in the final scene. In the final scene,

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[30] This accusation is probably based on the leniency the Duke has shown toward sexual behaviors during the past years. And compare these triads to the Duke's description of himself as "a scholar, a statesman, and a soldier."

[31] Brian Gibbons glosses this phrase as "while I myself am not directly the instrument of disgrace" (95).

the disguised Duke himself makes bitter comments on his government, presenting

himself as "a looker-on" in Vienna "where [he has] seen corruption boil and bubble/

Till it o'errun the stew" (5.1.318-21). Though it appears that the Duke's primary

intention might be to test the loyalty of his subjects, we cannot be blind to its obvious

irony in this self-critical moment. Such actions surely call into question his

punishment of Lucio for "slandering a prince" (5.1.527).

The Duke's reaction to Lucio's slanders on his personality, however, is more

than a trivial concern of whether "a fellow of much license" (3.1.461) tells the truth

or not. The Duke is more concerned with the fact that even the most powerful are

subject to public mockery, which is an inherent danger of depending on the power of

theatricality.[32] Lucio's rhetorical and theatrical buzzing clearly frustrates the Duke's

attempt to control his subjects. On hearing Lucio's slandering remarks, for example,

the Duke laments:

> No might nor greatness in mortality
> Can censure scape; back-wounding calumny
> The whitest virtue strikes. What king so strong
> Can tie the gall up in the slanderous tongue? (3.1.442-5).

Simon Shepherd points out that the early modern English establishment took

"murmurings" as "a practical political threat" and thus "the ideological devaluing of

such 'murmurings' is clearly part of the state's efforts to maintain its secrecy" (31). As

a purveyor of public murmurings, Lucio loves to intertwine truth and deception, not

much different from what the Duke does. Lucio claims that he knows "the very

nerves of state" (1.4.53) and has an intimate knowledge about the Duke ("I was an

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[32] Like the Duke, Lucio himself is also a theatrical director on his own: for example, when he tries to coach Isabella how to persuade Angelo in Act 2 Scene 2.

inward of his" 3.1.392).[33] Even when the Duke stages his dramatic return and the restoration of order in the trial scene, Lucio continues to meddle with the ducal theater of power. Thus I agree with M. Lindsay Kaplan that "The Duke condemns Lucio not so much for impugning his authority, but for competing with it. Lucio poses a threat to the state precisely because he usurps the Duke's ability to deploy slanders" (93). By the presence of Lucio the Duke is constantly reminded that "the cast of guises and personae is not ultimately determinable from a single sovereign script" (Davis 102).

The final scene provides the Duke with a platform to stage his desire to preserve his reputation and avoid slander by putting Lucio and his tongue under control with an imposition of silence.[34] By taking advantage of the theatrics of the public trial, the Duke plays the role of judge and administrator at the same time. As Steven Mullaney points out, "The power of the stage was precisely the power of fiction, the power to induce an audience or an Angelo to view themselves as actors in their own lives, as artificial and artfully manipulated constructions, as indeed they were, whether they existed onstage or off, whether they were constituted by a playwright or by larger cultural forces of determination" (113). His theatrical machinations, as in the case of the head tricks, signify more than just a safe restoration of ducal power in Vienna. With the aid of rhetorical and theatrical arts, the Duke is able to mediate between his political maneuvering and the art of

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[33] Lucio is in no position to know Vincentio's dark scheme. By duplicating the Duke's rhetorical and theater, Lucio proves himself "a spokesman for the play's political order" though maybe not for the Duke's (Hanson 65).

[34] For the significance of slander in the play, see Kaplan 92-108 and Knoppers 460-71.

government. Shakespeare's play establishes a clear similarity and analogy between the prince's art and the art of theater, registering early modern governmentality in the form of collective entertainment. But such a hegemonic theater of the monarch is anything but unilateral.

7. Discipline and Punish

The formal, ceremonial closure of the play at once glorifies and problematizes the pastoral fantasy of the Duke that can only come into existence with constant oversight and supervision. Insofar as the Duke here tries to imagine "a public reconciliation of law and morality," the ending qualifies his "redemptive wish-fulfillment of the status quo" (Dollimore 83-4). In his spectacular return to the city, in a contrasting way to his stealthy exit in the beginning, the Duke tries to foreclose the slippage of authority--not only in the precise Angelo's stumbling but also in the Duke's own fourteen years of laxity--by configuring the sovereign power both as mediation and as medium between violence and justice. Despite his initial claim that "I love people,/ But do not like to stage me to their eyes" (1.1.68-9), he devises a plan for a pompous royal entry, which confirms the power of theater and the theater of power. The ritual of royal entry as a political and judicial platform paves way for the mercy and compassion that the Duke doles out to the accused. He is ready to peel off the layers of Angelo's secrets and deceptions before he metes out the rewards and punishments (guilt and suffering) in a way that signifies his dominance. As Stephen Cohen points out, "the function of Angelo's trial is not to punish him for his legal misdeeds but to use the discovery of his malfeasance to demonstrate and justify

the authority of the true ruler" (449). By granting pardons and sentences, the Duke proves that his monarchial authority can rewrite the existing law and that the power of sovereign is above the penal power of the law. The Duke is able to legitimate that power--the sovereign power as the container of the law's virtues--only by making himself the exception to the rules he is supposed to uphold. In his parajudicial decisions about punishment and pardons, the Duke becomes a true governor of the realm, an executor of justice and mercy. The seemingly excessive festivity at the finale with the flurry of pardons allows the Duke to present himself as an object of respect, admiration, and awe. The Duke's experiment thus proves, as Meredith Skura points out, that "the problem is not with the abuse of justice but with contradictions in the nature of unabused justice and law" (49). If the law is not the best way of "governing" the subjects, as the Duke's final resolution reveals, there is a need to find ways to make individuals internalize normative values and ethics. His final resolution attends not only to past conduct but also to the future well-being of the realm. He is able to impose the normative definition of happiness on his subjects (including himself) through the institution of marriage.

If the Duke employs "his disguise in a symbolic effort to disown culpability and separate himself from Vienna's corruption" (Berger 382), it is essential in the unmasking scene to dramatize "the disguised monarch's recognition that only his own unique wisdom and authority can restore and maintain his kingdom" (Cohen 449). If the Duke's histrionic distribution of justice and mercy vindicates his voyeuristic practice and surveillance under the guise of priesthood, his triumphant power comes only with his grasp of information and knowledge not only of what

happens, but also of the inner mind of those involved. His secretive project generates not only the mystical aura in the dramatic experience of death and life, but also the power relations relying on the dynamics of concealment and revelation. The dizzy circularity of secrecy and discovery thus crystallizes the desire to get hold of knowledge about individuals, as well as the demand for inwardness or the sense of a self reflecting upon itself. The Duke enjoys the play of secrecy--concealment and revelation--as a way of binding his subjects with the system.

The calculated theatricality of the Duke's spectacular return is doubled by the game of secrecy that comes to a climax with Lucio's histrionic revelation of his true identity. The Duke's confirmation of power relations is, to borrow Michael Taussig's words, "achieved through 'a drama of revelation' which, like unmasking, amounts to a transgressive uncovering [of] a 'secretly familiar.'" (51). The Duke recovers or regains his royal power first through unmasking Angelo in public and then himself. The public unmasking enables the Duke to reassert his authority by transforming the on-stage audience "from welcoming spectators into chastened criminals" (Kaplan 106). The public spectacle in the final scene thus plays on the dialectic of concealment and revelation, or the process of actualizing public secrets. The Duke's power is in deciding when to hide and reveal the secrets. In other words, his true magic lies not in his mask or disguise but in the act of unmasking himself and revealing his disguised identity in public. Hence comes the need for Lucio's dramatic unmasking of the Duke designed by the Duke himself. And this spectacular unmasking is not just for a recovery of his former status, but for a creation of new mystical power relations that can only emerge from the game of secrecy--the fusion

of the ideal and the real. The same is true of the Duke's rationale for withholding from Isabella the information that Claudio is still alive.

If the play is seen as a process of the Duke's becoming a consummate governor, we must also acknowledge among his subjects certain reluctance to go along with the theatrical resolutions. In a sense, Lucio's "act of revelation and unmasking suggests the contained subversion that deconstructs what the Duke constructs" (Goldberg *James I* 239). The possibility of resistance to such governmentality, if any, is certainly something Shakespeare leaves open at the end when he stops immediately after the Duke's proposal to Isabella. Even if the restoration of order through marriages is theatrically effective and vivacious, it is doubtful if the resolution can work well as a political resolution of social problems. The euphoric epithalamiums may not be a terminus of the problems, but rather a beginning of new ones in Vienna. The uncomfortableness many critics have felt about the ending might be a sign that the playwright, in fact, does not endorse either Angelo's strict application of law or Vincentio's exercise of power. Some of the audience may leave the theater disturbed by the arbitrary resolution and sentences. For some, Isabella's silence is acquiescence; for others, defiance.[35] The often-ironic portrayal of the Duke rather points to the playwright's declining to participate in the

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[35] Should we accept a pliant Isabella who would receive the Duke's hand? Couldn't we think the possibility that Isabella might reject the coercive proposal of Vincentio and wants to go back to her convent? Should we see her silence only as "yes"? Haven't we already seen how eloquently Sir Thomas More made use of his silence as a way of resistance? Leah Marcus for example argues, "Isabella could easily have held back, given evidence that she was being conquered against her wishes, before finally yielding to the duke. The effect would be to cast a shadow, however brief, upon his triumph" (183). Certainly we cannot but notice her gradual transformation throughout the play, from a purist novice to a subordinated lady. And marriage serves surely as an institutionalized means of female subordination.

sovereign mystery that many of disguised monarch plays tended to join.[36] What Shakespeare puts to the test is, after all, the government of Vincentio whose success is dependent upon the willingness of his subjects to govern themselves. If, as many critics have argued, this play was intended as homage to James I, I would argue that it offers not a simple deference to the new king but a speculative and complicated meditation of governmentality. If the Duke's initial project begs the question of why, in the past, he has not tried to activate the existing law, then we now have yet to hear of any imminent plan to revise the austere law that almost killed Claudio.

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[36] Shakespearean skepticism certainly makes the play different from other disguised monarch plays. In those plays," Tennenhouse points out, we are typically offered the notion that "only the true monarch is the best form of political power [and] only with his authority does the law cease to be arbitrary and punitive, for he alone acts out of a selfless desire for the good of the state" ("Representing" 143). As Philip McGuire notes, the final scene features not only four men--Angelo, Claudio, Barnardine, Lucio--who have received the sentence of death one time or another, but also six people--Angelo, Barnardine, Claudio, Juliet, Isabella, and Mariana--who fall into open silence (63-4). The garrulous Lucio is, thus, in stark contrast to those silent ones. Then the happy resolution does not look so happy after all.

CHAPTER 7
EPILOGUE: KNOWLEDGE AS POWER IN SIR FRANCIS BACON'S
NEW ATLANTIS

> "For if a man have that penetration of
> judgment as he can discern what things are
> to be laid open, and what to be secreted,
> and what to be shewed at half lights, and
> to whom and when, ... to him a habit of
> dissimulation is a hindrance and a
> poorness. But if a man cannot obtain to
> that judgment, then it is left to him
> generally to be close, and a dissembler."
> (Bacon, "Of Simulation and Dissimulation")

I have investigated the early modern process of subjectification represented in

literary works, mainly drama, by employing, as the major perspective, the art of

government that, in turn, is dependent on theatricality and surveillance. The main

focus has been on how those literary representations engaged in the discursive

formation of this art through a dynamic conflation of political, social, and religious

issues. In explaining the process of subjectification both as subjection and

individuation, I have employed Foucault's notion of power that defines the subject as

at once free and restrained, and as *subjected* to the legitimate authority of a sovereign

power. In so doing, I have offered the early modern art of government as a specific

type of political rationality and a specific form of rational knowledge. What emerged

in early modern subjectification, therefore, were the ontological and epistemological

necessity for privacy, secrecy, and surveillance, all of which, I argue, were

inseparable from theatricality in the practice of government. The art of government served to naturalize a performative identity as both the norm and the origin of the subject. In this sense, the art of properly governing one's self, household, and the state at once gestures toward and yet is different from the modern conception of the human subject with privileged interiority. This early modern art of government served to prescribe the code of acceptable behaviors and its conditions, while surveillance and theatricality rendered problematic the traditional dyads of flesh/soul and natural/political bodies, thereby transforming them into the binaries of body/mind and private/public.

I began with a discussion of Sir Thomas More and his utopian vision; now instead of recapitulating what have already been discussed, I would like to conclude this dissertation with a brief discussion of Sir Francis Bacon and his *New Atlantis*, for that work underscores the issues and themes raised throughout this study. Bacon's utopian narrative was written after he had fallen out of the king's favor, and published posthumously in 1626.[1] More than 100 years after More's fable of an ideal community, Bacon's story of Bensalem invokes the precedent text constantly as the reference point. But as many critics have noted, his account of ideal society is quite distinct from More's in its lack of any direct allusions to contemporary political issues. As Ian Box explains, "it is more likely that the apolitical character of the fable was

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[1] According to Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart, "Legally constrained to the country and physically weak, Francis Bacon's contribution to Britain's political life was now no more than a joke. It is not surprising that he spent these months working on the *New Atlantis*, a work which presented an idealized picture of the intellectual's relationship with the state. Its utopian fantasy cast into stark relief the impotent isolation of its author" (500). See also Zagorin, 123-4. The circumstance of its composition makes an interesting comparison with the context in which More wrote *Utopia*.

the result of his unwillingness to offer opinions on potentially sensitive matters of legislation and public policy" (127). Where other critics see Bacon as apolitical, however, I rather locate his crucial engagement in the construction of new political ideas about government. If we read the text in relation to the social and political backdrop, but without succumbing to topical interpretations, we will have a better grasp of Bacon's utopian fiction and its political significance. Thus I suggest that *New Atlantis* at once engages and challenges the early modern art of government, by hinging on the metaphors of secrecy, discovery, and revelation.[2] In this utopian narrative, Bacon tries to revise More's model of ideal society, offering an "influential program for an impersonal, technocratic, and surveilling state" (Archer 151). In *New Atlantis*, Bacon does not try to imagine a space where the private becomes the public, as Thomas More did in *Utopia*; instead, Bacon's narrative presupposes a permanent chasm between them, and thus tries to fill it with a perfect grasp of information and knowledge by the institutionalized government.[3]

When the Spanish explorers discover the unknown island, Bacon's technological utopia comes to life, not as a recovery of the Old Atlantis, but as a discovery of a New Atlantis.[4] Unlike More's *Utopia*, *New Atlantis* configures navigational discovery as the gateway to the newfound island, a new way to get to the truth of nature and humanity. The discourse of discovery as "a dominant mode

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[2] For a persuasive study of secrecy in the *New Atlantis*, see Archer chapter 5.

[3] So I differ from Mariana Leslie's suggestion that "*New Atlantis* offers the idealized locus where the practice of natural simulation makes political dissimulation unnecessary" (105).

[4] As Denise Albanese suggests, "For More, the New World is not a site for further exploration, but an informing presence whose newness 'explains' the desire to create society anew, an impetus to formal and cultural innovation" (113).

of knowing" (Hanson 123) signals the emergence of new epistemology based upon scientific and technological arrangements. As shown by his maxim "Knowledge is power," Francis Bacon, of course, is known for his association of scientific discovery (knowledge) with power in the context of English nationalistic expansionism. As Denise Albanese points out, the Baconian text promotes colonialism both as "topos and trope," which certainly was "a defining move in the emergence of modern scientific practice from within late Renaissance culture " (Albanese 97-8).[5]

The Bensalemite government impinges on the institutionalization of power and the principle of self-discipline, as is manifest in the noticeable absence of penal codes. Elizabeth Hanson points out that "The sphere of scientific discovery, as Bacon represents it, will be self-regulating and self-limiting. In the work of discovery, subjection will be reformulated as self-discipline" (140). With the meticulous division of labor, the Fathers of the House of Salomon administer the kingdom and govern the people with great success. Salomon's House is the backbone of Bacon's reformed idea of government as an institutionalized practice of power, at once collaborative and individualized. So it is no wonder how much attention the Bensalemites give to the rearrangement of relationships among the state, the family, and the individual. As Susan Bruce points out, "[while] in *Utopia*, there is no clear distinction between the family and the state [,] … [i]n the *New Atlantis* the family exists in a subordinate relation to the state; and one of its principal functions is to provide the commodities from which the state's power emerges" (143).

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[5] Charles Whitney, for example, finds in the *New Atlantis* "a covert form of colonialism" (256). For a general discussion of the period in terms of reconnaissance, see J. H. Parry's book.

At the center of Bensalemite government is Salomon's House, "the noblest foundation (as [they] think) that ever was upon the earth" (471). Bacon's utopia is literally run by the Fathers of Salomon's House, whose oligarchic government displaces the monarchical hegemony. The reformed structure of governance is predicated not on the individual monarch but on the institution of Salomon's House. Bacon's *New Atlantis* "localizes those emergent structures in the Father and codes him as the de facto ruler of his land" (Albanese 109). In this context, Denise Albanese offers a useful comparison between *Measure for Measure* and *New Atlantis*:

> In *Measure for Measure* … the volitional absence of the ruler leads to an instructive disorder in the state, which can be resolved only by strategies of containment recasting Jacobean patriarchialism as legitimacy, the familial reproduction of right governance. In *The New Atlantis*, however, the fruit of paternity is the natural philosophy of the Salomonic Fathers, and its operations have more in common with the contemporary emerging logic of accumulation than with the maintenance of central political authority. (211 note 24)

As a kind of laboratory for human and natural affairs, the House of Salomon thereby epitomizes the institutionalized process of producing and disseminating knowledge. In this island, "the virgin of the world" (476), Salomon's House is at once "the lanthorn of this kingdom" (471) and "the very eye of this kingdom" (464). The House both enlightens and scrutinizes the residents, as well as the outsiders. What makes Bacon's *New Atlantis* unique lies in its failure to mention the current monarch: while naming all but two kings in the past, the text makes no mention of the present one.[6] The king Altabin, "a wise man and a great warrior" (468),

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[6] Albanese suggests two different readings of this apparent absence of monarchical center, either "as imaginative reconfiguration of the Jacobean monarchy, [or] as model for a

successfully defended the island from outside intruders, while Solamona was "the lawgiver of our nation" (469), with the House of Salomon named after the legendary sovereign. Solamona, who knew well how to "make his kingdom and people happy" (469), is presented as the mythical origin of utopian governance that is administrated by the oligarchic group of Fathers.

What surfaces as essential for the safety of "the Bensalemite regime" is, without the presence of monarch, to "perpetuate secrecy, even toward the fellows and Fathers of Salomon's House" (Weinberger 883). As the governor explains, the Fathers of Salomon's House call for every participant in research to take "an oath of secrecy, for the concealing of those [inventions and experiments] which [they] think fit to keep secret; though some of those [they] do reveal sometimes to the state, and some not" (487). The Bensalemites put emphasis on " laws of secrecy touching strangers" (466; 463) and are eager to glean "news and intelligence of other countries" (466). Every twelve years, the Bensalimites send two ships for reconnaissance to acquire "knowledge of the affairs and state of those countries to which they were designed, and especially of the sciences, arts, manufactures, and inventions of all the world" (471). In this fashion, Bacon's *New Atlantis* proposes an idea of government that necessitates surveillance founded on the dialectic of concealment and revelation. The bureaucratic administration of Bensalem sets in motion a narrative of secrecy, which enables utopian polity to maintain its superiority and security against strangers.

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subsequent coexistence between scientific investigation and the dismantling of Stuart absolutism" (111).

In his essay, "Of Simulation and Dissimulation," for example, Bacon sees the dialectics of secrecy as an intersubjective moment: "if a man be thought secret, it inviteth discovery" (350). He also suggests that "an habit of secrecy is both politic and moral" ("Simulation" 350) and that secrecy is "the virtue of a confessor" (350).[7] Secrecy is something you wear ("habit") and thus a guise that you can manipulate for others. His discourse of secrecy and discovery advocates a new form of power relations that mobilizes both the individuals and the state apparatuses to join the dynamic force of surveillance. He goes on to say that "in confession the revealing is not for worldly use, but for the ease of a man's heart, so secret men come to the knowledge of many things in that kind; while men rather discharge their minds than impart their minds" ("Simulation" 350). Anchoring the rational order of utopian society on secrecy and discovery, his ideal government derives the institutional impetus from "the tensions in those operative metaphors of secrecy and apocalypse, veiling and revelation, mystery and illumination to be essential features of Bacon's utopia project" (Leslie 83).

The obsession of the Bensalemites with secrecy, as Elizabeth Hanson discovers, "testifies to the instrumentality of the discoverer's relation to the world; it makes clear the dimension of power in knowledge relations that is elided in the account of discovery as the eye steadily fixed on the facts of nature" (129). With the discrediting of alchemy and astrology as major forms of knowledge, Bacon's writings

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[7] For a detailed discussion of this essay in relation to Castiglione's *sprezzatura*, see Posner, Chapter 3, especially 102-110. Elizabeth Hanson points out that "The dual role of Francis Bacon, as a champion of the discovery of the nature's secrets and as a persistent practitioner of torture, apparently the only English lawyer who actually asserted that torture was permissible in English juridical practice, is also suggestive" (26-7).

promote the techniques of voyaging and inquiry as new ways of accumulating knowledge.[8] What Bacon suggests in *New Atlantis* is that "the perfect government would be a natural byproduct of the self-perfecting arts of Natural History" (Leslie 97). In Bacon's utopian text that assesses "the genuine possibility of new knowledge allied with a new form of power" (Archer 139), the art of government thus rests upon a new formation of knowledge and power, stemming from observation, navigation, classification, experimentation, and analysis. As Dorothy Donnelly points out, Bacon's text develops an "association of the idea of order with the acquisition of knowledge" (93). In the age of reconnaissance and discovery, Bacon's utopia attests, the art of government is involved in institutionalized surveillance and colonial expansion, in line with navigational and cartographical developments.

Bacon's political vision is more apparent when *New Atlantis* is read alongside his *The History of Henry VII*, a work reminiscent of More's *Richard III*. Bacon's history of the first Tudor king presents him "as a spy monarch obsessed with details of the intelligence system upon which he bases his regime" (Archer 122).[9] Bacon's *Henry VII*, as John M. Archers argues, bears witness to his "attempt to render techniques of governing that he associated with the superceded Tudor dynasty applicable to a new age that he felt was even better suited to the Tudors' exemplary closeness and secrecy" (134). Bacon's chronicle on the first monarch of the Tudor can be read in relation to the government in Bensalem that operates efficiently upon the dialectic of surveillance and theatricality, the latter of which, for example, is

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[8] For a detailed discussion of this change, see Foucault's "Truth and Juridical forms" 32-52.

[9] Archer points out, "Henry the spy king, or at any rate the version of him that we find in *Henry VII*, is largely Bacon's invention" (134).

manifest in the triumphant procession of the governor. When "the governor of the city, one of the Fathers of Salomon's House" makes a spectacular entry to the city, the awed crowd is called upon by its lavishness to turn themselves into an army-like homogenous group: "There was never any army had their men stand in better battle-array, than the people stood. The windows likewise were not crowded, but every one stood in them as if they had been placed" (479). Even though "the cause of his coming is secret" (478-9), the crowd is there in orderly fashion to glorify the pageantry. The secret mission and activities of the Fathers are entirely compatible with, or even completed by, the theatrical procession of governor who positions himself as the object of public gaze and thus serves to interpellate the individual spectators. *New Atlantis* embodies the early modern art of government that deploys secrecy and theatricality as a cultural practice in and through which social power relations are produced and circulated.

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
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Mr. Tai-Won Kim started his doctoral study at the University of Florida in 1994, after teaching English at Korea Air Force Academy for three years. He received a master's degree in English literature from Seoul National University in 1990, and two years earlier a bachelor's degree in English language and literature from Chonnam National University in South Korea. At the University of Florida, he was a recipient of the Rotary Foundation Fellowship and the Robert H. Bowers Fellowship. Since 1998, he has taught several English courses including freshmen composition, literature, and drama at the university. His specialty is English Renaissance literature, classical and modern drama, and critical theories. In addition to his ongoing interest in the Renaissance, he plans to do research on literary representations of pain, solitude, and the change of ideas on man.

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
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
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
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August, 2001

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